
























My thesis includes three chapters in applied microeconomics. Chapter 1 provides evidence on 
the multigenerational impacts of educational expansion in Vietnam. The expansion raises 
schooling years and educational levels, literacy, non-agricultural economic activity, earnings 
as well as the intergenerational educational mobility while it improves marriage rates and 
fertility at an extensive margin, but reduces fertility at the intensive margin for the directly 
affected generation. It also improves human capital investments for the children of the directly 
affected generation and the general health of the parents of the directly affected generation.  
Chapter 2 examines the causal effect of cultural heritage on modern-day educational 
success focusing on Confucian culture in Vietnam. The results show robust positive effects of 
longer historical exposure to Confucian culture on schooling years and degree achievements 
for adults as well as school enrollment and standardised test scores for children. These effects 
are found to work through increases in a positive preference and towards schooling and a belief 
about the importance of obtaining high education as well as increased educational investments.  
Chapter 3 explores the effect of a welfare reform on mental health by estimating the effect 
of entering unemployment and claiming Universal Credit (UC) on mental health in the United 
Kingdom. The results show that the welfare reform under the UC system exaggerates mental 
health problems of unemployed individuals. The mediation analysis reveals that the indirect 
effects via changes in two mediators including a cut in income and a reduction in the number 
of benefits claimed contribute to about 15% of the total treatment effect. These findings suggest 
that the costs of a welfare reform are underestimated if the mental health costs are not taken 
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This thesis comprises three chapters in applied microeconomics. The first two chapters 
contribute to the economics of education by studying the causes and consequences of schooling 
using the data and context from a developing country, Vietnam. The third chapter contributes 
to the public and health economics literature by exploring the relationship between welfare 
reform and mental health using the policy context and data from a developed country, the 
United Kingdom. 
Policymakers around the world strongly believe that education can be a powerful tool for 
fighting against poverty and improving human well-being (World Bank, 2018). Governments 
and international organisations have spent enormous resources to improve educational 
attainment worldwide, especially in developing countries where there is still a relatively low 
schooling level compared to developed countries. An annual public expenditure of nearly one 
trillion USD has been invested by governments from developing countries on education, 
making considerable progress in improving educational attainment in many parts of the poor 
world over the last few decades (Glewwe and Muralidharan, 2016; World Bank, 2018). 
However, despite such an improvement, many poorest regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa still 
face a high rate of school dropouts even for the fundamental level of primary education. Only 
40 over 145 developing countries completed the goal of universal primary education in 2015 
when the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals was completed (World Bank, 2016). 
The recent statistics still indicate a very low level of school attendance, for example, only 59% 
of primary school completion in low-income countries (UNESCO, 2019) and about 260 million 
school-aged children were not at school in 2018 (World Bank, 2018).  
Many governments and international organisations believe that delivering educational 
policies and programmes that create considerable educational expansion in developing 
 
2 
countries is essential in the years to come. One important question asks whether it is worth 
implementing such policies and programmes. In other words, how large are the benefits of 
educational expansion? Comprehensive answers to these questions would provide insights into 
the rationale for implementing educational policies and programmes.  
The returns to schooling in general and the benefits of exposure to an educational 
expansion, in particular, has traditionally focused on the private benefits of those who are 
directly exposed to schooling. Economists traditionally focused on wage or earnings when 
looking at the relationship between education and economic outcomes using the canonical 
Mincer equation (Mincer, 1974). Although the Mincer approach was very abstract in capturing 
the reliable causal link between schooling and earnings, it has placed a very crucial cornerstone 
for studying the returns to schooling which has become an important topic in labour economics 
(Lemieux, 2006). Over the last two decades, the economics literature has witnessed the 
development of econometric methods combined with improved-quality data that help push 
forward our understanding of the causal effects of schooling (Card, 2001). Moreover, 
economists have expanded knowledge about the individual benefits of schooling by 
investigating the effects on different non-economic outcomes that go beyond labour markets 
outcomes such as family, health, political and criminal outcomes. The literature has shown that 
education creates huge benefits such as stable marriage, reduced fertility, reduced mortality, 
increased health, increased political participation, and reduced criminal activities. These 
findings provide a rationale for delivering schooling to all children to achieve the goals of 
poverty reduction and improved human wellbeing.  
However, it would be a fundamental mistake if the returns to schooling are only drawn 
on the individual benefits. This is because education might generate the intergenerational 
spillover effects on other generations such as the children’s generation (Currie and Moretti, 
2003; Suhonen and Karhunen, 2019) and the parents’ generation (De Neve and Fink, 2018; 
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Lundborg and Majlesi, 2018; Ma, 2019). Although the private benefits of schooling have been 
well-documented in economics, little is known about the intergenerational benefits, especially 
those running from children’s education to parental outcomes. Given a fact that the family is a 
key peer group within which the spillovers of education can eventuate (Kuziemko, 2014), 
studying the intergenerational benefits in addition to the individual benefits of schooling would 
provide more comprehensive insights into the returns to schooling. Chapter 1 aims to fulfil this 
research gap by providing evidence on the multigenerational impacts of educational expansion 
in Vietnam. To the best of my knowledge, Chapter 1 provides the first comprehensive 
evaluation of the causal effects of an educational policy on various outcomes of three 
generations: the directly affected generation, the children’s generation, and the parents’ 
generation. I particularly exploit the 1991 compulsory schooling reform that mandated children 
aged 14 and younger to complete primary school to create the treatment and control groups for 
the educational expansion. The reform led to heterogeneity in increases in primary school 
completion across regions in which the expansion would be stronger for the regions with a low 
pre-reform level of primary school completion than for those with already a high level of 
primary school completion before the reform came into effect. The nature of changes in primary 
educational attainment induced by the reform allows me to construct a set of treatment regions 
that had experienced large changes in primary school completion and a set of control regions 
with little or no changes in primary school completion. I then apply a difference-in-difference 
method for the estimation using a combination of large-scale Census and household survey 
data.  
The results in Chapter 1 show that exposure to the educational expansion improves the 
schooling outcomes such as the probability of completing primary and lower secondary school 
for the directly affected generation. It also improves economic outcomes such as literacy skills, 
non-agricultural economic activities, earnings, and family outcomes such as the probability of 
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being married, the schooling of marital partners, residential stability for the directly affected 
generation. Moreover, the educational expansion increases the likelihood of having a child but 
reduces the number of children for a woman who was directly exposed to the reform. 
Importantly, the educational expansion exposure helps promote intergenerational educational 
mobility for the directly affected generations. Chapter 1 further reveals that the benefits of 
exposure to the educational expansion in Vietnam can reach both the next and previous 
generations. School-aged children of the reform-exposed parents enjoy a higher probability of 
school enrolment and larger investments in school and learning activities than children of the 
parents who were not affected by the reform. I also find a considerable reduction in child labour 
which can be treated as a human capital investment in the context of developing countries for 
children of the reform-exposed parents compared to the counterpart children. The directly 
affected generation’s reform exposure further improves the health of their parents in old age 
such as reduced sick days and improved self-reported health. These effects mainly work 
through increased financial resources, increased access to better health insurance and decreased 
unhealthy behaviours for old age parents of the directly affected generation. By showing the 
positive effects of an educational policy on three generations, Chapter 1 shows that the returns 
to education might be considerably larger than what we have previously understood. The larger 
benefits an educational policy generates can be a more convincing rationale for implement 
educational policies and programmes worldwide, especially in developing countries as an effort 
to fight against poverty and to improve human welfare.  
Given the huge benefits of education, understanding its causes is of importance for 
initiating efficient related policies. Economists have long been interested in exploring factors 
deciding educational outcomes such as family background (Björklund and Salvanes, 2011; 
Black et al., 2005; Dizon-Ross, 2019), school quality and resources (Case and Deaton, 1999; 
PopEleches and Urquiola, 2013; Laliberté, 2021), policies and interventions (Meghir and 
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Palme, 2005; Angrist and Krueger, 1991), technology (Muralidharan et al., 2019), 
neighbourhood effects (Åslund et al., 2011), public welfare programmes (Aizer et al., 2016), 
and environmental factors (Ebenstein et al., 2016). While Chapter 1 focuses on the role of a 
compulsory schooling policy in promoting educational attainment among school-aged children 
in Vietnam, Chapter 2 moves to another potential factor in explaining disparities in schooling 
outcomes that is culture. While culture has been long discussed as a key determinant of 
schooling by researchers from other social science disciplines, it has been recently received an 
increasing interest among economists. However, disentangling the causal paths of the cultural 
effects can be challenging as numerous aspects including but not limited to genetics, family 
background and socio-economic characteristics, and natural conditions among other 
unobservable factors can also determine schooling outcomes (Becker et al., 2020). Chapter 2 
aims to answer the questions of whether and how a historical pro-schooling culture causally 
affects educational attainment and academic performance in present-day society. Answering 
these questions would help understand inequalities in schooling across socio-demographic 
groups or across regions both within and across countries. The questions would also provide 
policy implications in the sense that if culture matters for schooling, policymakers can deliver 
some interventions helping develop or foster positive beliefs or preferences towards schooling, 
especially for socio-economic groups or geographic regions with traditionally less focus on 
education.  
To study the cultural determinants of schooling in Chapter 2, I examine the causal effects 
of Confucian cultural heritage on educational outcomes in Vietnam. Confucianism is well 
known for valuing education. During the historical times, Confucianism inspired historical 
states to develop meritocratic institutions using academic performance on imperial civic 
examinations to recruit and allocate public servants. Educational achievement, therefore, 
played a very fundamental role in deciding whether a person, regardless of their initial status 
 
6 
such as social class or family background, would become a state bureaucrat and enjoy huge 
benefits from this career. The coevolution between Confucianism and exam-based meritocracy 
helped root Confucian values on schooling into local societies and importantly transmit these 
values across generations making them influentially alive in present-day societies.  
To identify the causality of the relationship between Confucian cultural heritage and 
modern-day educational success, Chapter 2 exploits a unique territorial expansion of pre-
modern Vietnam in which the spread of Confucianism and meritocratic institutions was 
staggered across locations over time. Historical Vietnam with Confucianism was initially 
located in Northern Vietnam today. The historical state of Vietnam known as Dai Viet gradually 
expanded its territory between the 11th and 19th century from the North to the South, exporting 
Confucian culture into newly conquered lands. This process induced differences in historical 
exposure to Confucian culture across locations from the North to the South of modern-day 
Vietnam. Moreover, to control for potential confounding factors, that is a region with a stronger 
influence of Confucianism also differs from other regions by climate and socioeconomic 
characteristics, Chapter 2 employs a spatial regression discontinuity design and focuses on a 
narrow geographic area around the second-to-last historical boundary, which was established 
in 1698. The 1698 boundary divided the surrounding area into two geographic parts: one part 
with 160 years of historical exposure to Confucianism and meritocracy and another part with 
only 25 years of exposure. I particularly compare a schooling outcome in regions with 160 
years of exposure to the outcome in regions with 25 years of exposure.  
The results in Chapter 2 show that longer exposure improves educational attainment and 
degree achievement for adults, and also improves post-compulsory enrolment and standardised 
test scores for children. For the main mechanisms, the results indicate that people exposed to 
Confucian culture have a higher preference for having better educational attainment and they 
are more likely to have a belief about the importance of access to higher education beyond 
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compulsory schooling. Chapter 2 further shows the positive causal effects of Confucian culture 
on investments in children’s school and learning activities. Moreover, I find that Confucian 
culture promotes intergenerational schooling mobility by reducing the dependence of child 
schooling on parental schooling. Chapter 2 would contribute to a limited but growing literature 
in economics studying the causal effects of culture on education. Previous studies mostly focus 
on cultural practices such as bequest and marriage norms but my research is more interested in 
the direct values and beliefs towards education. My findings also help understand cross-country 
differences in educational outcomes by focusing on a pro-schooling culture. Finally, my 
research relates to the literature of the long-run effects of historical institutions on economic 
development by showing the importance of the meritocratic character of historical institutions 
which has been ignored from the economics literature.  
Importantly, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 reveal the moderating roles of compulsory 
schooling laws and culture in reducing the dependence of inequality in schooling across 
generations. These findings contribute to the growing literature on the determinants of 
intergenerational mobility (Bütikofer and Salvanes, 2020; Bütikofer et al., 2018; Carneiro et 
al., 2021; Chetty and Hendren, 2018a, 2018b; Chetty et al. 2014; Chetty et al. 2017a; Chetty et 
al., 2017b; Chetty et al., 2020).  
While the two first chapters of my thesis focus on the causes and consequences of 
schooling in Vietnam, Chapter 3 investigates the effect of a welfare reform on mental health 
using data from the United Kingdom. Welfare reform comes up regularly on the agenda of 
many governments around the world as tax-benefit systems adjust to changing economic 
conditions. Understanding the costs and benefits of a welfare reform is crucial for policy makers 
who plan changes to existing social benefit systems. On the one hand, a welfare reform is 
expected to make the social benefits system more efficient in protecting vulnerable people from 
negative shocks, encouraging those from a low socio-economic background to join the labour 
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market, reducing poverty rates, and using public resources economically. On the other hand, 
there are the reform costs, including unintended consequeces of poor mental health and crime 
(d’Este and Harvey, 2020; Giulietti and McConnell, 2020; Tuttle, 2019; Watson et al., 2019). 
This has sparked a debate on whether the benefits of a welfare reform sufficiently outweigh the 
costs (Blank, 1997, 2002).  
Chapter 3 provides evidence on the mental health costs of implementation of a new 
welfare system - Universal Credit (UC) - in the UK. The aim of this chapter is not only to 
estimate the effect of entering unemployment and claiming UC on mental health but also to 
decompose the main treatment effect into the direct effect and the indirect effects working 
through various mediators. The UK Welfare Reform Act 2012 introduced UC, which has been 
recognised as the most radical social security reform over the last 60 years of British history, 
replacing the existing “legacy” system (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). This vital overhaul of the 
welfare system was implemented by simplyfing the applications of six legacy benefits 
(including Income Support, Income Based Jobseeker’s Allowance, Income-Related 
Employment Support Allowance, Housing Benefit, Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit) 
into only one application of UC. This simplification may reduce the adminstrative procedures 
and also time for claimants’ benefit application, but in contrast it may trigger financial 
difficulties for claimaints due to the loss of the application diversity, that is if a claimant were 
to fail in applying UC he would have no other sources of benefit income. There is also a 
considerable increase in the digitalisation level of the application procedure (for example, using 
apps in mobile phones, managing applications via a computer) under UC compared to the 
former legacy system. These changes in the application procedures likely have impacts on 
claimants’ mental health. Furthermore, there are changes in the payment, including the way 
from weekly or bimonthly to monthly leading to at least 5 weeks between approval and 
payment, and paying benefits for housing and council tax to the claimant rather than the tenant 
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or council. All these changes in the payment are likely to cause changes in income claimants 
can receive. Equally importantly, unemployed or low income claimants must meet work-related 
requirements that mandated to fulfill intensive job search of up to 30 hours per week among 
others. All changes in policy rules under the new UC system potentially affect the mental health 
of claimants.  
The results in Chapter 3 show that claiming UC has a negative impact on the mental 
health for unemployed individuals compared to claiming previous legacy benefits. Entering 
unemployment under the UC system has a worse mental health than under the legacy system 
by 26% of a standard deviation of the poor mental health score. The mediation analysis finds 
that the indirect effects via a reduction in income and the number of benefits claimed can 
explain up to 15% of the total treatment effect. These findings indicate a considerable mental 












Chapter 1  
The Multigenerational Impacts of Educational Expansion: 
Evidence from Vietnam 
 
This chapter is jointly co-authored with Thomas Cornelissen  
 
Abstract 
We exploit a compulsory schooling reform in Vietnam to investigate the multigenerational 
effects of public primary school expansion. In the directly affected generation, the expansion 
increases educational attainment, literacy, non-agricultural economic activity, earnings and the 
intergenerational educational mobility. It increases marriage rates and fertility at the extensive 
margin but reduces fertility at the intensive margin. The expansion increases human capital 
investments in the children of the directly affected generation, with increased educational 
expenditures, school enrolment, and health investments, and a reduction in child labour. Finally, 
the expansion improves the health in old age of the parents of the directly affected generation. 
They benefit from improved general health, but not mental health, as well as improved financial 
resources, access to private health insurance and reduced alcohol consumption. 
 
JEL codes: I15, I21, I25, I26, I28, J13, J14, J21, J22, J24, O12, N35 
Keywords: Primary school expansion; Compulsory schooling; Multigenerational 
impacts; Intergenerational spillovers; Human capital investments; Child labour; Old age 









Expansion and promotion of primary schooling have been shown to affect long-term individual 
economic and financial outcomes (Duflo, 2001; Ajayi and Ross, 2020), fertility decisions 
(Keats, 2018; Osili and Long, 2008), political engagement (Larreguy and Marshall, 2017), and 
pro-social behaviors (Chankrajang and Muttarak, 2017), amongst others.1 Yet, due to spillovers 
and external effects of education, the full social returns of such policies could be far higher than 
this literature suggests with impacts going far beyond the generally well-documented effects on 
the individuals directly affected by the policy change. In particular, given that the family is an 
important peer group within which spillovers of education policies are likely to materialize 
(Kuziemko, 2014), educational expansion is likely to have impacts on the children of the 
directly affected generation (downward intergenerational spillovers) and on their parents 
(upward intergenerational spillovers; De Neve and Kawachi, 2017). 
Downward intergenerational spillovers are suggested by a large body of literature 
documenting a strong dependence of educational attainment and success later in life on parental 
education and family background (Björklund and Salvanes, 2011; Black and Devereux, 2011; 
Carneiro et al., 2013; Currie and Moretti, 2003; Holmlund et al., 2011; Lundborg et al., 2014), 
although the precise degree of causality is a matter of debate and varies by context (Holmlund 
et al., 2011). Evidence is also starting to accumulate about the effects of parental education on 
children’s long-run health outcomes (Huebener 2018, 2019; Lundborg et al., 2014).  
Upward intergenerational spillovers have been less well documented. But several 
arguments suggest that children’s education may affect parental health and well-being in old 
 
1 A related strand of the literature analyzes the effect of policies to promote primary schooling on primary school 
enrolment and completion (Deininger, 2003; Lucas and Mbiti, 2012). There is also a large literature documenting 
the effects of compulsory schooling laws in developed countries (see Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Harmon and 
Walker, 1995; Devereux and Hart, 2010; Black et al., 2008; Oreopoulos et al., 2006), in which these compulsory 
schooling laws usually operate at the secondary school level rather than the primary school level as is often the 
case in developing countries. 
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age through several channels. First, well-educated children might invest greater resources to 
improve their parents’ living standards (Friedman and Mare, 2014; Lavy et al., 1996). Second, 
higher educated children may provide their parents with more knowledgeable advice or help to 
make better decisions about healthcare, nutrition, lifestyle choices, and access to social services 
(Berniell et al., 2013; Kuziemko, 2014; Lundborg and Majlesi, 2018). Third, well-educated 
offspring may positively influence their parents’ health behaviors, lifestyles and attitudes 
(Friedman and Mare, 2014; Torssander, 2013). Finally, parents of well-educated children may 
have less necessity to engage in work and may be able to retire earlier. These channels are 
particularly relevant in lower income countries where parents are more likely to co-reside and 
to share resources with their adult children (Cameron and Cobb-Clark, 2008; De Neve and Fink, 
2018), while social insurance systems are less developed (Bloom et al., 2011), prompting 
elderly people to work at an advanced age often under poor conditions (Cai et al., 2012; 
Cameron and Cobb-Clark, 2008). Evidence on such upward spillovers is still scant, and prior 
estimates of the relationship between children’s education and parents’ outcomes are mostly 
correlational rather than causal (De Neve and Harling, 2017; Friedman and Mare, 2014; 
Torssander, 2013). 
In this study, we investigate the multigenerational impacts of educational expansion in a 
developing country context. We analyze the effects of a compulsory primary schooling reform 
in Vietnam on individuals of the directly affected generation, investments in the human capital 
of their children, and health outcomes in old age of their parents. The reform, introduced in 
1991, mandated for the first time that Vietnamese children aged 14 or younger complete at least 
five years of primary education. The reform strongly increased primary school completion in 
regions with initially low levels of primary schooling (i.e., treatment regions), but had little 
impact in regions in which primary school completion was already high (i.e., control regions). 
The identification strategy consists of a difference-in-differences estimator based on a 
combination of large-scale data from Vietnam’s 2009 Population and Housing Census, several 
 
13 
waves of the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey and the 2011 Vietnam Aging 
Survey. 
We find that the reform has a strong positive effect of 10 percentage points on primary 
and secondary school completion of the directly affected cohorts. Through this effect, the 
reform increases the intergenerational educational mobility. Reform exposure also increases 
literacy, economic activity outside the agricultural sector, and earnings. It raises residential 
stability, the probability of being married, the level of education of the marital partner, and 
increases fertility at the extensive margin, while reducing it at the intensive margin. In terms of 
downward spillovers, we find effects on the directly affected cohorts’ investments in their 
children’s human capital. The results indicate that parental exposure to the reform raises 
children’s school enrolment at ages 6-17 by about 9 percentage points. Spending on tuition fees 
increases by 14-24% of a standard deviation and other education-related spending, such as on 
books and learning materials, by 14-20% of a standard deviation. Moreover, we find evidence 
for an increase in health investments, with higher per capita food consumption, less exposure 
to smoking in the household, and more expenditure on preventive health visits in the private 
health sector, resulting in fewer hospitalizations. We further find a reduction in child labour, 
suggesting that downward intergenerational spillover effects or primary school expansion may 
be particularly beneficial in developing countries. Heterogeneity analysis by gender reveals that 
the effects are concentrated more on sons than on daughters. In terms of upward spillovers, we 
find that the primary school expansion improves several measures of general health in old age 
of the parents of the directly affected generation, but no effect on mental health. In terms of 
potential channels, we document effects on improved financial resources in old age, access to 
private health insurance and reduced alcohol consumption. 
Our contributions are as follows. We provide first comprehensive causal evidence on the 
multigenerational impacts (including both downward and upward intergenerational spillovers) 
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of primary school expansion. Besides strong educational, financial and economic returns to the 
directly affected generation, we document important impacts on the next generation’s health 
and human capital and on the previous generation’s health. Through these spillovers, enacting 
and enforcing compulsory schooling laws has high social returns. These findings are 
particularly policy relevant in low-income countries where primary school enrolment is still far 
below universal (World Bank, 2016).2 
Our research contributes to a sparse literature on intergenerational spillover effects in 
human capital in developing countries (Assaad and Saleh, 2018; Grépin and Bharadwaj, 2015; 
Hahn et al., 2018; Keats, 2018).3 The studies most closely related to ours is the work by Akresh 
et al. (2018) and Mazumder et al. (2019), who investigate downward intergenerational 
spillovers from primary school construction in Indonesia on educational attainment and health 
of the second generation. We are able to extend their results by looking at a wider set of second-
generation outcomes, including not only school enrolment but also a wide range of household 
expenditures on education, health outcomes, and child labour. We believe our study to be the 
first to document effects of parental exposure to primary school expansion on reductions in 
child labour among their children. Child labour is still widespread in low-income countries with 
a prevalence rate of roughly 19% (ILO, 2017).4 While its reduction over the last few decades 
has been linked to numerous interventions (see Dammert et al., 2018 for a review), our results 
suggest that improved parental education is an important but so far neglected causal contributor. 
 
2 As of the end of the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals in 2015, only 40 over 145 developing 
countries achieved the goal of universal primary education (World Bank, 2016). The recent rates of primary school 
completion in low-income countries are still very low with only 59% (UNESCO, 2019).  
3 There is also an extensive literature on downward intergenerational spillovers in developed countries (Currie and 
Moretti, 2003; Dickson et al., 2016; Heckman and Karapakula, 2019a, 2019b; Huebener, 2018, 2019; Lindeboom 
et al., 2009; Lundborg et al., 2014; Meghir et al., 2012; Oreopoulos et al., 2006). 
4 This compares to an incidence rate of 9% in lower-middle-income countries, 7% in upper-middle-income 
countries, and 1% in upper-income countries (ILO, 2017). See also Basu (1999) and Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) 
for economic surveys on child labour. 
 
15 
Our study also extends a nascent literature on causally identified upward human capital 
spillovers (De Neve and Fink, 2018; Lundborg and Majlesi, 2018; Ma, 2019; Potente et al., 
2020). While Lundborg and Majlesi (2018) and De Neve and Fink (2018) focus on parental 
survival as the main outcome of interest, in Sweden and Tanzania respectively, Ma (2019) 
examines the effects on parental health and cognitive ability in China. While these studies tend 
to find positive effects of children’s schooling on parental health, Potente et al. (2020) find 
limited and small causal effects on parental outcomes of health and mortality in the United 
Kingdom. We build on these studies by significantly extending the range of outcomes and 
investigating important channels of the effects. 
Furthermore, we make a range of contributions to a wider set of literatures. We contribute 
to the literature on the determinants of parental investments in children’s human capital 
(Attanasio, 2015; Brown, 2006; Strauss and Thomas, 1995) by showing that exposure to stricter 
compulsory schooling laws has a causal effect on a range of specific human capital investments. 
We also complement a comparatively sparse literature on the mediating channels of the 
intergenerational transmission of education (Carneiro et al., 2013; Piopiunik, 2014) by showing 
that direct monetary investments in children’s health and human capital play an important role 
in downward intergenerational spillovers. 
Furthermore, we contribute to a growing literature documenting substantial heterogeneity 
in intergenerational social and economic mobility across time (Chetty et al. 2017a), space 
(Chetty et al. 2014), and socio-economic background (Chetty et al., 2020). Prior research has 
documented the importance of the neighborhood conditions during childhood (Chetty and 
Hendren, 2018a, 2018b), type of college education (Chetty et al., 2017b), income shocks 
(Bütikofer et al., 2018), disease control (Bütikofer and Salvanes, 2020), and the timing of 
parental income during childhood (Carneiro et al., 2021). Our findings suggest that well-
implemented compulsory schooling laws, by equalizing opportunities of access to basic 
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schooling for all children, increase intergenerational educational mobility.5 Finally, our 
findings of the effects of the human capital of the younger generation on the later-life health of 
parents contributes to a growing literature that seeks to identify a broad range of social and 
economic determinants of health in old age (Antman, 2010; Atalay et at., 2019; Barnay and 
Juin, 2016; Bhalotra et al., 2017; Böhme et al., 2015; Case and Paxson, 2009; De Nardi et al., 
2009; Fabrizio and Franco, 2017; Fetter and Lockwood, 2018; Salm, 2011). 
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional 
background and data. Section 3 discusses our empirical strategy, and Section 4 presents our 
results including the main causal effects, heterogeneity and potential mechanisms. Section 5 
concludes our paper. 
 
1.2 Institutional background and data 
1.2.1 The Vietnamese 1991 compulsory schooling reform 
Until 1991, there was no minimum level of compulsory schooling in Vietnam, and primary 
school completion rates were low and heterogeneous across regions (Glewwe and Jacoby, 1998; 
National Committee for EFA Assessment, 1999). In order to raise education levels in the 
economy, the Vietnamese government introduced a law on compulsory schooling, the Law on 
Universal Primary Education (LUPE). The law came into effect in 1991 and stated that with 
immediate effect all children aged 14 or younger had to complete five years of primary school. 
Consequently, children born before 1977 were not affected by the reform, while children born 
in 1977 and onwards were, in principle, affected. However, the implementation of the reform 
was “piecemeal rather than comprehensive” across the country, requiring years of preparation 
(MOET and JICA, 2002). Moreover, children aged 14 or younger in 1991 could have left school 
 
5  Our results complement findings by Demirel and Okten (2020), who document that an increase in compulsory 
schooling in Turkey (from 5-8 years) reduced gender differences in intergenerational educational persistence. 
 
17 
already and thus would have been unlikely to return to school even if technically required by 
the LUPE. Therefore, in our analysis, we allow up to four years for the reform to be effective 
and define individuals born between 1977 and 1980 as phase-in cohorts. We treat children born 
in 1981 and onwards as fully exposed to the reform. 
The reform triggered substantial investments in primary education (Nguyen, 2004), with 
a significant increase in public expenditures devoted to constructing new schools, training 
additional teachers with enhanced qualifications and providing scholarships and financial aid 
to students from disadvantaged families or remote regions. These investments were financed 
by a mix of increased contributions and investments by the private sector and international aid 
from governmental and non-governmental organizations (Dang and Glewwe, 2018; Glewwe 
and Patrinos, 1999). As a result, infrastructure and human resources employed in primary 
education in Vietnam expanded considerably. From 1991 to 1998, 11,334 new schools were 
constructed and close to 50,000 new primary school teachers were hired, leading to an 
expansion of primary school classes from 262,686 to 316,968 (MOET, 1998). 
Due to these developments, primary school attendance increased greatly. The aggregate 
number of students enrolled in primary school increased from roughly 8.1 million in 1986 to 
nearly 9.1 million in 1995, and primary school completion rates rose from 81% in 1979 to 
nearly 100% in the 2000s (World Bank, 2018). Thanks to the reform, primary school enrolment 
rates in the 2000s were higher in Vietnam than in other comparable countries (Dang and 
Glewwe, 2018).  
1.2.2 Data  
Our study is based on three nationally representative data sources for Vietnam. The first data 
source is a 15% sample of the 2009 Population and Housing Census of Vietnam (hereafter “the 
Census”). It is one of the largest existing micro datasets for Vietnam, covering 14 million 
individuals from 3.5 million households. It contains basic information on demographics, 
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education, employment, mortality and housing. The second data source are the 2010, 2012 and 
2014 waves of the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS). This is a biannual 
household survey consisting of roughly 40,000 individuals from 9,000 households, drawn from 
the Census population. The third data source is the 2011 Vietnam Aging Survey (VNAS). It 
contains information on demographic characteristics, housing and assets, employment, social 
protection and inclusion, physical and mental health, and emotional well-being from 4,007 
individuals aged 50 years old and over from 12 provinces across all of 6 Vietnamese economic 
zones. 
We restrict the Census and VHLSS data to the 1974-1984 birth cohorts to construct our 
samples of the directly affected generation. From the Census we extract key variables such as 
birth year, residential location (district and urban indicators) and educational attainment to 
identify treatment and control regions for our analysis. We further extract a range of outcomes 
for the directly affected generation from both Census and VHLSS. These consist of educational 
outcomes (primary and secondary school completion, years of schooling, and literacy), 
economic outcomes (being economically active, working in a non-agricultural sector, and the 
logs of real earnings), family outcomes (being lived in the same municipality over the last 5 
years, being married, spouse’s years of schooling, having at least one child, being experienced 
child mortality, and number of children conditional on having at least one child), and parental 
years of schooling (used for exploring intergenerational educational persistence). 
To estimate the effect of parental exposure to the reform on investments in their children’s 
human capital, we use the VHLSS and restrict the sample to children aged 6-17 who were born 
to parents from the 1974-1984 birth cohorts. For these children, we then construct three sets of 
dependent variables for parental investments in their children’s human capital: educational 
investments, child labour outcomes, and health investments. We extract information on 
children’s school enrolment, parental expenditures on school-related activities (school tuition, 
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books and learning materials, learning tools and instruments, private tutoring, and total overall 
spending on education), and expenditures on children’s books and maganizes and toys. We use 
information on children’s employment to construct three measures for child labour: working 
for the household, working for earnings and hours of work for earnings. For investments into 
children’s health, we extract information on household expenditures on food and children’s 
health and healthcare utilization to construct the following outcomes: monthly per capita 
household spending on food consumption, monthly household spending on tobacco and 
cigarettes, the child’s health insurance coverage, number of preventive health visits, 
expenditures on preventive health care for public and private health services, and probability 
of hospitalization over the last 12 months. Monetary expenditures are measured in 1,000 
Vietnam Dong (VND) in 2010 prices, with the exchange rate equaling roughly 20,000 VND 
per 1 U.S. Dollar in 2010. 
We use the VNAS to estimate the effects of the reform on the health in old age of the 
parents of the directly affected generation. One of the most important advantages of the VNAS 
compared to other Vietnamese data surveys is that it includes all children of the respondents, 
not only co-resident children but also those living outside the household, allowing us to estimate 
a full sample of children and thus to avoid potential sample selection bias. We exploit 
information on physical health, mental health, and emotional well-being to construct five 
measures for the health of the parents in old age over the past 12 months. These include the 
number days of sickness, self-reported health status (absolute and relative to others in the same 
age group), depression, sleep problems, and general life satisfaction. We additionally exploit 
information on household economic conditions and individual behaviors of the parents to 
construct multiple measures for potential mechanisms used to explain the main effects, 
spanning from financial mechanisms (dummies for poverty, income and savings, satisfaction 
with financial status, private health insurance, home improvements) to behavioural health 
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mechanisms (smoking, drinking, social activities, grandchildren, and the number of children-
in-law). We present summary statistics of all variables in Table A.1 in Appendix A. 
 
1.3 Empirical strategy 
1.3.1 Definition of treatment and control regions and event study of pre-trends 
Before the reform, educational attainment was heterogeneous across different regions in 
Vietnam (Dang and Glewwe, 2018). This was due to differences in schooling preferences 
between local populations (Anh et al., 1998) and in regional economic development (Dell et 
al., 2018; Nguyen et at., 2007). Given that the compulsory schooling law mandated all regions 
to achieve universal primary schooling, regions with lower initial levels of primary school 
completion experienced a stronger expansion. Based on this idea, we define treatment regions 
as those with low initial school enrolments and comparison regions as those with high initial 
enrolments. We define regions by the interaction of districts with an urban indicator.6 We then 
define the initial level of primary education (hereafter “the initial level”) as the region’s average 
rate of primary school completion for the 1977 birth cohort using the Census sample. We define 
treatment regions as those with a below-median initial level and comparison regions as those 
with an above-median initial level. Among a total of 1,272 included regions, 636 are defined 
as treatment regions and 636 as comparison regions. For the treatment region definition, and in 
order to assign treatment status to individuals observed in our data, we rely on the region of 
residence observed for adults in the respective data waves (between 2009 and 2014) as a proxy 
for their region of residence when they were at school age. As has been argued by Dell et al. 
(2018), supported by several empirical sources, residential mobility has traditionally been low 
in Vietnam. Our own calculations from Census data reveal a 5-year residential mobility rate 
 
6 A district is a medium administrative unit in Vietnam, which is smaller than a province but larger than a 
commune. Vietnam has 696 districts with an average population of roughly 125,000 people (CPHCSC, 2010).  
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across districts of 6.3%. While this rate does not appear excessively large, and not every move 
changes the treatment status, it would introduce some misclassification error into our treatment 
status definition. To the extent that residential mobility is random, we would expect it to cause 
attenuation bias into our estimates, meaning that we can interpret our results as lower bound 
estimates. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the evolution of primary school completion rates across the cohorts 
born from 1974-1990 separately for treatment and comparison regions. The vertical bars 
illustrate the pre-reform, phase-in and post-reform cohorts, as defined in Section 1.2.1. By 
definition, comparison regions initially had considerably higher primary schooling rates than 
treatment regions, but trends are fairly parallel over pre-reform cohorts. However, this pattern 
gradually changes for cohorts affected by the reform. While rates in comparison regions are 
highly stable, rates in treatment regions increase considerably from phase-in cohorts to post-
reform cohorts and then almost completely catch up with rates in the comparison regions for 
the youngest cohorts. The primary school completion rate in comparison regions increased by 
only about 3 percentage points between the pre-reform and post-reform cohorts. However, it 
increased by about 13 percentage points in the treatment regions, suggesting a difference-in-
difference reform impact on primary school completion of roughly 10 percentage points.  
Given that we have access to several pre-reform cohorts, we can check for diverging pre-
trends using an event study approach. We do this for the primary school completion rate of the 
directly affected generation, for schooling and child labour outcomes of their children, and 
health status of their parents. We regress each of the outcomes on treatment status, birth cohort 
dummies of the directly affected generation, and the corresponding cohort dummies interacted 
with treatment status (omitting the first phase-in cohort of 1977 as the reference group). For 
each cohort we then plot the coefficients of the treatment-cohort interaction terms in the event 




FIGURE 1.1: PRIMARY SCHOOL COMPLETION RATE BY COHORT  
FOR TREATMENT AND COMPARISON REGIONS 
 
Data source: Population and Housing Census of Vietnam (2009, 15% sample). 
 
Across all outcomes there are small pre-treatment differences, moderate differences 
opening up in the phase-in cohorts, and more substantial differences emerging in the post-
reform cohorts. Importantly, differences in pre-trends are mostly insignificant, with the main 
exception of the primary school completion rate of the directly affected generation, where even 
very small differences are statistically significant because of the large sample size of the Census 
(1.6 million observations). While the absence of strong pre-trends is encouraging, we make our 
regression models robust against a range of differential trends. As we explain in more detail 
below, our regressions will allow for cohort dummies to vary by province, and we will show 
that our results are robust against allowing for differential time trends by rural and urban areas. 
We further probe the validity of our identification strategy in the next section, and present 










Data source: Population and Housing Census of Vietnam (2009, 15% sample); Vietnam Household Living 






1.3.2 Exogeneity of the treatment 
In this section, we provide evidence of how treatment and control regions differ in terms of 
their observed characteristics. We also conduct balancing tests to check the degree to which the 
identifying region-by-cohort variation in primary school completion correlates with trends in 
observables. 
Table 1.1 presents the results of cross-sectional, region-level regressions of regions’ 
treatment statuses on their average observed characteristics. These characteristics include the 
age of the population, the composition of the population in terms of ethnicity and religious 
affiliation, an urban indicator, and the location of the region in Vietnam’s six major economic 
zones (Southeast, Red River Delta, Mekong River Delta, Northern and Southern Central Coast, 
Central Highlands and Northern Midlands and Mountains). As expected and by construction, 
the treatment status of a region is strongly affected by its initial primary school completion rate 
across all specifications. Among the remaining regressors in column 2, the most significant 
associations are with the major economic zone dummies, and one ethnicity dummy appears 
weakly significant. Overall, this suggests relatively few systematic differences in observables 
apart from the initial primary school completion rate and broad geographic location. 
The results in Table 1.1 help us understand how treatment and comparison regions differ. 
Yet, it is important to note that even if there were differences in time-constant regional 
characteristics, they would be taken into account by our difference-in-difference identification 
strategy in which we condition on region and cohort fixed effects (see Section 1.3.3). 
In the following we establish that the differential expansion of primary school completion 
across regions, which we use to identify the reform effect, is unrelated to trends in other 
observables. For this purpose, we regress the region-by-cohort share of primary school 
completion on region-by-cohort specific observables, conditioning on cohort and region fixed 
effects. Given that the Census data is from 2009, we must be careful not use observables that 
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are likely to be outcomes of the reform, such as education, earnings or employment. We 
therefore use demographic characteristics of ethnicity and religious affiliation that can change 
in a region over time but are unlikely to change at the individual level in response to the reform.  
 
TABLE 1.1: DETERMINANTS OF THE TREATMENT STATUS 
  (1) (2) 
Initial level of primary education (percent) -2.19928*** -1.99516***   
 (0.03799) (0.075384) 
Age (years)   0.03102   
(0.02719) 
Rural (dummy)  0.00008   
(0.00017) 
Kinh ethnicity (percent)  -0.00041   
(0.00062) 
Tay ethnicity (percent)  0.00214**  
 (0.00101) 
Thai ethnicity (percent)  0.00068   
(0.00071) 
Other ethnicities (percent)  reference 
Buddhism affiliation (percent)  -0.00139   
(0.00091) 
Other religious affiliations (percent)  0.00114   
(0.00077) 
No religious affiliation (percent) 
 
reference 
Southeast (dummy)  0.00148***   
(0.00039) 
Red River Delta (dummy)  -0.00008   
(0.00024) 
Mekong River Delta (dummy)  0.00190***  
 (0.00038) 
Northern and Southern Central Coast 
(dummy)  0.00067***   
(0.00025) 
Central Highlands (dummy)  0.00159***   
(0.00036) 
Northern Midlands and Mountains (dummy)  reference 
Constant 2.21983***  1.07733   
(0.03211) (0.80133) 
Observations 1,272 1,272 
Notes: This table reports a regression of treatment region status (dummy) on the 
initial level of primary education for the 1977 cohort (column 1), and some regional 
characteristics (column2). The initial level of primary education is measured by the 
primary education completion rate for the 1977 cohort. Observations are at the 
regional level. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




As shown in Table 1.2, the only covariate that is statistically significantly correlated with 
the region-by-cohort share of primary school completion is the Tay ethnicity. Yet, this is with 
such a negligibly small effect size that it is unlikely to be of practical relevance.7 We thus 
conclude that our identifying variation is not related to demographic trends in ethnicity or 
religious affiliation. We discuss further placebo tests and robustness checks to underpin the 
causal interpretation of our results at the end of the following section. 
 
TABLE 1.2: BALANCING TEST 
Dep. variable: Region-by-cohort share of primary school completion 
Kinh ethnicity (percent) 0.00009 
  (0.00023) 
Tay ethnicity (percent) -0.00154**  
 (0.00061) 
Thai ethnicity (percent) -0.00039  
 (0.00039) 
Other ethnicities (percent) reference 
Buddhism affiliation (percent) 0.00013  
 (0.0003) 
Other religious affiliations (percent) -0.00062  
 (0.0004) 
No religious affiliation (percent) reference 
Constant 0.75196***  
 (0.02041) 
Dummies for cohorts Yes 
Dummies for regions  Yes 
p-value for joint significance of covariates   0.3141 
Observations 13,990 
Notes: Observations are measured at the region-by-cohort level for individuals of 
the birth cohorts 1974-1984. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level 
are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




7 In 98% of the regions, the Tay ethnicity share changed by less than 6 percentage points between the pre-reform 
cohorts (1981-1984) and the post-reform cohorts (1974-1976). The coefficients of -0.0015 (Table 1.2) would 
suggest that the extreme event of a 6-percentage point increase in the Tay ethnicity share would affect the primary 
school completion rate by only 0.9 percentage points (-0.0015*6=-0.009), which is about one tenth of the reform 
effect we show in Table 1.3. 
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1.3.3 Estimation methods  
Our empirical strategy is based on generalized difference-in-differences regressions that 
compare across regions and cohorts, controlling for region and cohort effects, and letting cohort 
effects vary across provinces. The implementation of the regression differs according to 
whether we estimate effects on the generation directly affected by the reform, their children’s 
generation, or their parents’ generation. The three respective approaches are the following. 
Effects on individuals from the directly affected generation  
For an outcome 𝑌𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡, such as primary school completion, of an individual 𝑖 of the directly 
affected generation, living in region 𝑟 within province 𝑝(𝑟), belonging to birth cohort 𝑐, and 
surveyed in year 𝑡, we run the regression: 
𝑌𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑟 × 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐 + 𝛼3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑟 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 + 𝛼4𝑿
′
𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡
+ 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜑𝑟 + 𝜔𝑐 × 𝜋𝑝(𝑟) + 𝜁𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡                                                                (1.1).
 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑟 is a dummy variable indicating whether region 𝑟 where individual 𝑖 lives is a treatment 
region. 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐 is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual belongs to the phase-
in birth cohort (1977-1980). 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual 
belongs to the post-reform birth cohort (1981-1984). 𝑿′𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡 is a control vector for individual 
characteristics, including dummies for gender and ethnicity (Kinh, Tay, Thai and other 
ethnicities). For the Census data, we also add religious affiliations (Buddhism, other religions 
and no religions) into the set of controls. 𝜃𝑡, 𝜑𝑟 and 𝜔𝑐 are fixed effects for the survey year, 
region and birth cohort, 𝜋𝑝(𝑟) are dummies for 63 provinces, and 𝜁𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡 is the error term. The 
survey year fixed effect 𝜃𝑡 controls for potential time trends across survey years, and is dropped 
in specifications using the Census data consisting of one year only. The region fixed effect 𝜑𝑟 
controls for time-invariant regional characteristics and the birth cohort fixed effect 𝜔𝑐 controls 
for cohort trends in the outcome. The joint inclusion of region and cohort fixed effects turns 
Equation (1.1) into a generalized difference-in-differences regression, in which 𝛼3 is the effect 
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of exposure to the reform on the outcome. The interaction of birth cohort with province 
dummies, 𝜔𝑐 × 𝜋𝑝(𝑟), allows trends across cohorts to vary in unrestricted ways across 
provinces. 
Effects on the children of directly affected individuals 
To explore how reform exposure of individuals affects their children, indexed 𝑗, we focus 
on children observed in the VHLSS survey in year 𝑡 (2010, 2012 and 2014). We run regressions 
of the type: 
𝑌𝑗𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2Treat𝑗𝑟 × ParentPhasein𝑗




+ 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜑𝑟 + 𝜔
𝑐𝑚 × 𝜋𝑝(𝑟) + 𝜔
𝑐𝑝 × 𝜋𝑝(𝑟) + 𝜀𝑗𝑟𝑡                                             (1.2).
 
𝑌𝑗𝑟𝑡 is an outcome, such as an investment into child 𝑗’s human capital. 𝑿
′
𝑗𝑟𝑡 includes ethnicity, 
age, age squared and gender of the child. 𝜀𝑗𝑟𝑡 is the error term. As before, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗𝑟 is a dummy 
variable indicating whether region 𝑟 where child 𝑗 lives is a treatment region. Parent𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑗 
is a dummy variable indicating whether at least one of the parents of child j belongs to the 
phase-in birth cohort (1977-1980). 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 is a dummy variable indicating whether at 
least one of the parents of child j belongs to the post-reform birth cohort (1981-1984). 𝜃𝑡 and 
𝜑𝑟 are survey year and region fixed effects. Maternal birth cohort fixed effects, 𝜔
𝑐𝑚, and 
paternal birth cohort fixed effects, 𝜔𝑐𝑝, are interacted with province dummies 𝜋𝑝(𝑟). To avoid 
losing children in single-parent households, we imputed the maternal/paternal birth cohort 
variable of a missing parent by setting it to a mid-point value (1980), and introduced two 
dummies in 𝑿′𝑗𝑟𝑡 indicating the observations with a missing value for maternal or paternal birth 
cohort (which applies to 4.5% of the children’s sample). 
We specify treatment as at least one of the parents being exposed to the reform, instead 
of separate indicators for father being exposed and mother being exposed, for the following 
reasons. First, our indicator can be constructed for single-parent households. Second, maternal 
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and paternal exposure do not have a lot of independent variation. In 80 percent of families in 
our sample, the husband is older than the wife, implying that if the father is treated, the then the 
mother is in most cases also treated.8 
We ruled out using separate samples of mother-child pairs and father-child pairs to get 
separate estimates of maternal of paternal exposure, because these estimates would be 
confounded by the exposure of the respective other parent, which would act as an omitted 
variable in this approach. We also ruled out pooling together mother-child pairs and father-
child pairs into a combined sample, as this would have inflated our numbers of observations by 
double-counting children of two-parent households. 
Effects on the parents of directly affected individuals 
To explore how reform exposure of individuals affects their parents, indexed 𝑘, we focus 
on parents from the 2011 VNAS survey who have at least one child born in the 1974-1984 
period. We run regressions of the type: 
𝑌𝑘𝑟𝑐 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2Treat𝑘𝑟 × ChildPhasein𝑘 + 𝛾3Treat𝑘𝑟 × ChildPost𝑘 +  𝛾4𝑿
′
𝑘𝑟𝑐
+𝜑𝑟 + 𝜔𝑐 × 𝜋𝑝(𝑟) + ∑ 𝜌𝜏𝑁𝐶𝜏
𝜏
+ 𝜖𝑘𝑟𝑐                                                              (1.3).
 
𝑌𝑘𝑟𝑐 is an outcome, such as health status of a parent 𝑘. 𝑿
′
𝑘𝑟𝑐 includes ethnicity and gender of 
the parent, and 𝜖𝑘𝑟𝑐 is the error term. As before, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗𝑟 is a dummy variable indicating whether 
region 𝑟 where parent 𝑘 lives is a treatment region. Child𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑘 is a dummy variable 
indicating whether at least one of the children of parent 𝑘 belongs to the phase-in birth cohort 
(1977-1980). 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑘 is a dummy variable indicating whether at least one of the children 
of parent 𝑘 belongs to the post-reform birth cohorts (1981-1984). As before, 𝜑𝑟 are region fixed 
 
8 We tried the approach of including ‘one parent treated’ and ‘both parents treated’ variables and did not find 
evidence that effects amplify if both parents are treated. However, interpretation is complicated by the fact that 
the indicator for both parents being treated is highly collinear with a maternal treatment indicator. Ideally, one 
would want to estimate separate effects for: only the father being treated, only the mother being treated, and both 
parents being treated. But these indicators do not have sufficient independent variation in our sample. 
 
30 
effects, and 𝜔𝑐 × 𝜋𝑝(𝑟) is an interaction between parent 𝑘’s birth cohort and province 
dummies.9 Finally, 𝑁𝐶𝜏 is the number of children born in year 𝜏 to control for family size and 
age structure of the children, with associated regression coefficients 𝜌𝜏.
10 
For most variables in our analysis, missing values are rare, and we therefore proceed with 
a complete case analysis. The only exceptions are information on income from the VHLSS and 
information on parents’ occupations from the Census. For these two variables, substantial 
shares of observations are missing, and we impute missing values with the mean value. This 
imputation cannot drive any of the reform effects because the mean of the variable is absorbed 
by the regression constant. However, the imputation has the advantage of making use of the 
full sample for the other variables in the regression model.  
For a more straightforward interpretation of the regression analysis, unless otherwise 
stated, we standardise continuous variables with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. 
Moreover, standard errors are clustered at the district level to account for potential correlations 
across birth cohorts within the same district (Bertrand et al., 2004). For effects with a clear 
prediction of their sign from economic theory, we use one-sided hypothesis testing (Heckman 
and Karapakula, 2019a, 2019b), otherwise we use two-sided hypothesis testing. Table notes 
indicate which type of testing is used. 
Causal interpretation, placebo tests and robustness 
Interpretation of 𝛼3, 𝛽3 and 𝛾3 as causal effects of primary school expansion requires the 
parallel trends assumption to hold. In other words, there should be no diverging cohort trends 
in the outcomes between treatment and comparison regions that would lead to nonzero 
estimates of 𝛼3, 𝛽3 or 𝛾3 in the absence of the reform. This assumption is supported by our 
 
9 Because parents’ birth cohorts are less densely populated, differently from the previous equations, in Equation 
(1.3) birth cohort 𝑐 is measured in 5-year intervals. 




discussion in Section 1.3.1 where we found no strong pre-trends in Figure 1.2, and by the 
evidence of uncorrelatedness of the identifying variation with trends in observables 
demonstrated in Section 1.3.2. Nevertheless, as shown in Equations (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3), we 
include birth cohort effects interacted with province dummies throughout our analysis to allow 
cohorts trends to vary in unrestricted ways across provinces. This is possible because the 
treatment-by-post indicators vary within province-cohort cells as provinces include both treated 
and untreated regions.  
Moreover, for a range of robustness checks presented in Appendix A (Tables A.3, A.7-
A.13) we augment Equations (1.1)-(1.3) by allowing for linear cohort trends interacted with an 
urban-rural indicator to control for the possibility of a general catch-up of rural areas. Our 
results are remarkably robust against this inclusion, suggesting that a general catch-up of rural 
areas is not driving our results. We also conducted placebo tests to further verify the validity of 
the common trends assumption. In Appendix A, Table A.2, panel A, we use the occupation of 
the parents of the directly affected generation as a placebo outcome. We use an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the parent holds a highly skilled occupation, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
Since parents’ occupational choices were shaped before the reform, there should be no reform 
effect on this outcome. The results confirm that the reform has no effect on parents’ occupation. 
Furthermore, we defined a placebo reform that assumes the reform took place in 1982, nine 
years prior to the actual reform in 1991. We estimate a similar model as Equation (1.1) using 
only the 1965-1975 pre-reform birth cohorts, neither of which was affected by the real reform.11 
The results in panel B of Appendix A, Table A.2 show that exposure to the placebo reform has 
no effect on the probability of completing primary school for both males (columns 1-2) and 
 
11 In the placebo reform, the pre-placebo cohorts include individuals born between 1965-1967, the phase-in cohorts 
include individuals born between 1968-1971, and the post-placebo reform cohorts include those born between 
1972-1975. The regions’ primary school completion rates for the 1968 cohort are used as the initial level to define 
the placebo treatment and comparison regions, as done with the real reform. For the estimation, we obtain in total 
a sample for fathers of 726,409 observations and a sample for mothers of 748,326 observations from the Census 
data. The placebo reform cannot be applied to child outcomes, because children of the placebo reform cohorts may 
well be affected by the actual reform. 
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females (columns 3-4). Overall, the results of these robustness checks and placebo tests make 
us confident that our findings are indeed driven by the real reform, not by violations of the 
common trends assumption due to diverging trends in unobservables.12 
 
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Reform effect on the directly affected generation  
We start by presenting the effect of exposure to the reform on the directly affected generation 
in Table 1.3, using a mix of outcomes from both the Census and VHLSS datasets. The results 
are based on regression Equation (1.1) with additional interaction effects by gender in order to 
separate effects for men and women. Panel A of the table reports results on educational and 
economic outcomes. 
The results in columns 1-3 of panel A show that for both males and females exposure to 
the reform increases the probability of completing primary and secondary by about 10 
percentage points, and that this translates into roughly one additional year of schooling. To 
further verify whether this affects their actual skills, we estimate effects on an indicator for 
literacy (the full ability to read and write) in column 4 of panel A. Exposure to the reform 
improves literacy by about 1.2 percentage points for both males and females. This effect is 
highly statistically significant. Compared to the baseline illiteracy rate of 3.3% for pre-reform 
cohorts in treatment regions (own calculations from Census data) this is a sizable effect, 
implying that reform exposure almost halved the illiteracy rate. 
 
 
12 It may be tempting to use the compulsory schooling reform as an instrumental variable (IV) to estimate the 
causal effect of primary school education on investments in children’s human capital and on parental health. We 
refrain from implementing such an IV strategy because, as pointed out by Holmlund et al. (2011), the compulsory 
schooling reform is unlikely to meet the exclusion restriction that is required for it to be a valid instrument. This 
is because not only will a given focal individual gain a higher level of schooling with the reform, but also will 
other individuals of the same generation in the same regions. And these other individuals could directly or 
indirectly affect the children or the parents of the focal individual, violating the IV exclusion restriction. 
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TABLE 1.3: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE DIRECTLY AFFECTED GENERATION 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Panel A. Education and economic outcomes         














Treat*Post*Female 0.094*** 0.106*** 0.909*** 0.012*** 0.005** 0.068** 0.214*  
(0.003) (0.005) (0.047) (0.001) (0.003) (0.032) (0.131) 
Treat*Post*Male 0.102*** 0.116*** 0.974*** 0.012*** 0.044*** 0.069*** 0.269**  
(0.004) (0.006) (0.049) (0.001) (0.003) (0.028) (0.148) 
Data source: Census Census Census Census Census VHLSS VHLSS 
Observations  1,656,579  1,656,579  1,656,579  1,656,579  1,656,579 17,471 17,471 
 Panel B. Family outcomes 
 
Lived in same 
municipality  











Treat*Post*Female 0.071*** 0.030*** 0.524*** 0.065*** -0.071*** -0.091***   
(0.004) (0.006) (0.028) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) 
Treat*Post*Male 0.029*** 0.114*** 0.811*** n.a. n.a. n.a.   
(0.004) (0.007) (0.029) 
   
Data source: Census Census Census Census Census Census  
Observations  1,656,579  1,656,579  1,656,579 832,706 832,706 832,706  
 Panel C. Intergenerational persistence 
Dep. variable: Years of schooling of directly affected generation    





father   
Parental schooling 0.391*** 0.363*** 0.397*** 0.391*** 0.399***    
(0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015) 
Treat*Post*Parental -0.084*** -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.027** -0.011   
schooling (0.010) (0.015) (0.023) (0.014) (0.023) 
Data source: Census Census Census Census Census   
Observations 415,370 236,127 91,600 187,957 71,804   
Notes: All specifications include fixed effects for cohorts-by-province, region, and (for VHLSS data) survey year. Further control variables are dummies for gender 
and ethnicity (Kinh, Tay, Thai and others). For the Census data, dummies for religious affiliations (Buddhism, others and no religious affiliations) are included into 
the set of control variables. Earnings are measured by the log of Vietnam Dong 1,000 (in 2010 prices). The sample includes individuals born in 1974-1984. 
Significance levels are based on one-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data source: Population and Housing Census of Vietnam (2009, 15% sample); Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (2010, 2012 and 2014) 
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In the remainder of panel A, we present results for economic activity, economic sector, 
and earnings. As shown in column 5, reform exposure increases the probability of being 
economically active by half a percentage point for women, and 4.4 percentage points for men. 
For both men and women, it increases the probability of being active in the non-agricultural 
sector by 7 percentage points (column 6). Moreover, there is a strong increase in earnings of 
about 20-25 log points, which is slightly stronger for men (column 7). This is a sizable effect 
compared to conventional returns to schooling estimates. However, differently from 
conventional returns to schooling, our earnings effect includes a labour force participation 
effect because economically inactive individuals are included in the earnings variable with zero 
earnings.13 Moreover, reform exposure affects earnings not only through an individual’s own 
education, but potentially also through spillovers from the fact that many individuals in a local 
region are treated by the reform.  
In panel B of Table 1.3, we investigate a range of family outcomes. We start with an 
indicator of having lived in the same commune over the past 5 years (an inverse measure of 
migration). Reform exposure makes it more likely for individuals to have remained resident in 
the same commune by 7 percentage points for women, and 3 percentage points for men (column 
1). This could be a result of a stronger local economy due to higher local levels of education 
and economic activity and expansion of the non-agricultural sector. As columns 2 and 3 show, 
it also increases the probability of being married (3 percentage points for women, 11 percentage 
points for men), and it raises the average quality of the spouse as proxied by their years of 
schooling (half a year for women, 0.8 years for men). This latter finding is in line with previous 
findings from both developed and developing countries (Hahn et al., 2018; Pencavel, 1998). 
These factors might be related, as the availability of spouses of higher quality in the local region 
might induce couples to marry earlier, and as a result be more likely to settle down in the local 
 
13 The log transformation of earnings is then performed after adding a constant of one. 
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geographic area. This process might also partly explain the higher likelihood for women of 
having at least one child (6.5 percentage points – column 4). Another contributing factor to this 
could be the decrease in having experienced child mortality by 7 percentage points, as shown 
in column 5. If we control for having at least one child, on the other hand, we find that reform 
exposure reduces the number of children by approximately 0.1 (column 6). Positive fertility 
effects at the extensive margin and negative effects at the intensive margin can be rationalized 
by the theory developed in Aaronson et al. (2014). As these authors show, interventions that 
decrease the cost of investing in child quality, for example because of increased access to 
schooling or decreased child mortality, have positive fertility effects at the extensive margin, 
because taking advantage of the increased opportunities to invest in child quality requires 
having at least one child. At the intensive margin, such policies have negative effects, in line 
with the traditional quantity-quality tradeoff.14 One caveat to bear in mind when interpreting 
these findings is that the sample includes individuals aged 25-35. The marriage and fertility 
effects are therefore not necessarily ‘completed’ effects, and they might result from changes in 
marriage and birth timing. 
We further examine the reform effects on the intergenerational persistence of schooling 
between individuals of the directly affected generation and their parents. Our estimation is 
based on an augmented version of Equation (1.1) with years of schooling of an individual of 
the directly affected generation on the left hand side. The right-hand side is augmented by 
adding parental years of schooling and its interactions with 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑛, 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 and 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑛. While the coefficient for parental schooling indicates the baseline 
intergenerational persistence of schooling, the coefficient for 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ×
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 measures how exposure to the reform affects the intergenerational 
 
14 The reform we study not only potentially lowers the cost of investing in child quality, but it also provides 
improved earnings and employment opportunities for mothers, from which one would expect a negative extensive 
margin effect (Aaronson et al., 2014). Our empirical results suggest that the positive extensive margin effect 
outweighs the negative one. 
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persistence. The coefficient in panel C of Table 1.3 on parental schooling indicates a baseline 
IGE of about 0.4 years of schooling.15 The interaction effect shows that reform exposure 
reduces the dependence of schooling of the directly affected generation on their parents’ 
schooling. The coefficient in column 1 shows a reduction of approximately 0.08 for the overall 
child-parent pairs. The four remaining columns of panel C in Table 1.3 show the results broken 
down by child and parental gender pairs. These differences should be interpreted cautiously 
due to two kinds of sample selection. Father-child pairs are less frequently observed than 
mother-child pairs because if children reside with a single parent, then this is more likely to be 
the mother. Second, daughter-parent pairs are less frequently observed than son-parent pairs 
because daughters are more likely to leave the parental home to live with their in-laws. With 
these caveats in mind, we find the reduction of the intergenerational persistence to be about 
0.07 for both son-mother and daughter-mother pairs in columns 2 and 3 (both statistically 
significant at the 1% level), and about 0.03 for son-father pairs in column 4 (statistically 
significant at the 5% level), with no significant moderating effect for daughter-father pairs 
(column 5). 
Overall, our results suggest that the directly affected generation benefitted from the 
reform through increased educational attainment, literacy, and economic activity (with a shift 
away from agriculture), as well as higher labour market earnings. It also increased the 
likelihood of being married, the quality of the marital partner, and the probability of having 
children. Conditional on having children, however, it decreased family size. Moreover, the 
reform increased intergenerational educational mobility for the directly affected generation. In 
 
15 For column 1, we measure parental education by the highest level of education obtained by one of the parents. 
One caveat for our analysis is that child-parent pairs can only be observed in the Census if they live in the same 
household. As sons are more likely to live with their parents than daughters, our sample includes more sons. The 
data also contains more mother-child pairs than father-child pairs because of the higher life expectancy of females. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of our IGE estimate is broadly in line with international evidence. For earlier birth 
cohorts (1929-1978), Hertz et al. (2007) find a higher estimate of 0.6 for Vietnam and they document a falling 
trend over cohorts. Our smaller value of 0.4 estimated on later birth cohorts therefore seems very plausible. 
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Appendix A,Table A.3, we find these effects to be highly robust against adding a linear cohort 
trend interacted with a rural indicator.  
1.4.2 Intergenerational spillover effects on the children’s generation 
The reform effects documented in the previous section might generate spillover effects on 
school attainment and investments into the human capital of the children of the generation 
directly affected by the reform. The improved education and skills may enable the directly 
affected generation to better understand the importance of human capital investments for their 
children’s long-term success (Lundborg et al., 2014, 2018) and the implications for their 
children’s ability to support parents in old age (Becker et al., 2016). Better education may also 
lead to being better informed about school choices and enrolment processes, and it may foster 
attitudes and values in favor of educational investments (Figlio et al. 2019, Piopiunik 2014). 
The increased probability of economic activity and higher earnings might allow the directly 
affected generation to invest more monetary resources into their children (Bruins, 2017; Calero, 
2009).16 This effect could be amplified by the decreased family size (conditional on having 
children), as the theory of quantity-quality trade-offs would suggest (Hanushek, 1992; 
Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009). Our finding that the directly affected individuals also choose 
higher educated marital partners could further amplify downward spillover effects, given that 
higher educated spouses may increase their partner’s own economic outcomes (Huang et al., 
2009; Lefgren and McIntyre, 2006) and contribute directly to overall household resources. In 
this section we therefore explore downward intergenerational spillover effects on school 
attainment and investments into the human capital of the children of the directly affected 
generation. We start with the main results, followed by gender heterogeneity. 
Main results 
 
16 This mechanism may work stronger in developing countries where numerous children reside in financially 
restricted families while there have been typically insufficient public investments (Strauss and Thomas, 1995).  
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We derive the effects of exposure to the reform on investments into children’s human 
capital, based on regression Equation (1.2). In Table 1.4 we investigate school enrolment, 
school tuition, and other educational expenditures and, in Table 1.5 child labour, and in Table 
1.6 health investments. 
Column 1 in Table 1.4 displays the effects of exposure on school enrolment for children 
aged 6-17. Exposure of at least one parent to the reform increases the probability of a child’s 
school enrolment by 8.7 percentage points (column 1), an effect that is highly statistically 
significant at the 1% level. We verified that this effect operates entirely via secondary school 
attendance, as one would expect because primary school is compulsory for everyone in the 
children’s generation.17 Given very high levels of school attendance at baseline (just above 90% 
of children of pre-reform parents in treatment regions), the effect size implies that the reform 
brought school attendance of the children’s generation at primary and secondary school to a 
universal level. 
Reform exposure of at least one parent also increases payments for children’s school 
tuition, by 23.7% of a standard deviation, statistically significant at the 1% level (column 2). A 
range of school types in Vietnam, such as semi-public and private schools, charge higher tuition 
fees than traditional public schools, and are thought to be of higher quality in terms of skill 
development, educational services, teaching resources and facilities (Glewwe and Patrinos, 
1999). In principle, the increase in tuition fees could reflect parents choosing higher quality 
schools, holding enrolment constant. But it could also be simply driven by the increase in 
enrolment itself, given that non-enrolled children pay zero tuition fees. To check this, estimate 
the tuition equation conditional on enrolment (column 3), and we find that there is still a weakly 
statistically significant effect of 14% of a standard deviation on tuition fees.
 
17 We found that effects for children of primary and lower secondary school age are close to zero and statistically 






TABLE 1.4: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE CHILDREN'S GENERATION: INVESTMENTS INTO SCHOOLING AND LEARNING 




School related expenditures  Home expenditures 






















At least one treated parent*Post  0.087*** 0.237*** 0.142* 0.194** 0.215** -0.015 0.217**  0.149* 0.171* 
 (0.027) (0.093) (0.092) (0.093) (0.123) (0.100) (0.105)  (0.106) (0.120) 
Observations 9,237 9,237 8,694 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237  9,237 9,237 
Notes: All specifications include fixed effects for survey year, paternal cohort-by-province, maternal cohort-by-province, and region. Control variables: child's 
gender, ethnicitiy (Kinh, Tay, Thai and others), age and age squared. Expenditure variables are based on log expenditure (in 2010 prices), standardised into a mean 
of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The sample includes children aged 6-17 of parents born in 1974-1984. Significance levels are based on one-sided hypothesis 
tests. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data source: Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (2010, 2012 and 2014) 
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Looking at further types of educational expenditure in the remaining columns of Table 
1.4, we find that reform exposure of at least one parent increases spending on children’s books 
and learning materials, learning tools and instruments, and total school-related spending. Effect 
sizes are roughly similar around 20% of a standard deviation and statistically significantly at 
the 5% level. There is no effect, however, on private tutoring. While private tutoring has been 
found to be effective in improving children’s academic performance in developing countries 
(Banerjee et al., 2007; Dang and Rogers, 2008), it has traditionally been uncommon in many 
areas in Vietnam (Dang, 2007). Increased parental exposure to compulsory schooling in our 
treatment regions does not seem to have noticeably increased this practice. The last two 
columns of Table 1.4 include results on educational expenditures related to the home rather 
than school. They show weakly statistically significant effects on children’s books and 
magazines (14.9% of a standard deviation) and toys (17.1% of a standard deviation). 
 
TABLE 1.5: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE CHILDREN’S GENERATION:  
CHILD LABOUR OUTCOMES 






Hours of work 
for earnings 
At least one treated parent*Post  -0.018 -0.019* -0.282**  
 (0.034)  (0.012) (0.131) 
Observations 9,237 9,237 9,237 
Notes: All specifications include fixed effects for survey year, paternal cohort-by-province, 
maternal cohort-by-province, and region. Control variables: child’s gender, ethnicitiy (Kinh, Tay, 
Thai and others), age and age squared. The sample includes children aged 6-17 of parents born 
in 1974-1984. Significance levels are based on one-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the district level are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data source: Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (2010, 2012 and 2014) 
 
In Table 1.5, we investigate child labour. We interpret it as a negative investment in 
children’s human capital, as it has been shown to be detrimental to educational attainment 
(Beegle et al., 2009), academic performance (Goulart and Bedi, 2008) and health (O’Donnell 
et al., 2005). Column 1 shows no effect of parental reform exposure on the probability that their 
children work for the household. In column 2, we find that children of parents who were 
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exposed to the reform are also less likely to have a paid job outside of the household, with an 
effect size of 1.9 percentage points, statistically significant at the 10% level. Finally, as column 
3 shows, parental exposure also reduces children’s daily hours of paid work, by close to 0.3 
hours (statistically significant at the 5% level). 
In Appendix A, Table A.4 we show that these effects also exist for children aged 6-14, 
below the legal minimum age of 15 for labour market participation. We find that, although the 
effects are smaller than in the overall sample (slightly smaller for the probability of working 
for earnings, and nearly half for the hours or work), parental exposure continues to have 
statistically significant effects. 
Health is an important component of human capital and ill-health can hinder school 
attendance and skill acquisition. In Table 1.6 we explore how parents’ exposure to the school 
expansion reform affects investments into their children’s health. Given that children’s 
malnutrition has negative effects on long-run outcomes and is still a concern in developing 
countries (Currie and Vogl, 2013; Strauss and Thomas, 1998), we start by considering the 
household’s per capita food consumption as our first proxy for health investments and find a 
strongly significant positive effect of 23% of a standard deviation (column 1). In column 2, we 
find a reduction in household spending on tobacco and cigarettes (14% of a standard deviation, 
weakly statistically significant). Given that parental smoking is harmful to child health because 
of second-hand smoke (Adda and Cornaglia, 2010; Cawley and Ruhm, 2011), this reduction 
can be interpreted as a positive health investment. Our findings are consistent with previous 
evidence on the tradeoff between household expenditures on food consumption and those on 







TABLE 1.6: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE CHILDREN’S GENERATION: INVESTMENTS INTO HEALTH 





























At least one treated parent*Post  0.228*** -0.141* 0.037 0.202 -0.136 0.142* -0.026*  
(0.097) (0.103) (0.040) (0.217) (0.128) (0.106) (0.017) 
Observations 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 
Notes: All specifications include fixed effects for survey year, paternal cohort-by-province, maternal cohort-by-province, and region. Control 
variables: child's gender, ethnicitiy (Kinh, Tay, Thai and others), age and age squared. Expenditure variables are based on log expenditure (in 2010 
prices), standardised into a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The sample includes children aged 6-17 of parents born in 1974-1984. 
Significance levels are based on one-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data source: Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (2010, 2012 and 2014) 
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In columns 3 and 4 we investigate the child’s health insurance coverage, and the number 
of preventive health visits to health centers. While we find positive point estimates for both, 
these are not statistically significant. Columns 5 and 6 reveal no statistically significant effect 
on preventive public health care expenditures (although point estimates point to a decrease) and 
a positive effect on preventive private health care expenditures (statistically significant at the 
10% level). This points towards parents spending more on their children’s health within the 
private health care system which is reputed as having a higher quality than the public system, 
particularly in Vietnam (Nguyen and Wilson, 2017). Finally, we look at the probability of the 
child having been hospitalized within the past year. Acute ill health requiring hospitalization 
may in parts be caused by a lack of parental health investments, and hospitalization potentially 
involves absenteeism from school. For these reasons we interpret the reduction in 
hospitalizations of 2.6 percentage points (column 7, weakly statistically significant) as a 
beneficial effect on health investments. 
In Appendix A, we present additional evidence to rule out that the effects presented in 
this section are affected by differences in children’s ages. If exposure to the compulsory 
schooling reform causes parents to postpone or speed up childbearing, the children of treated 
and untreated parents would have a different age at the time of the survey. If educational 
investments or incidences of child labour vary by child’s age (e.g., are higher in secondary than 
in primary school), this could affect or even drive our results. Reassuringly, as we show in 
Appendix A, Table A.5, parental exposure to the reform has no effect on children’s age at the 
time of the survey. 
Heterogeneity by gender 
We now investigate whether the results reported so far are heterogeneous by the 
children’s gender. Improving understanding of sex differences in parental investments in 
children’s human capital is important as it may help explain gender gaps in social and economic 
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outcomes in adulthood (Baker and Milligan, 2016; Booth and Nolen, 2012; Brenøe and 
Lundberg, 2018). 
In Table 1.7, we focus on a selection of the outcomes from the previous Tables 1.4-1.6. 
A more comprehensive analysis for all outcomes is in Appendix A, Table A.6. While point 
estimates show beneficial effects of parental exposure to the reform for children of both 
genders, it is striking that effect sizes are relatively larger for sons than for daughters. For school 
enrolment (column 1), the effect for sons exceeds that for daughters by a factor of 1.4. For 
school tuition, educational spending and private health expenditures this rises to a factor of 1.5-
2, and for child labour and hospitalizations to a factor of 3. Furthermore, the effects on total 
educational spending, child labour, and the health outcomes are statistically significant for boys 
only. The third row of coefficients in Table 1.7 reports the differences in the effects between 
sons and daughters. With the exception of total school related spending, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the effects are equal between genders. Nevertheless, it is intriguing that all effect 
differences point to the same direction, favoring boys. 
These imbalances may well reflect preferences for sons in Asian cultures such as Vietnam 
(Bharadwaj and Lakdawala, 2013), which may affect how parents choose to distribute 
additional monetary investments between sons and daughters (Barcellos et al., 2014; Choi and 
Hwang, 2015; Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011).18 In the last row of coefficients in Table 1.7 
we show, however, that the (unconditional) pre-reform difference in these investments was not 
in all cases skewed in favor of boys. Prior to the reform boys experienced lower school 
enrolment and school-related spending, and more hours of child labour. Judging from the point 
estimates, the reform effects would then have over-compensated these differences leading to 
post-reform outcomes in favor of boys.  
 
18 In other cultural settings, the results may be different. For example, Baker and Milligan (2016) find that parents spend time 
on teaching activities more with daughters than with sons in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom.  
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Overall, we conclude from this section that the compulsory schooling reform not only 
improved the quantity and quality of schooling of the children of the directly affected 
generation, as well as the monetary investments in their education, but also had a significant 
preventative effect on child labour, and positive effects on health investments. Moreover, these 
effects tend to be larger for sons compared to daughters. To our knowledge, such 
comprehensive intergenerational spillover effects of primary school expansion have not been 
shown in the literature before. In further robustness checks presented in Appendix A, Tables 
A.7-A.10, we show that the results presented in this section are highly robust against allowing 
for different linear paternal and maternal cohort trends between rural and urban areas. 
1.4.3 Intergenerational spillover effects on the parent’s generation 
Previous literature has argued that having more children contributes to economic security in old 
age due to integenerational support from offspring to parents (Banerjee et al. 2010; Chen and 
Fang, 2018; Oliveira, 2016). Recent studies have emphasized that the quality of children (e.g., 
their level of schooling) also matters for upward intergenerational support and thus may affect 
the later-life outcomes of parents (De Neve and Fink, 2018; Lundborg and Majlesi, 2018; Ma, 
2019). The role of children for old-age parents is likely to be particularly strong in developing 
countries where social security systems are poorly functioning and financial markets are 
underdeveloped. In this section we investigate upward intergenerational spillover effects, on 
old age health outcomes of the parents of the generation directly affected by the reform. We 
start with the main results, followed by an analysis of mechanisms. 
Main results 
Table 1.8 presents effects of exposure to the reform on one’s parents’ old age health 
outcomes based on regression Equation (1.3). We present the baseline effect in panel A and 
heterogeneity by parental gender in panel B. The age range of parents included in the sample is 





TABLE 1.7: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE CHILDREN’S GENERATION: HETEROGENEITY BY CHILD GENDER 

















At least one treated parent*Post*Daughter 0.069** 0.168* 0.126 -0.114 0.095 -0.013  
(0.031) (0.104) (0.115) (0.155) (0.121) (0.034) 
At least one treated parent*Post*Son 0.096*** 0.298*** 0.302*** -0.365*** 0.204* -0.045*  
(0.028) (0.112) (0.114) (0.147) (0.127) (0.035) 
Effect difference (son-daughter) 0.027 0.130 0.176* -0.251 0.109 -0.032   
(0.027) (0.108) (0.094) (0.159) (0.121) (0.033) 
Unconditional pre-reform gender difference  -0.022*** -0.027 -0.076*** 0.121*** 0.033 0.007 
(son-daughter) (0.006) (0.023) (0.023) (0.036) (0.023) (0.004) 
Observations 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 
Notes: All specifications include fixed effects for survey year, paternal cohort-by-province, maternal cohort-by-province, and region. Control variables: 
child's gender, ethnicitiy (Kinh, Tay, Thai and others), age and age squared. Expenditure variables are based on log expenditure (in 2010 prices), 
standardised into a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The sample includes children aged 6-17 of parents born in 1974-1984. Significance levels are 
based on one-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Data source: Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (2010, 2012 and 2014) 
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With respect to the general health outcomes in the first three columns, we find that having 
at least one child exposed to the reform reduces the annual days of sickness by 10 days (column 
1). We also find a roughly 10 percentage points increase in general self-reported health, both 
absolute (column 2) and relative to peers of the same age range (column 3). With respect to 
mental health outcomes in the last three columns, panel A shows no overall effects on 
depression, sleep problems, or general life satisfaction. With respect to the gender of the parent, 
Panel B shows that even though there are some gender differences for specific outcomes there 
is no general pattern that would indicate that the effects benefit only mothers or only fathers. 
The difference in the effects for mothers and fathers are not statistically significant, except for 
sleep problems, where there is a beneficial effect for fathers but not for mothers of treated 
children (column 5, panel B). To sum up, we find positive overall effects on general health, 
and some indication of a beneficial mental health effect for fathers.  
Mechanisms 
One important mechanism why old age parents could be in better health if their children 
had access to better education is an improved financial situation, which could allow them access 
to better health care or earlier retirement. A second important class of mechanisms are better 
health behaviors (Ma, 2019). According to these broad classes of mechanisms, we split our 
analysis up into financial mechanisms (Table 1.9) and behavioural mechanisms (Table 1.10). 
With regards to the overall effects in panel A of Table 1.9, we find no reform effects on 
indicators for poverty, for whether the income meets personal needs, or whether parents receive 
income support from their children, although these estimates all point into the direction of 
improvement. We do however find positive effects in columns 4-6 on an indicator for having 
savings, on household assets (an index summing up items such as having a refrigerator, a water 
heater, an improved sanitation, etc.) and on satisfaction with the financial status. One reason 
why assets and financial satisfaction might be improved despite no significant improvements 
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in income could be if better educated children require less financial support from their parents, 
allowing the parents to increase savings and other assets. Column 7 further shows an effect of 
1.7 percentage points on having a private health insurance which is expected to provide the 
elderly with better health care compared to a public health insurance. Heterogeneity results in 




TABLE 1.8: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE PARENT’S GENERATION: HEALTH OUTCOMES 
















 Panel A. Baseline  
At least one treated child*Post -10.031** 0.088***  0.120***  -0.001  -0.020  0.042  
  (5.634) (0.036) (0.048) (0.003) (0.042) (0.048) 
 Panel B. Heterogeneity by parental gender  
At least one treated child*Post*Mother -7.683**  0.075** 0.076*** -0.001  0.025  0.039  
 (3.389) (0.034) (0.032) (0.003) (0.040) (0.042) 
At least one treated child*Post*Father -3.553  0.082* 0.141***  0.002  -0.127*** 0.063  
 (5.782) (0.053) (0.054) (0.006) (0.050) (0.054) 
Effect difference (father-mother) 4.130 0.007  0.065  0.003 -0.152** 0.024  
 (6.350) (0.068) (0.064) (0.007) (0.067) (0.067) 
Unconditional pre-reform gender difference  4.552 0.101*** 0.097*** 0.003 -0.087*** -0.061**  
(father-mother) (2.880) (0.025) (0.027) (0.004) (0.023) (0.025) 
Observations 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 
Notes: All specifications include fixed effects for region and five-year-age-interval-by-province (age intervals defined as 60-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, 
and ≥80 years old). Control variables: gender, ethnicity (Kinh), and dummies indicating the number of children by birth cohort category (before 1974, 
1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, and after 1984).  Sample includes the individuals aged 60 and above who have 
children born in 1974-1984. Significance levels are based on one-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in 
parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data source: Vietnam Aging Survey (2011) 
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Looking at behavioural mechanisms, Table 1.10 reveals no effect on smoking of old age 
parents, but very sizable reductions in alcohol consumption, driven entirely by fathers. As 
columns 2-4, panel B, show, the probability of both moderate and daily alcohol consumption 
reduces by 10 percentage points for fathers. In the remaining columns we investigate social 
contacts within and outside the family, which may affect mental health (Meng and Xue, 2020). 
There is evidence for an increase in social activities outside the house for fathers of treated 
children (column 5, panel B). Finally, while there is no effect on having at least one grandchild, 
there is an increase in the number of children in law (i.e., one’s children being married). This 
result matches the positive effect on the marriage probability of the directly affected generation 
(Table 1.3 above). A higher number of children in law might affect parental outcomes positively 
in line with the strong evidence on the positive effects of the number of own children on old-
age support (Oliveira, 2016). 
To sum up, we find some positive effects of the primary school expansion on the old age 
health of the parents of the directly affected generation. These appear to be primarily physical 
rather than mental health effects, and relevant mechanisms include a better financial situation, 
private health insurance and, for fathers, reduced drinking and improved social activities. In 
Appendix A (Tables A.11-A.13), we find the results presented in this section to be highly robust 







TABLE 1.9: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE PARENT’S GENERATION: POTENTIAL FINANCIAL MECHANISMS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 



















 Panel A. Baseline  
At least one treated child*Post -0.003  0.059  0.019  0.088***  0.203**  0.066**  0.017* 
  (0.039) (0.050) (0.040) (0.027) (0.089) (0.030) (0.012) 
 Panel B. Heterogeneity by parental gender 
At least one treated child*Post*Mother 0.009  0.024 0.018  0.034*  0.130**  0.034* 0.010   
(0.030)  (0.042) (0.037) (0.023) (0.071)  (0.026) (0.012) 
At least one treated child*Post*Father 0.025  0.058   -0.029  0.071**  0.123*  0.069**  0.020**   
(0.039) (0.050) (0.060) (0.032) (0.096) (0.035) (0.012) 
Effect difference (father-mother) 0.016 0.034 -0.047 0.037 -0.007 0.035 0.010  
(0.050) (0.063) (0.073) (0.036) (0.115) (0.041) (0.015) 
Unconditional pre-reform gender difference  -0.042** 0.039 -0.073*** -0.014 0.081 0.049*** -0.002 
(father-mother) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.016) (0.069) (0.018) (0.006) 
Observations 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 
Notes: All specifications include fixed effects for region and five-year-age-interval-by-province (age intervals defined as 60-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, and ≥80 
years old). Control variables: gender, ethnicity (Kinh), and dummies indicating the number of children by birth cohort category (before 1974, 1974, 1975, 1976, 
1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, and after 1984).  Sample includes the individuals aged 60 and above who have children born in 1974-1984. 
Significance levels are based on one-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





TABLE 1.10: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE PARENT’S GENERATION: POTENTIAL BEHAVIOURAL HEALTH MECHANISMS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Smoking 











size   
2-3 times 
per week 
4-6 times per 
week  
once per day  
 Panel A. Baseline  
At least one treated child*Post -0.018  -0.059**  -0.055**  -0.038*  -0.019  0.007  0.273***  0.129 
  (0.035) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.049) (0.012) (0.099) (0.209) 
 Panel B. Heterogeneity by parental gender 
At least one treated child*Post*Mother -0.017  -0.003  0.005  0.015  -0.034  0.001  0.291***  -0.028  
(0.026) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.037) (0.014) (0.089) (0.150) 
At least one treated child*Post*Father -0.048  -0.103***  -0.128***  -0.114***   0.075*  0.006 0.142*  0.159  
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.041) (0.056)  (0.011) (0.093) (0.195) 
Effect difference (father-mother) -0.031 -0.100* -0.133*** -0.129*** 0.109* 0.005 -0.149 0.187  
(0.050) (0.053) (0.051) (0.048) (0.060) (0.017) (0.127) (0.250) 
Unconditional pre-reform gender difference  0.327*** 0.279*** 0.234*** 0.216*** -0.065** -0.002 0.132 0.070 
(father-mother) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.006) (0.112) (0.116) 
Observations 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 
Notes: All specifications include fixed effects for region and five-year-age-interval-by-province (age intervals defined as 60-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, and ≥80 
years old). Control variables: gender, ethnicity (Kinh), and dummies indicating the number of children by birth cohort category (before 1974, 1974, 1975, 1976, 
1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, and after 1984).  Sample incluses the individuals aged 60 and above who have children born in 1974-1984. 
Significance levels are based on one-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data source: Vietnam Aging Survey (2011) 
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1.5 Discussion and conclusion 
We have studied the multigenerational effects of primary school expansion in Vietnam sparked 
by the country’s 1991 schooling reform. Our results show that the reform had a strong positive 
effect of 10 percentage points on primary and secondary school completion of the directly 
affected cohorts. Through this effect, the reform increased the intergenerational educational 
mobility. Reform exposure also increased literacy, economic activity outside the agricultural 
sector, and earnings. It raised residential stability, the probability of being married, the level of 
education of the marital partner, and it increased fertility at the extensive margin, while 
reducing it at the intensive margin. In terms of downward spillovers, we document effects on 
the affected cohorts’ investments in their children’s human capital. The results indicate that 
parental exposure to the reform raised children’s school enrolment and parental spending on 
school-related expenses (tuition fees, textbooks) and other educational spending (children’s 
books and magazines, toys). Moreover, we find evidence for an increase in health investments 
and a reduction in child labour. Most of these downward spillover effects benefit sons more 
than daughters. This may be a driver of gender gaps in achievement in adulthood (Barcellos et 
al., 2014; Chetty et al., 2016), and the gender pattern mirrors results reported in causal studies 
on the intergenerational transmission of human capital (Black et al., 2005; Lundborg et al., 
2014). Our findings complement a comparatively sparse literature on the mediating channels 
of the intergenerational transmission of education. While we focus on monetary investment in 
children’s health and human capital, Carneiro et al. (2013) focus on the home environment and 
parental investments in children’s cultural knowledge, musical skills, reading ability, computer 
skills, and joint home activities. Piopiunik (2014) isolates the degree to which parents value 
education as an important channel. By showing that downward intergenerational spillovers 
operate through parental investments in their children’s human capital, we also contribute to 
the literature on the determinants of parental investments (Attanasio, 2015). The evidence 
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available on the link between parental schooling and their investments in child human capital 
is mainly correlational (Brown, 2006; Strauss and Thomas, 1995). The literature has highlighted 
determinants such as child endowments (Adhvaryu and Nyshadham, 2016), parental beliefs 
(Kinsler and Pavan, 2016), fertility (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009), gender and race 
(Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011; Thompson, 2018), household characteristics (Newman 
and Holupka, 2014), and labour market conditions (Majlesi, 2014). Our results suggest 
exposure to primary school expansion as an additional causal determinant of investments into 
one’s children’s human capital through the various channels we identify. 
In terms of upward spillovers, we find that the primary school expansion had positive 
general health effects in old age for the parents of the directly affected generation. As potential 
channels of these effects, our results indicate improved financial resources in old age, access to 
private health insurance and reduced alcohol consumption. Prior research on the causal 
determinants of health in old age has emphasized the roles of economic conditions (De Nardi 
et al., 2009), early-life conditions (Bhalotra et al., 2017; Case and Paxson, 2009), retirement 
decisions (Atalay et at., 2019; Fabrizio and Franco, 2017), child migration (Antman, 2010; 
Böhme et al., 2015), home care (Barnay and Juin, 2016), social pensions and government 
assistance programmes (Fetter and Lockwood, 2018; Salm, 2011). Our results add to this 
literature by focusing on the human capital of the younger generation as an important driver of 
the old age individuals’ health and well-being.  
While educational attainment has long been recognized as one of the most powerful and 
sustainable tools for transforming human lives and promoting economic development (Krueger 
and Lindahl, 2001; Manuelli and Seshadri, 2014; Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011), fully 
understanding the social returns of educational policies is very much a matter of ongoing 
research. Prior literature has often emphasized spillovers on economic outcomes, including 
aggregate productivity and economic growth (Lange and Topel, 2006; Moretti, 2004a). Micro-
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level studies have documented spillovers on plant productivity (Moretti, 2004b), crime 
(Lochner and Moretti, 2004), and voter participation (Moretti et al., 2003). Our paper shows 
that the family is an important social group in which spillovers materialize across generations, 
including on non-economic outcomes such as health. 
Our findings show that downward and upward intergenerational spillover effects 
constitute important components of the social returns of compulsory schooling policies such as 
primary school expansion. Moreover, we show that in a developing country, increased 
monetary investments in children’s health and education and decreased instances of child 
labour may be important drivers of the downward spillover effect, while the upward spillover 
effect on parental health seems to be driven by both financial resources and health behaviors. 
These channels have received little attention in the literature trying to disentangle the channels 
of intergenerational spillover effects of human capital. 
Overall, our findings imply that through both long-term effects on the directly affected 
generation and external effects within families on the next and the previous generation, enacting 
and enforcing compulsory primary schooling has high social returns. Given recent estimates 
for low-income countries that put the average primary school completion rate at 59% 
(UNESCO, 2019) and the prevalence rate of child labour at 19% (ILO, 2017), our results carry 
particular policy relevance for those countries and call for increased efforts in achieving 
universal primary school completion. More generally, however, given that positive externalities 
of education are among the predominant economic rationales for the provision of publicly 
funded education (Hanushek, 2002), our results reinforce the economic rationale for providing 











I exploit exogenous variation in regional exposure to Confucian cultural heritage by drawing 
on a unique historical evolution in Vietnam and employ a spatial regression discontinuity design 
to estimate the causal effect of culture on educational success. My results show that exposure 
to Confucian cultural heritage increases schooling years and degree achievement for adults as 
well as school enrolment and test scores for children. I provide evidence to suggest that these 
effects work through positive cultural values and beliefs towards schooling and increased 
human capital investments. Exposure to Confucian cultural heritage further ameliorates 
intergenerational educational mobility. 
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While education generates considerable economic and nonpecuniary returns (Angrist and 
Krueger, 1991; Card, 1999, 2001; Clark and Royer, 2013; Duflo, 2001; Heckman et al., 2018; 
Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011), it varies substantially across various ethnic groups and 
geographic regions both across and within countries (Barro and Lee, 2013; Lee and Lee, 2016). 
Understanding what fundamentally affects schooling outcomes is therefore indispensable to 
account for inequalities in socioeconomic outcomes. Economists have focused on multiple 
economic factors and educational policies to explain disparities in educational success such as 
income, family background, school resources and policies, and institutions among others 
(Björklund and Salvanes, 2011; Black et al., 2005; Case and Deaton, 1999; Hanushek and 
Woessmann, 2011; Meghir and Palme, 2005; Woessmann, 2016). However, these determinants 
are not arguably fully satisfied in explaining the robustly exceptional success of Vietnam on 
the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)19 in comparision with other 
countries when relating income to academic performance.20  
Scholars from other disciplines such as psychology, sociology, and education have long 
recognized the importance of culture for educational achievement.21 Yet, it is challenging to 
identify the causality of this relationship because an ethnic group or a region with a culture that 
likely drives schooling outcomes typically differs from other groups or regions along climate, 
historical, institutional, and socioeconomic characteristics.  
 
19 PISA measures the academic performance of 15-year-old students across the globe in an internationally 
comparable way. 
20 On both the 2012 and 2015 PISA waves, Vietnam was in among the top-ranked participating countries and was 
considerably higher than all other developing countries despite a fact that this country was among one of the 
poorest countries. Vietnamese students even performed better the counterparts from several developed countries 
including the USA and the UK (see Dang et al., 2020).    
21 Culture is defined as beliefs, values, and preferences shared by individuals within communities or ethnic groups 
(Fernández 2011; Tabellini, 2008). 
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In this paper, I explore a unique historical setting in Vietnam to study the effect of 
Confucian cultural heritage on present-day educational success. Confucianism, which 
originated in ancient China and is named after the scholar Confucius,22 represents a compilation 
of ancestral philosophical thoughts on political, social, and family values. Due to its dominant 
influence throughout regional history, Confucianism has been recognized as the fundamental 
component creating the Northeast Asian culture up until present times (Kim et al., 2017; Bell, 
2010; Paramore, 2016).23 Confucianism is particularly well-known for its emphasis on 
education (Tan, 2017), and its positive values towards schooling are presumed to have persisted 
into modern society, strongly affecting people’s preferences and beliefs (Wang, 2016). Inspired 
by Confucianism, historical states developed meritocratic institutions, such as using academic 
performance on imperial civic examinations to recruit and allocate public servants. Educational 
achievement, therefore, played a crucial role in deciding whether a male, regardless of his initial 
status or social class, would become a state bureaucrat and enjoy the immense benefits and 
respects that this career entailed. Cultural values towards education were therefore firmly 
established and rooted in Northeast Asian societies due to the extended joint evolution of 
Confucianism and exam-based meritocratic institutions (Chen et al., 2020). As a result of one 
millennium years of Chinese occupation between 111 B.C. and 938, Chinese culture and 
institutions were imported and rooted into pre-modern Vietnamese society, which was 
aboriginally established by the Kinh people24 in the region known as Northern Vietnam today 
 
22 Although Confucius or Kong-Fuzi in Chinese (551-479 B.C.) was the formal founder and also the initial 
instructor of Confucianism, he was not the original inventor of what made up Confucianism which was already 
present before the time he had lived. Confucius was actually the first person systematically collecting and 
documenting traditional philosophical wisdoms and thoughts of his past generations, who was followed by other 
two influential Confucian philosophers Mencius (371-289 B.C.) and Xunzi (310-235 B.C. or 314-217 B.C.) among 
others to compose Confucian texts which have been well-known as Four Books and Five Classics (Yao, 2000).  
23 The term ‘Confucianism’ was invented by the 16th century Jesuit missionaries in pre-modern China when they 
started to fully acknowledge the focal position of Confucius amongst the intellectual traditions of ancient China. 
Confucianism is typically mentioned as Rujiao in Chinese, Jukyo in Japanese, Yukyo in Korean, and Nho giao in 
Vietnamese, which all approximately convey a message of the teaching of traditional scholars (Goldin, 2014; 
Yao, 2000). 
24 The Kinh people is the ethnic majority in Vietnam’s today, which amounts to about 89% while other remaining 
62 ethnicities only occupy 11% of the total population (Population and Housing Census, 2009).  
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(Thuc, 1967; Whitmore, 1997). After gaining self-rule in 938, the Kinh people formally 
assumed the colonial legacy of Chinese culture and institutions to construct their historical state 
of Dai Viet.25 Confucianism was not only formally accepted as the state ideology but also 
actively promoted and expanded in parallel with the meritocratic institutions used for public 
personnel recruitments in the Dai Viet kingdom.  
Based on a similar approach as the one developed in Dell et al. (2018), my study draws 
on marked cultural and institutional differences in the 10th century between the historical states 
of what is today Northern and Southern Vietnam. As demonstrated in Figure 2.1, the territory 
of today’s Vietnam comprised three kingdoms in the 10th century: Dai Viet, Champa, and 
Khmer, which were respectively located in the northern, middle, and southern parts of modern-
day Vietnam. While Dai Viet possessed all the necessary characteristics to be identified as one 
of the Sinic states of Confucianism-based Northeast Asian societies, Champa and Khmer 
belonged to Southeast Asian states of the Indic cultural trajectory, which were not influenced 
by ancient Chinese culture and institutions. Between the 11th and 19th century, Dai Viet engaged 
in a politically idiosyncratic process of southward territorial expansion, exporting its Confucian 
culture and meritocratic institutions to Champa and then Khmer. Due to the gradual southward 
conquest, different parts of modern Vietnam were exposed to the Dai Viet culture and 
institution for varying amounts of time ranging from 25 to 920 years. This is depicted in Figure 
2.1, in which the differently shaded areas which were generated by different historical 
boundaries established at different times mark different lengths of rule by the Confucian Dai 
Viet kingdom. Years of exposure to the Dai Viet rule are calculated as the time span between 
 
25 Dai Viet, which has a meaning of ‘Great Viet’, was the name used for the longest time (732 years) among the 
names the pre-modern Vietnamese states used between 938 and 1858 compared to other short-time names such as 
Tinh Hai Quan (30 years), Dai Co Viet (86 years), Dai Ngu (7 years), Giao Chi (20 years), Viet Nam (35 years) 
and Dai Nam (19 years). For that reason, I use the name of Dai Viet to mention all Vietnamese states throughout 
pre-modern times for the purpose of simplification.  
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when an area was first annexed by Dai Viet and the start of French colonization in 1858 when 
the Western-style institution used for exploitation colonialism replaced Dai Viet rule.  
 




Source: This figure is created by the author based on Taylor (2013); Quoc Su Quan 
Trieu Nguyen (1972); Ngo et al. (2001) 
 
Although Dai Viet’s historical ideology of Confucianism and its inspired exam-based 
meritocracy do not formally exist in modern times, their legacies may still be surviving through 
Confucian cultural heritage bequeathed from generation to generation. However, Confucian 
cultural inheritance would have different levels of concentration in different parts of modern-
day Vietnam, and it would be expected to be more intensive in regions with longer exposure 
times to Dai Viet rule. Motivated by the strong positive relationship between years of exposure 
to Dai Viet rule and contemporary educational outcomes, as illustrated in Figure 2.2, my study 
seeks to answer the questions of whether and how Confucian cultural heritage causally 
improves educational outcomes in modern-day Vietnam. To control for potential confounding 
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factors26 along with the treatment of Confucian cultural heritage, my empirical strategy relies 
on a spatial regression discontinuity design (SRDD) by exploiting the second-to-last historical 
boundary of Dai Viet’s southward expansion, which was formed in 1698 as depicted in Figure 
1. As I discuss in Section 2.4, the 1698 boundary was arbitrarily established as a result of 
exogenous political shocks within both the Dai Viet and Khmer kingdoms, dividing the 
southernmost region of today’s Vietnam into two distinct parts in terms of the duration of 
exposure to Dai Viet’s culture and institution: the right-hand side part having nearly 160 years 
and the left-hand side part having only 25 years. The differences in length of annexation led to 
differences in the strength of Confucian culture, given that a culture can be expected to become 
more deeply rooted into local society with increased exposure time (Alesina et al., 2013; 
Giuliano and Nunn, 2020; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012). I, therefore, use the region to the right 
of the boundary to construct my treatment regions of Confucian cultural heritage, with the 
regions to the left of the boundary acting as control regions more strongly influenced by Khmer 
rather than Dai Viet culture. Focusing on a narrow geographic area around the 1698 boundary 
allows my empirical analysis to disregard confounders stemming from differences in regional 
characteristics.27  
I find robust positive effects of Confucian cultural heritage on modern-day educational 
outcomes. It increases adults’ educational attainment by 0.7 schooling years and also increases 
their degree achievement by 4 percentage points for completing primary school, 8 percentage 
points for completing lower secondary school, 6 percentage points for completing upper-
secondary school, and nearly 3 percentage points for obtaining a college degree. Confucian 
 
26 This is because various parts of today’s Vietnam, spanning from northern to southern regions, have different 
characteristics in terms of climate, demographic traits, historical formation, local labour markets, and economic 
development. 
27 In Section 2.4, I provide evidence that potential confounding factors are smooth at the 1698 boundary, lending 
support to the spatial regression discontinuity design. 
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cultural heritage increases children’s post-compulsory school enrolment by 5.8 percentage 
points and improves test scores for high school graduates on their national high school exams.  
 
FIGURE 2.2: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DURATION OF EXPOSURE TO DAI VIET  
AND CONTEMPORARY SCHOOLING OUTCOMES 
 
Notes: This figure shows the correlations between years of exposure to Dai Viet and 
contemporary educational outcomes. The outcomes include schooling years, 
educational level completion rates (primary school, lower secondary school and upper 
secondary school) and rate of a college degree for adults aged 25-64, and school 
enrollement rate for children aged 6-17. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
Data source: Vietnam Population and Housing Census (2009, 15% sample) 
 
To interpret these results, I analyse several channels. First, I show that Confucian cultural 
heritage improves positive values and beliefs towards schooling. Individuals living in treatment 
regions particularly show stronger preferences towards aspiring to additional education and are 
more likely to have positive beliefs regarding the importance of higher education beyond 
compulsory schooling for their lives than those living in control regions. Second, I show that 
Confucian cultural heritage raises human capital investments, which have been well 
documented as being a vital determinant of long-run educational achievement. In particular, 
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school-aged children in treatment regions enjoy higher investments in their school and learning 
activities than those in control regions. Moreover, I find that Confucian cultural heritage 
enhances social mobility across generations by helping reduce the dependence of child 
education on parental education, suggesting a favourable effect on intergenerational 
educational mobility.  
My paper has several key contributions. First, it contributes to a body of literature 
exploring the causal link between culture and schooling outcomes which has been understudied 
but received an increasing interest from economists. The psychology, sociology, and education 
literatures have long recognized that learning aspirations, study effort, educational attainment, 
and academic performance of students are related to cultural background (for example, Li, 
2012; King and McInerney, 2014; Sullivan, 2001). However, these studies have been 
suggestive without having established causal links between culture and educational outcomes.28 
A rare study in economics by Tramonte and Willms (2010) provides a largely correlational 
analysis pointing towards positive associations between parental cultural behaviours and 
children’s educational performance. Recent causal works in economics (Ashraf et al., 2020; La 
Ferrara and Milazzo, 2017) show that visible cultural practices in the areas of bequests and 
marriages affect educational decisions. My research is more interested in the direct role of 
cultural values and beliefs towards education in shaping educational outcomes which has been 
rarely investigated (Becker et al., 2020; Figlio et al., 2019). My paper further makes a broader 
contribution in advancing our understanding of how culture in which traits have been shown to 
be persistent across centuries (Alesina et al., 2013; Giuliano and Nunn, 2020; Voigtländer and 
Voth, 2012) interacts with economics (Eugster and Parchet, 2019; Eugster et al., 2017; 
 
28 An exception is Jæger (2011), who uses household panel data to net out family fixed effects and finds evidence 
for a positive relationship between culture and academic achievement. By focusing on within-family differences 




Fernández, 2008; Fernández and Fogli, 2006; Guiso et al., 2006; Lowes et al., 2017; Nunn, 
forthcoming). 
Second, my paper provides evidence to help understand the role of cultural values towards 
schooling in explaining cross-country differences in academic performance. An intriguing 
example is the PISA results in which students from Confucianism-originated countries such as 
South Korea, Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, Japan, Macao, Singapore, and Vietnam are 
surprisingly consistently among the top-ranked positions (see Appendix Table A.1. for the top 
ten-performing countries across the PISA waves).29 Their PISA success stories have received 
enormous attention from both academics and policymakers around the world but have not been 
fully understood. Casual observation and anecdotal evidence suggest that Confucian cultural 
heritage in which high value is placed on education may be a factor in helping to explain PISA 
results (Jerrim, 2015; Jerrim and Choi, 2014).30 Yet, whether such cultural differences causally 
affect test scores is largely unknown. My findings support the hypothesis that Confucian 
cultural heritage likely plays an important role in accounting for Northeast Asian success.  
Third, my paper contributes to another literature strand that documents the long-run 
effects of historical institutions on contemporary economic development (Dell et al., 2018; 
Nunn, 2007, 2020; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2020). My paper suggests that a pro-
schooling-culture-inspired institution may contribute to long-run development via the human 
capital channel. A paper close to mine is one by Dell et al. (2018), which shows that historical 
exposure to the Dai Viet kingdom has positive effects on Vietnam’s modern-day economic 
development. The authors argue that these benefits originated from Dai Viet’s strong historical 
institutions of village-level local governance, which created persistent norms in favour of 
 
29 Northeast Asian students are also ranked at top positions in other competitions such as the Trends in International 
Mathematics and Science Study (see Provasnik et al., 2016). 
30 Public discussions also mentioned Confucian culture as a potential driver of the Northeast Asian success. For 
instance, the Economist (in 2016) and the Guardian (in 2014) respectively ran articles “Culture or policy? What 




cooperation and community engagement that favour economic development today. My study 
complements their findings through an in-depth analysis of the effects of Dai Viet exposure on 
modern-day educational outcomes. Differently from their paper, I highlight the meritocratic 
character of Dai Viet’s institution as an important factor. Since I document the roots of these 
institutions in ancient Confucian culture and philosophy and argue that the persistent effects 
are based on the transmission of cultural values and beliefs, I interpret my results as the effects 
of culture on educational outcomes. Given that recent evidence in economics suggests that 
culture and institutions evolve jointly, influence each other over time, and likely affect long-
run development (Nunn, 2012; Bisin and Verdier, 2017; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; Lowes et 
al., 2017; Tabellini, 2010), fully disentangling the effects of historical culture from those of 
historical institutions is, however, typically unfeasible. 
The remainder of my paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides the cultural and 
historical background. Section 2.3 describes the data, and Section 2.4 discusses my empirical 
strategy. Section 2.5 presents the empirical results, while Section 2.6 explores the potential 
mechanisms. Section 2.7 provides results on intergenerational educational mobility. Section 2.8 
concludes my paper. 
 
2.2 Cultural and historical background 
2.2.1 Confucianism and its emphasis on education 
Confucianism arose as one of many doctrines of thought for constructing society under the 
Zhou dynasty (1046-256 B.C.) in ancient China. Confucianism was formally chosen as the 
imperial ideology which played the role of providing philosophical keystones for governing 
society (Kung and Ma, 2014). Rulers invested large amounts of resources to root Confucian 
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traditions into social life by spreading Confucian knowledge to local communities via teaching 
Confucian lessons and constructing Confucian temples in villages.  
Confucianism particularly highlighted the role of education as being essential for societal 
transformation and advancement (Dutton et al., 2012).31 It firmly valued high standards for the 
ruling class’s competence, demonstrating that rulers and bureaucrats should be distinguished 
from commoners through their par excellence scholarship with the highest moral merits 
(Confucius, 1993). Confucianism valued educational success not only for the ruling class but 
also among males from lower social classes who, in the Confucian perspective, should achieve 
educational success through rigorous schooling to pursue a public service career (Tan, 2017). 
While Confucianism highlighted educational success as a core ethical conformity for any male 
in society, it promoted an equal openness of access to schooling because ‘in education, there 
are no class distinctions’ (de Bary and Bloom, 1960, IV, pp. 38). The emphasis on education 
has, therefore, been well-established as one of the central values of Confucianism (see 
Appendix B1 for the Confucian perspective on education). 
In pre-modern independent Vietnam, since defeating ancient Chinese colonists, the 
historical state of Dai Viet used Confucianism as a formal imperial doctrine for constructing its 
monarchical regime’s ethical, political, and social orders throughout its ruling times spanning 
from the late 10th to early 20th century (Duiker and Spielvogel, 2008; Kiernan, 2017; Kim, 
1971). Dai Viet’s Confucianism-inspired rulers valued the quality of state officials and thus 
education for the state’s development.32 Dai Viet, therefore, invested in its educational system 
as a fundamental means for creating the state’s talents (Mo, 2003). Governors constructed 
 
31 Confucius once said, ‘by nature men are pretty much alike, it is learning and practice that set them apart’ and 
‘education breeds confidence, confidence breeds hope, hope breeds peace’ (de Bary and Bloom, 1960, XVII, pp. 
2). 
32 Emperor Le Thanh Tong once said that ‘mandarins are the fundamental origin of the order or the disturbance. 
Virtuous and talented people holding state positions would make society in order. Otherwise, immoral and 
untalented people would cause a disordered society’ and ‘therefore, it is necessary for any emperors in any 
dynasties to emphasize training the talented, recruiting the intellectuals, and growing the national vitality’ (Quoc 
Su Quan Trieu Nguyen, 1998). 
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systems of universities and schools in both the capital and localities to educate people as well 
as extensively opened access to school not only for royal clans and noblemen but also for those 
among talented commoners without discrimination based on a person’s background (Thang, 
2005).33 Moreover, learning societies were developed across Dai Viet due to informal teaching 
activities in villages (Hong, 1992).  
2.2.2 Exam-based meritocracy 
Confucian ideology manifested its meritocratic essence by using talents for social governance 
(Elman, 1991). Being inspired by Confucianism, monarchical rulers used educational 
performance shown via imperial civic exams to recruit well-learned males to serve in the 
bureaucracy (Elman, 1991). The first exam-based meritocratic institution that initiated in 
ancient China was known as keju, the oldest exam-based meritocratic institution in the world, 
which was then spread to neighbouring states, including pre-modern Vietnam (Chen et al., 
2020).34  
Imperial civic exams which were broadly accessible to all males (but not for female 
candidates) regardless of a male’s origin and social status would, to a large extent, provide 
talented citizens with significant ‘equality of opportunity’ to become bureaucrats and receive 
large material benefits and the prestigious reputation entitled with a public servant position. A 
paper by Chen et al. (2020) has found that this meritocratic institution promoted 
 
33 In 1070, Dai Viet established the Temple of Literature (Van Mieu) in the capital of Thang Long, which was 
known as the imperial temple presenting the statues of Confucius and his following intellectuals to manifest Dai 
Viet’s recognition of Confucian values towards learning and education and also to encourage citizens acquiring 
knowledge (Son, 1968; Vien Khoa hoc Xa hoi Vietnam, 2001). Subsequently, Dai Viet constructed the first 
university of the empire the Imperial Academy (Quoc Tu Giam) in 1076 and the National Institute of Learning 
(Quoc Hoc Vien) in 1253 to establish key infrastructures for education at the central government level. 
34 Prior to exam-based meritocracy, public official vacancies were mainly chosen via an aristocratic mechanism 
in which the elite class with advantaged background and political connection occupied most of appointments. Such 
an aristocratic institution strongly violated Confucian perspective on fairness and efficiency in selecting civil 
servants. Identifying these problems, Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty (141-87 B.C.) in ancestral China was the 
first ruler to initiate imperial exams to select the best talents for governmental officials, opening a new era using 




intergenerational economic mobility in historical China. The benefits of exam success are 
evocatively illustrated in the poem ‘Advice on Studying’ written by Emperor Zhenzong (968-
1022) of the Song dynasty (920-1279); this poem aimed to encourage the emperor’s citizens to 
join exams:  
There is no need to buy land to make the family rich, for there are tons of grains in 
the books. There is no need to set the frame to build a house, for there are golden 
places in the books. There is no need to feel sorry for the lack of matchmakers for 
marriage, for there are jade-like beauties in the books. There is no need to worry 
about having no followers, for there are carriages and horses in the books. To fulfill 
his life ambition, men should bend over to the Confucian classics in front of the 
window (Gu, 2014, pp. 106).  
Given strong economic motivation, the exams were competitive with large numbers of 
participants. The exam system was thus a focal point in political and social life, making it 
exceptional as a key meritocratic character of historical institutions in Northeast Asia. Exam-
based meritocracy and Confucianism jointly evolved in a two-way interaction in which 
meritocracy was initiated via the inspiration of Confucianism, and meritocracy, in turn, helped 
strengthen the roots of Confucianism in social life. As the exam curricula mainly relied on 
Confucian texts such as Four Books and Five Classics, learning and teaching activities of 
Confucian knowledge were substantially expanded. Confucian values would therefore lead to 
the forming of positive beliefs about the importance of schooling among not only exam takers 
but also the general population. This process repeated across generations for a long time and 
thus made Confucian values towards education prevalent during lengthy historical time periods 
(Elman, 1991).  
Dai Viet developed its Confucian examination system to serve as the key means for public 
official recruitment which was highly similar to the Chinese system in terms of its format, 
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curricula, and admissions. The system lasted over 844 years starting in 1075 under the rule of 
the Ly dynasty and ending in 1919 under the rule of the last Nguyen dynasty35 (see Appendix 
B2 for a description of Dai Viet’s exam system structure).  
When the French colonists arrived in Vietnam, Confucianism and its inspired exam-based 
meritocracy were formally removed until today. Yet, Confucianism and its exam-based 
meritocratic institutions continue to be mentioned as the ‘national essences’ characterizing 
Vietnamese culture and traditions (Dinh, 1969, 1970; Nghia, 2005; Kim, 1971). Historians and 
anthropologists strongly believe that, although Confucianism and exam-based meritocracy are 
no longer formally present in present-day Vietnam, their legacies are nonetheless alive through 
cultural values towards education that were created and have persisted over time to influence 
current generations’ educational decisions (Anh, 1950; Thuc, 1967; Dinh, 1970; Giau, 1988; 
Khieu, 1997; Truong et al., 2016). 
2.2.3 Khmer’s culture and institution 
The Khmer culture and institutions were markedly different from those of Dai Viet (Whitmore, 
1997; Wolters and Wolters, 1999). While Dai Viet was a Sinic-style state of Northeast Asia, 
Khmer belonged to the Indic civilization of Southeast Asia (Lieberman, 1993). Khmer’s culture 
was strongly influenced by the Indian religions of Buddhism and Hinduism, making it an 
intensively religious society (Hansen, 2004). The influence of Indian culture on the Khmer 
kingdom has been revealed through not only religion, ways of life, social norms, language, and 
arts but also architecture, all being imported from India and amended with local traditions 
(Tully, 2006).36  
 
35 Dai Viet’s exam-based meritocracy was gradually replaced by other institutions since the French commenced 
in 1858.  
36 For example, Angkor Wat, which was constructed by the Khmer King Suryavarman II in the early 12th century 
in Yaśodharapura, the capital of the Khmer kingdom, is so far the greatest Hindu temple in the world. 
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In the religiously driven society of Khmer, education was not the focal point of social 
life. Educational activities were narrowly related to Buddhist monastic education, which was 
typically delivered by monks at temples (Kalab, 1976). Moreover, monastic education was only 
available to a limited number of people because the main role of temples was to manage elites’ 
economic resources (Hall, 2010). Importantly, individuals from low social classes had fewer 
opportunities to access schooling because Khmer was predominantly influenced by ‘the Indian 
traditions that remove ordinary people from literary consideration’ (Chandler, 2018, p. 83). 
Khmer’s political institution relied on a decentralized system in which semi-independent 
administrative systems at the local level were mainly used by the central government in royal 
courts as bureaucratic tax collectors (Lieberman, 1993; Tarling, 1999; Woodside, 1971). Given 
such a decentralized regime, to maintain the central government’s political control over local 
authorities, Khmer applied aristocratic rule for political appointments as well as public servant 
positions in which personal relationships with the kings and rulers played a key role (Chandler, 
1983; Hall, 2010; Osborne, 1969). In such an aristocracy, the members of the royal family and 
the religious orders (Brahman priests) particularly enjoyed the highest chances of being chosen 
as governors and bureaucrats, while ordinary individuals were generally excluded from public 
positions (Tully, 2006, p. 39). This aristocracy was in contrast to the meritocracy of Dai Viet.  
2.2.4 Dai Viet’s southward advance and the 1698 boundary 
Between the 11th and 19th centuries, Dai Viet engaged in a southward conquest to expand its 
territory by taking over the Champa and Khmer empires (Taylor, 1993, 2013; Quoc Su Quan 
Trieu Nguyen, 1972; Ngo et al., 2001). The conquest process, which occurred through multiple 
waves of territorial annexation in different times, was completed in 1833 when Emperor Minh 
Mang of the Nguyen dynasty accomplished the final conquest of the easternmost part of the 
Khmer empire, which is the southernmost part of today’s Vietnam and is additionally known 
as the Mekong River Delta. Figure 2.1 depicts the complete process of Dai Viet’s southward 
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expansion. Historians strongly emphasize that idiosyncratic political conditions independent of 
climate, geographic, and socioeconomic issues influenced the timing of Dai Viet’s conquest 
process and southernmost borders (Taylor, 1993, 2013). Civil conflicts between two ruling 
families, the Trinh and the Nguyen, that started in the late 1620s divided the state into two rival 
governments, including the Trinh in the north and the Nguyen in the south (Taylor, 2013, p. 
307; Sakurai, 2004, p. 40). The Nguyen attempted to expand its land southwardly; however, 
periodic fighting against the Trinh reduced its capacity to conquer Champa and Eastern Khmer 
by the late 17th century.  
The focus of my study is on the second-to-last boundary, which was established in 1698 
and separated the area around the boundary into two geographic regions with a gap of 135 years 
of exposure to Dai Viet culture and institutions before the commencement of French occupation 
in 1858. This boundary was originally derived from a defense treaty between the Nguyen and 
Khmer in early 1620 which helped both governments to have additional resources to fight 
against their rivals. Based on this treaty, the Nguyen married Princess Ngoc Van to King Chey 
Chetta II of Khmer and provided Khmer with naval armed forces to combat its western 
neighbouring state of the Siam kingdom. In exchange, Khmer granted the Nguyen the right to 
collect taxes for five years in Khmer’s easternmost counties of Prei Nokor and Kampong 
Krabei,37 which were later formally organized into Dai Viet’s territory in 1698 (named as Gia 
Dinh in Vietnamese). Khmer planned to retrieve these counties after five years. However, the 
unexpected death of Chey Chetta II in 1628 caused this plan to fail (Vo, 2011). The Nguyen 
broke the treaty’s initial term of returning Prei Nokor and Kampong Krabei back to Khmer. 
Then, with significant support from Ngoc Van38 within Khmer’s royal, the Nguyen successfully 
seized these counties and added them to Dai Viet, thus formally establishing the new 
 
37 The Nguyen was not allowed to make any interventions on formal governance in these counties during these 
years.  
38 Ngoc Van was appointed as Khmer’s Queen. After Chey Chatta II died, Ngoc Van became Khmer’s Queen 
Mother, who had a strong political influence within Khmer’s royal.  
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administrative province of Gia Dinh in 1698 (Taylor, 2013; Vo, 2011). The Nguyen then 
reorganized this new land in a traditional Dai Viet manner by organizing a collective society 
that was based on Confucianism and northern institutions (Kiernan, 2017; Taylor, 1993; Wook, 
2004).  
The boundary became a formal state border between Dai Viet and Khmer from 1698 until 
1833. Although the Nguyen was ambitious in capturing all the remaining parts of Eastern 
Khmer, its involvement in civil wars prevented it from completing this plan around 1698. When 
the Trinh-Nguyen civil war ended in the late 17th century through a ceasefire agreement, the 
Nguyen persisted in involving itself in a new war with the Tay Son family, which arose from 
peasant revolts against the ruling class in the late 1770s. In Northern Dai Viet, the Tay Son 
defeated the Trinh in the late 1780s. In Southern Dai Viet, a series of periodic conflicts between 
the Nguyen and the Tay Son made the southward expansion process stall at the 1698 boundary. 
Moreover, given the lack of resources for directly conquering the entire eastern part of Khmer, 
the Nguyen changed its strategy by cultivating patrons within the Khmer’s royal court to 
maintain its political influence (Chandler, 2018). In 1802, the Nguyen finally defeated the Tay 
Son to reunify the entire country and become the only political holder in Dai Viet. After this, 
with all political powers, the Nguyen expanded its southward conquest directly. It finally 
organized the remaining territory of Champa in 1832 and the remaining counties of Easternmost 
Khmer in 1833, closing Dai Viet’s nine-century ‘March-to-the South’ process.  
2.2.5 Qualitative evaluation of the validity of the 1698 boundary  
I rely on the 1698 boundary to construct my treatment status of Confucian cultural heritage. In 
this section, I provide several qualitative arguments supporting this boundary being the ideal 
choice for constructing the treatment and applying a SRDD approach. First, rich historical 
evidence marks the fact that the 1698 boundary was established as a result of exogenous 
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political circumstances within both the Dai Viet and Khmer kingdoms rather than as a result of 
climate, natural environment, or socioeconomic reasons, as discussed in Section 2.4.  
Second, available historical and archaeological studies document similarities in natural 
environmental conditions and socioeconomic characteristics between the two sides of the 1698 
boundary before its establishment (Marchand et al., 2014; Nguyen, 1971; Sakurai, 2004; 
Taylor, 2013). Before being conquered by Dai Viet, the entire area around the boundary was 
highly identical in terms of natural conditions. The area was particularly described as a 
backwater with highly scattered settlements of local people (Biggs, 2005; Nguyen, 1971; 
Sakurai, 2004). Furthermore, both sides of the boundary were uniquely under Khmer rule. As 
an easternmost part of Khmer located relatively far from the capital of Angkor, this area was 
less developed compared to other regions around the capital. Local livelihoods on both sides of 
the 1698 boundary mainly relied on agriculture with homogeneous cultivation techniques as 
well as productivity. As Khmer was a weak state with an insignificant focus on education, 
public investments in schooling were relatively trivial for regions that were distant from the 
central government. For that reason, educational activities were rare on both sides of the 
boundary before 1698 (Nguyen, 1971; Sakurai, 2004). 
Third, both treatment and control communes in my study area experienced the same 
institutions during colonial and post-colonial times (Taylor, 2013). These institutions included 
French Cochinchina (1862-1945), the Empire of Vietnam (1945-1954), the Republic of 
Vietnam (1955-1975), and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (1975-present). Treatment and 
control communes received similar policies and rules during these times, making both treatment 
and control communes highly comparable in terms of other characteristics except for their years 
of exposure to Dai Viet. 
Fourth, the 1698 boundary provided control regions with the shortest duration (25 years) 
of exposure to Dai Viet, making them tenuous regarding the influence of Confucian culture 
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compared to the treatment regions while nonetheless satisfying other key requirements as 
discussed above. The geographic area, which was added into Dai Viet in 1832, as depicted in 
Figure 2.1, could be considered for another potential set of control regions, as it nearly provided 
the shortest time of exposure to Dai Viet (26 years) as well. However, both its northeast and 
southwest boundaries were the same administrative borders of the Champa kingdom before the 
area was conquered by Dai Viet (Taylor, 2013; Quoc Su Quan Trieu Nguyen, 1972; Ngo et al., 
2001), violating the assumption of exogeneity of the treatment.  
All of these qualitative arguments support the validity of the 1698 boundary for creating 
the exogenous treatment of exposure to Confucian cultural heritage for the SRDD analysis. In 
Section 2.4.2, I further provide quantitative and causal evidence that other climate and 
socioeconomic characteristics apart from the treatment were not statistically different between 
the treatment and control communes.  
 
2.3. Data 
2.3.1 Main analysis data 
I use several datasets for my main analysis. These include the 15% sample of the 2009 Vietnam 
Population and Housing Census (hereafter ‘Census’) and the 2016 Vietnam National High 
School Completion Examination Scores (hereafter ‘Exam Scores’). In order to hold the ethnic 
background constant throughout my study, I restrict the samples to individuals of Kinh 
ethnicity, who, on average, make up 86% of the population. Table 2.1 presents the summary 
statistics for the samples. 
The Census is one of the largest micro datasets in Vietnam containing information about 
demographics, schooling, and housing for approximately 14 million observations from 
approximately 3.5 million households surveyed across the country. I exploit its schooling 
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section to construct educational measures, including schooling years and degree achievement 
(primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary school diploma, and a college degree) for 
adults and school enrolment for school-aged children. 
I restrict the adult sample to those aged 25-6439 and the children sample to those aged 15-
17.40 My final adult and child samples respectively contain 341,930 and 42,028 observations. 
panel A of Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for this sample, with 9.3 average years of 
schooling, 82% of primary school completion, 68% of lower secondary school completion, 
38% of upper secondary school completion, and 17% of college degree attainment. Children’s 
post-compulsory school enrolment is nearly 71%. 
The Exam Scores dataset is the administrative data containing the test scores of core 
subjects (including compulsory and selective ones) which are annually taken by all 12th-grade 
Vietnamese students at their national high school completion examinations among other types 
of students such as part-time students.41 I exploit the 2016 Exam Scores data to construct the 
test score outcomes for compulsory subjects (mathematics, literature and English) and selective 
subjects (physics, chemistry and biology). I restrict the sample to 12th-grade students of the 
1998 birth cohort, which account for approximately 80% of the exam takers.  
 
39 I use the 25-64 age range because 25 is reasonably a stopping age for the highest educational level while 64 is 
still a well-representative age among the aging population in 2009. Therefore, those aged 25 and older would have 
in principle their lifetime schooling outcomes while excluding those aged over 64 would be a good strategy to 
avoid selection bias because the well-educated tend to live longer (over 64 years old) and thus have a higher 
likelihood to be included in the Census. 
40 In Vietnam, children start primary school (grade 1) at age 6 and complete high school (grade 12) at age 17 in 
Vietnam. In 2009, the ages for post-compulsory education are 15-17. 
41 These exams are held in a nationally comparable way in which their institutional arrangement and contents such 
as problems and solutions are identical across schools and provinces. The results from these exams are used for 












  Observations Mean Observations Mean Observations Mean 
 Panel A. Vietnam Population and Housing Census (2009, 15% sample)   
Adult sample (25-64 years old)         
Schooling years (years) 341,930  9.349  235,650 10.285   106,280 7.274 
Primary school completion (dummy) 341,930  0.823  235,650 0.882   106,280 0.693 
Lower secondary school completion (dummy) 341,930  0.683  235,650 0.774   106,280 0.480 
Upper secondary school completion (dummy) 341,930  0.378  235,650 0.463   106,280 0.189 
College degree (dummy) 341,930  0.174  235,650 0.222   106,280 0.068 
Child sample (15-17 years old)         
Post-compulsory school enrolment (dummy) 42,028 0.707   26,192 0.740   15,836 0.652 
 Panel B. Vietnam National High School Examination Data (2016)   
Math scores (0-10 scale) 93,767 4.781  65,598 4.975  28,169 4.331 
Literature scores (0-10 scale) 93,730 5.052  65,574 5.125  28,156 4.881 
English scores (0-10 scale) 84,996 3.739  62,741 3.924  22,255 3.218 
Physics scores (0-10 scale) 59,818 5.894  41,086 5.986  18,732 5.694 
Chemistry scores (0-10 scale) 45,787 5.312  29,102 5.419  16,685 5.126 
Biology scores (0-10 scale) 13,451 5.225   7,820 5.533   5,631 4.798 
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As the Exam Score data only has information about students’ residential locations at the 
province level but not at the commune level, I restrict the sample to students living in the 
provinces around the 1698 boundary, acting as treatment regions (Ho Chi Minh City and Dong 
Nai) as well as control regions (Binh Duong, Tay Ninh, and Long An). The score for each 
subject is measured by a 10-point scale which ranges from zero (the lowest score) to 10 (the 
highest score). The sample sizes vary by subject, and compulsory subjects have larger samples 
relative to selective subjects. Panel B of Table 2.1 presents the mean scores and the number of 
students for these subjects, including 4.8 for mathematics (93,767 students), 5.1 for literature 
(93,730 students), 3.7 for English (84,996 students), 5.9 for physics (59,818 students), 5.3 for 
chemistry (45,787 students), and 5.2 for biology (13,451 students). To make my interpretation 
of the results more straightforward, I standardise the continuous variables of the logs of the 
scores into a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.  
2.3.2 Mechanism data 
I additionally use several datasets to explore potential mechanisms behind the causal effects of 
interest, including cultural values and beliefs towards schooling and human capital investments. 
I firstly rely on the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) to construct my measures of cultural values 
towards schooling. The ABS is an international survey carried out in 18 countries and territories 
in East and Southeast Asia, including Vietnam. The ABS elicits respondents’ opinions about 
political attitudes and behaviour, social capital, traditionalism and culture, international affairs, 
and globalization. To construct the sample, I particularly use three ABS waves of 2003, 2004 
and 2006 for Vietnam and restrict the data to those living in four provinces around the 1698 
boundary, including Ho Chi Minh City and Ba Ria-Vung Tau for treatment regions, and Tien 
Giang and Can Tho for control regions. I rely on two main proxy measures for cultural values 
towards schooling. I particularly construct an indicator for a preference for having better 
educational attainment as already achieved by exploiting the following question: Please tell 
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me how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with your educational attainment in your life: (1) Very 
satisfied; (2) Somewhat satisfied; (3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; (4) Somewhat 
dissatisfied; (5) Very dissatisfied. The indicator has a value of one if the answer is (4) or (5), 
and zero otherwise. For the second measure, I construct an indicator for having beliefs about 
the importance of access to higher education beyond compulsory schooling using the following 
question: Of the following lifestyle aspects or life circumstances, please select five that are 
important to you: (1) Having enough to eat; …; (7) Having access to higher (beyond 
compulsory education) education; (8) Owning lots of nice things… The indicator takes a value 
of one if the choice set includes (7) and zero if the choice set does not include (7).  
Second, I use the 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 waves of the Vietnam Household Living 
Standards Survey (VHLSS). The VHLSS is a biannual household survey including about 
40,000 individuals from 9,000 households drawn from the Census population. I extract 
information on children’s education to construct several specific measures of parental spending 
on school-related activities over the last 12 months: school tuition, books and learning 
materials, learning tools and instruments, private tutoring, and total overall spending on 
education. These monetary expenditure variables are measured in 1,000 Vietnam Dong (VND) 
in 2010 prices, with the exchange rate equaling roughly 20,000 VND per 1 U.S. Dollar in 2010. 
 
2.4 Empirical strategy 
2.4.1 Estimation methods 
I start with a simple descriptive confirmation of whether educational outcomes change with the 
length of time exposed to Dai Viet. I estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) 
equation using a full sample of individuals living across all Vietnamese regions involved in the 
Kinh ethnicity’s territorial expansion:  
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𝑌𝑖𝑟 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑟
2 + 𝛼3𝑿′𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑟                         (2.1). 
𝑌𝑖𝑟 is an educational outcome for individual 𝑖 living in region 𝑟. 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑟 is the duration of 
exposure to Confucian culture measured by one hundred years between the year the region was 
added to Dai Viet and 1858 when the French arrived in Vietnam. 𝑿′𝑖  is the set of control 
variables, including birth cohort fixed effects and a dummy for gender (male). 𝜖𝑖𝑟 is an error 
term. Standard errors are clustered at the commune level. I allow for a quadratic in 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑟 
in order to allow for decreasing effects of annexation duration. I expect smaller effects at higher 
levels of duration because at high levels of duration (say, 600 years in the treatment regions 
versus 500 years in the control regions), the control region as well had ample time to absorb the 
culture in order that a 100-year difference could make less of a difference. The marginal effect 
of annexation duration is 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝛼1 + 2𝛼2𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑟 and indicates how the 
educational outcome changes with an additional 100 years of exposure to Confucian culture. 
The coefficient 𝛼1 can be interpreted as the effect of the first 100 years of annexation. 
In producing the estimates of causal treatment effects, however, the OLS estimates using 
Equation (2.1) are, arguably, possibly biased due to potential confounders. The economics 
literature has shown that many factors other than culture can drive schooling outcomes and thus 
possibly play the role of being potential confounders. These factors include climate and weather 
(Park et al., 2020; Randell and Gray, 2019), natural disasters (Takasaki, 2017), historical 
formation (Gallego 2010), political regimes (Fuchs-Schündeln and Masella, 2016), conflicts 
(Shemyakina, 2011; Chamarbagwala and Morán, 2011), and opportunity costs of schooling 
(Carrillo, 2020; Shah and Steinberg, 2017). In the context of Vietnam, these confounding 
factors are possible, as there are obvious regional differences in several characteristics across 
the country. First, climate differences are well documented across Vietnamese regions. For 
instance, while increases in annual temperatures are higher in southern than in northern regions 
(Nguyen et al., 2014; Phan et al., 2009), provinces in the middle region are more likely to suffer 
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from annual natural disasters such as typhoons and storms than those in northern and southern 
regions (Noy and Vu, 2010). Second, regarding the history of state formation, different regions 
have experienced the rules of different sets of institutions. While northern provinces purely 
belonged to the rule of a Chinese-style statecraft (also known as the Sinic state of Northeast 
Asia), provinces in the middle and southern regions were primarily governed by a Hindu-
Buddhist statecraft (also known as the Indic state of Southeast Asia) during pre-modern times 
(Wolters and Wolters, 1999). Third, during the Vietnam war (1955-1975), northern Vietnam 
was uniquely a Soviet Union-style socialist state, whereas southern provinces enjoyed a United 
States-style market system. The distribution of bombings dropped by American air forces was 
additionally uneven across Vietnamese provinces (Miguel and Roland, 2011). Last but 
importantly, educational policies in Vietnam have potential regional heterogeneity in their 
impacts, leading to various changes in schooling attainment (Cornelissen and Dang, 2020). 
These possible differences across Vietnamese regions spanning from natural to social and 
historical characteristics make causal inference from the OLS estimates unreliable. 
To disentangle the causal impact of Confucian cultural heritage on modern-day 
educational success, I follow Dell et al. (2018) to draw my main empirical analysis on a SRDD. 
I particularly estimate the following equation: 




+ 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑐 + 𝛽4𝑿′𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡                                               (2.2).                                                       
𝑌𝑖𝑐 is the educational outcome for individual 𝑖 living in commune 𝑐. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐 is an 
indicator for the individual living in a treatment commune, implying a 135-year longer 
historical exposure to Confucian cultural heritage compared one living a control commune. 
𝑓(𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑐) is a linear polynomial function of latitude and longitude of the corresponding 
commune (which I extend to a quadratic polynomial in a robustness check). The length of the 
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1698 boundary is divided into 20 segments (𝑛 = 20). In Equation (2.2), 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑐𝑗  is segment 𝑗 of 
the 1698 boundary to which commune 𝑐 is adjacent. The term ∑ 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑐𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  indicates boundary 
segment fixed effects. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑐  is the distance from the commune to Saigon, the central area of 
Ho Chi Minh City. 𝑿′𝑖  is the set of control variables including birth cohort fixed effects and a 
dummy for gender.  
θt indicates survey year fixed effects used to control for potential time trends across 
survey years in specifications using the ABS and VHLSS data consisting of several survey 
waves, and it is removed in specifications using the Census and Exam Scores data with only 
one year. 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 is an error term. My parameter of interest is the coefficient 𝛽1, which provides 
the causal effect of Confucian cultural heritage on the educational outcome. Standard errors are 
clustered at the commune level, which is the level of spatial characteristics. 
It is important to note that I interpret the coefficient of 𝛽1 as the effects of Confucian 
cultural heritage on the schooling outcome although this estimate only provides a reduced-form 
effect of exposure to Dai Viet rather than a direct effect of Confucian culture. This is because 
while Confucianism, that has strong connections with valuing education, was deeply rooted in 
treatment regions, institutions and policies in both treatment and control regions were changed 
and unified under the French and the subsequent political regimes as described in Section 2.2.5. 
For that reason, the persistent difference in schooling must have been driven by Confucian 
culture that is passed on from parents to children. Moreover, I show that cultural values and 
beliefs today are affected by the treatment in Section 2.6.1, which indirectly supports the idea 
that the cultural transmission of Confucianism is the mechanism of the persistent effect. 
2.4.2 Examining potential confounders  
To ensure that the effects of interest could be interpreted as causal treatment effects, it is 
essential for the SRDD strategy to satisfy the key identifying assumption that all relevant factors 
apart from the treatment and the educational outcomes must change smoothly at the 1698 
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boundary. To evaluate the plausibility of this assumption, I provide a series of balance tests 
using the commune-level data from the 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 waves of the VHLSS and 
estimate the baseline SRDD specification using Equation (2.2), in which the explanatory 
variables include a dummy for the treatment status, a linear function of latitude and longitude, 
dummies for boundary segments, the distance from the commune to Sai Gon, and boundary 
segment fixed effects. The results are present in Table 2.2, focusing on geo-climatic 
characteristics, local organisation and infrastructure (panel A), local economic structure and 
labour market costs (panel B), central and local government policy (panel D), and demographic 
characteristics and local school organization (panel E). I find that all these pre-determined 
characteristics smoothly work through the boundary.  
Columns 1-2 of panel A show that there are no statistically significant differences in geo-
climatic characteristics, including with indicators for mountainous terrain (column 1) and the 
number of natural disasters that had occurred in the commune over the previous 12 months 
(column 2). Additionally, columns 3-6 of panel A present statistically insignificant effects on 
local organization and infrastructure, in particular an indicator for the high quality of commune 
roads (column 3), an indicator for having a post office (column 4), an indicator for having a 
local radio station (column 5), and an indicator for having a community house (column 6).  
Columns 1-3 of panel B document the similar results for local economic structure for both 
sides of the boundary. The effects on indicators for main economic activities such as agriculture 
(column 1), and aquaculture (column 2) are all statistically insignificant. In the same manner, 
the estimates in columns 3-6 of panel B demonstrate that labour prices for economic activities 
are balanced between the treatment and control regions. I use an average price of agricultural 
production (column 3) and component prices for specific main tasks, including land preparation 
(column 4), caring (column 5), and harvesting (column 6). While the opportunity costs of 
schooling may affect educational decisions in less developed countries (Carrillo, 2020; Shah 
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and Steinberg, 2017), my results suggest that labour prices, which are effective proxies for the 
opportunity costs of schooling, are fairly equal across local labour markets, as this is the case 
in both the treatment and control regions of my study. 
Another concern could be that the implementation of development policies such as public 
infrastructure investments possibly differ across treatment and control regions (Do et al., 2017) 
and could drive schooling outcomes. As seen in panel C of Table 2.2, I examine the treatment 
effects on the implementation of both central and local government policies. I use an indicator 
for the receipt of a development project operated by the central government over the last three 
years as a proxy for the central government policies in column 1 (panel C) and find no 
differences at the boundary. In columns 2-6, panel C, I examine the effects on various measures 
of the local government policies which were carried out by the province and district authorities 
over the previous 12 months, including the percentage of households receiving financial support 
(column 2), the percentage of households receiving support from aid programmes due to natural 
disasters and production loss (column 3), the percentage of households receiving vocational 
training (column 4), the percentage of households receiving business tax exemptions (column 
5), and an indicator for having an irrigation system (column 6). I find no statistically significant 
effects on these outcomes, suggesting that disparities in educational outcomes between the 
treatment and control regions are not potentially driven by the execution of development 
policies at both the central and local government levels across regions. 
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TABLE 2.2: BALANCE TESTS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









Radio station (dummy) 
Community house 
(dummy) 
Confucian 0.037 0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.082 0.020 
 (0.030) (0.227) (0.053) (0.094) (0.058) (0.079) 
Observations 271 271 271 271 271 271 
 Panel B. Local economic structure and labour market costs     
 Agriculture as main 
activity (dummy) 
Aquaculture as main 
activity (dummy) 
Agricultural labour 
price (VND1,000, log, 
prices in 2010) 
Land preparation 
price (VND1,000, 
log, prices in 2010) 
Caring price 




prices in 2010) 
Confucian 0.008 -0.018 0.017 0.013 -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.079) (0.018) (0.038) (0.035) (0.043) (0.048) 
Observations 271 271 271 271 271 271 





Local gov: finance 
(% hh received) 
Local gov: aid 




(% hh received) 
Local gov:  business 





Confucian -0.020 -0.013 -0.001 0.004 -0.004 -0.012 
 (0.076) (0.020) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.098) 
Observations  271 263 255 252 252 270 
 Panel D. Demographic characteristics and local school organisation     
 Kinh as major 
ethnicity (dummy) 










Confucian -0.039 0.0003 0.042 -0.068 0.027 0.015 
 (0.042) (0.039) (0.028) (0.071) (0.023) (0.095) 
Observations 271 271 271 271 271 271 
Notes: Samples restrict to communes within 20 kilometers of the boundary distance. Robust standard errors clustered at the commune level are in parentheses. 
Controls include a linear function of latitude and longitude, a dummy for river segments, distance from commune to Sai Gon, and boundary segment fixed effects.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Data source: Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys (2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016)   
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Finally, I further find no differences around the 1698 boundary for the effects on key 
demographic characteristics and local school organization, as seen in panel D. I find that the 
distribution of the Kinh ethnicity, who are the ethnic majority in present-day Vietnam, is 
balanced across regions (column 1). An indicator for giving births at the hospital as opposed to 
a traditional home birth (column 2), which possibly captures traditional versus modern norms, 
changes smoothly at the boundary as well. In terms of local school organization, I do not find 
differences in the measures of the supply side of schooling, including an indicator for having a 
nursery school (column 3), an indicator for having a kindergarten school (column 4), an 
indicator for having a primary school (column 5), and an indicator for having a lower or upper 
secondary school (column 6).  
 
2.5 Empirical results 
2.5.1 Stylised facts 
I start my discussion of the empirical results by presenting the OLS estimates of the association 
between the duration of exposure to Dai Viet rule and present-day schooling outcomes using 
Equation (2.1). I use two samples: one countrywide sample (the country sample being 
3,638,776 individuals)42 and one sample restricted to those living within 20 kilometres of the 
1698 boundary (the SRDD sample being 341,930 individuals).  
The estimates in Table 2.3 show that the duration of exposure to Dai Viet rule is 
statistically significantly related to increases in present-day schooling outcomes using both the 
country and SRDD samples. The coefficients are all highly statistically significant at the 1% 
level. In the overall country sample, the coefficient on the linear term of 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝛼1 in 
Equation (2.1)) is the marginal effect of duration evaluated at zero duration. It can be 
 
42 I exclude those living in the provinces: Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Dak Lak, Dak Nong, and Lam Dong, which were 
out-of-the conquest process engaged by the Dai Viet kingdom. 
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approximately interpreted as the effect of 100 years of Dai Viet rule compared to zero years of 
Dai Viet rule. 
 
TABLE 2.3: ANNEXATION DURATION AND EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES 


















 Panel A. Country sample         
Duration 0.915*** 0.084*** 0.102*** 0.062*** 0.037*** 0.074*** 
 (0.039) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Duration squared -0.060*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.005*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 3,638,776 3,638,776 3,638,776 3,638,776 3,638,776 616,475 
 Panel B. SRDD sample         
Duration 2.190***  0.137*** 0.213***  0.200***  0.112***  0.066*** 
 (0.114) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) 
Observations 341,930 341,930 341,930 341,930 341,930 42,028 
Notes: Observations are at the individual level. Sample includes individuals aged 25-64. Country samples 
include individuals in all provinces across the country (excluding four out-of-the conquest provinces: Gia Lai, 
Kon Tum, Dak Lak, Dak Nong and Lam Dong). RDD samples includes individuals in communes within 20 
kilometers of the boundary distance (the distance from the commune to the 1698 boundary). Robust standard 
errors clustered at the commune level are in parentheses. Duration is measured by one hundred years between 
the year the land was added into Dai Viet and the French arrival timing in 1858. Specifications include control 
variables (a dummy for male) and cohort-fixed effects.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Data source: Vietnam Population and Housing Census (2009, 15% sample)   
 
As shown in panel A, for adults aged 25-64, this leads to an increase of 0.9 schooling 
years (column 1), 8.4 percentage points for primary school completion (column 2), 10.2 
percentage points for lower secondary school completion (column 3), 6.2 percentage points for 
upper secondary school completion (column 4), and 3.7 percentage points for achieving a 
college degree (column 5). A zero-to-100-year increase in exposure to Dai Viet rule 
additionally raises post-compulsory school enrolment for children aged 15-17 by 7.4 percentage 
points (column 5). For all outcomes presented in panel A, the coefficient on the squared term 
of 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is negative, implying that the effect of duration diminishes at higher values of 
duration, as expected (see the discussion of Equation (2.1) above). For example, for years of 
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schooling, the marginal effect of an additional 100 years of annexation declines from 0.9 when 
evaluated at zero year to 0.3 when evaluated at 500 years of duration. 
For the SRDD sample (panel B), it is not possible to identify a non-linear specification of 
annexation duration because the duration only assumes two values (160 years versus 25 years). 
Panel B therefore only reports a linear effect. The results show considerably higher associations 
between the duration of exposure to Dai Viet rule and schooling outcomes in the SRDD sample 
as compared to the overall sample. An additional 100-year duration of Dai Viet exposure is 
related to an increase in the number of schooling years by about two years (column 1), primary 
school completion by nearly 14 percentage points (column 2), lower secondary school 
completion by 21 percentage points (column 3), upper secondary school completion by 20 
percentage points (column 4), and college degree completion by 11 percentage points (column 
5).43  
2.5.2 Effects on adults’ educational attainment and degree achievement 
Next, I present my empirical results for the treatment effects on adults’ lifetime educational 
outcomes in Table 2.4, including schooling years (panel A), primary school completion (panel 
B), lower secondary school completion (panel C), upper secondary school completion (panel 
D), and a college degree (panel E). For each outcome, I use several different specifications in 
addition to the baseline SRDD specification to check how robust the estimates are.  
For comparison purposes, column 1 presents the simple OLS estimates in which I exclude 
from the baseline SRDD specification in Equation (2.2) all spatial terms (a linear polynomial 
function of latitude and longitude of the corresponding commune, the boundary segment fixed 
effects, and the distance from the commune to Saigon). In principle, these regressions are 
 
43 Several reasons might explain the higher effects in the SRDD sample. There might be regional effect 
heterogeneity, and the regions covered by the SRDD sample might simply have higher effects compared to regions 
at comparable margins of duration in the country sample. Alternatively, the parametric nonlinear specification in 
panel A as a quadratic might be restrictive and may lead to an under-estimate of the duration effect at low margins 
of duration.  
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similar to those presented in Table 2.3, but for comparability with the SRDD approach, the 
effects are then scaled differently. While, as shown in Table 2.3, the coefficients are scaled for 
a 100-year increase in historical exposure to Confucianism, the effects presented in Table 2.4 
are scaled for a 135-year increase (corresponding to the difference observed at the 1698 
boundary). As expected, the effects shown in column 1 of Table 2.4 are greater than those 
shown in Table 2.3 by a factor of 1.35, confirming the substantially positive and highly 
statistically significant associations between duration of exposure to Dai Viet rule and 
schooling outcomes. 
Column 2 of Table 2.4 presents the baseline SRDD estimates which are used as my main 
results. The treatment effects considerably lessen to between one-fifth and one-quarter of the 
OLS effects, suggesting that there are upward biases in the OLS estimates when excluding all 
spatial terms. Panel A shows that Confucian cultural heritage increases schooling years by an 
average of 0.69 years (statistically significant at the 1% level). The estimates in panels B, C and 
D show that Confucian cultural heritage increases the probability of completing basic school 
levels by 3.8 percentage points (statistically significant at the 5% level) for primary school, 7.8 
percentage points (statistically significant at the 1% level) for lower secondary school, and 6.1 
percentage points (statistically significant at the 1% level) for upper secondary school. 
Importantly, the cultural effect further reaches tertiary education. Panel E indicates that a person 
living in a region with Confucian cultural heritage is, on average, more likely to obtain a college 
degree by about 2.7 percentage points (statistically significant at the 10% level). 
As seen in the remaining columns, I perform several robustness checks for the baseline 
SRDD model. First, the literature on applied RDD methods documents a debate regarding the 
choice between a linear polynomial function and high-order polynomials of the cut-off variable 
(Gelman and Imbens, 2019; Imbens and Wager, 2019). To check whether my baseline results 
change when using a higher-order polynomial function of the geographic running variable, I 
 
89 
use a quadratic polynomial function instead of a linear polynomial function of latitude and 
longitude, as shown in column 3 of Table 2.4. This specification produces highly similar 
estimates compared to the baseline SRDD approach in terms of both their effect sizes and the 
statistical significance levels. 
 
TABLE 2.4: EFFECTS ON ADULTS’ SCHOOLING OUTCOMES 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
















 Panel A. Schooling years         
Confucian 2.956***  0.687***  0.771***  0.498**  0.544***  0.930***  
  (0.154) (0.188) (0.193) (0.210) (0.180) (0.195) 
 Panel B. Primary school completion       
Confucian 0.185***  0.038**  0.037**  0.026*  0.022  0.026*  
   (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) 
 Panel C. Lower secondary school completion     
Confucian 0.288***  0.078***  0.079***  0.058** 0.058** 0.068** 
  (0.018) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) 
 Panel D. Upper secondary school completion     
Confucian 0.270*** 0.061***  0.073*** 0.047**  0.057***  0.106***  
  (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015) 
 Panel E. College degree         
Confucian 0.151***  0.027*  0.037***  0.019*  0.026***  0.071***  
  (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) 
Observations  341,930  341,930  341,930 167,381 129,936 184,434 
Clusters 574 574 574 311 255 319 
Notes: Samples restrict to individuals in communes within 20 kilometers of the boundary distance 
(adults aged 25-64). Robust standard errors clustered at the commune level are in parentheses. OLS 
specification in column 1 includes controls (a dummy for male) and birth cohort-fixed effects. Baseline 
specification in columns 2-6 includes controls (a dummy for male), a linear function of spatial location, 
distance to Saigon, boundary segment-fixed effects and birth cohort-fixed effects. Linear function of 
spatial location is a linear function of latitude and longitude of the commune. Boundary segment varies 
with a 20-kilometer unit. Distance to Saigon (kilometers) is measured by the shortest travelling 
distance from the center of commune to the center of Ho Chi Minh City (Ho Chi Minh City People's 
Committee Hall).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data source: Vietnam Population and Housing Census (2009, 15% sample)  
 
Second, regional economic development has been shown to link to educational 
attainment. My treatment regions include observations from Ho Chi Minh City’s urban areas, 
which are the most developed areas in Vietnam. A possible concern is therefore that this 
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inclusion could drive the baseline treatment effects. I, therefore, estimate another version of the 
SRDD sample that excludes individuals living in urban Ho Chi Minh City from the treatment 
regions. All the estimates remain statistically significant (column 4, Table 2.4), and treatment 
effects reduce by 20-30% compared to the baseline SRDD effects. These findings confirm that 
the inclusion of urban Ho Chi Minh City does not largely drive my baseline treatment estimates. 
Third, there is the possible issue that urbanicity either acts as a confounder (although this 
is unlikely due to the smoothness of placebo outcomes, as demonstrated in Table 2.2) or that 
effects are purely driven by urban areas. For that reason, in column 5 of Table 2.4, I present 
estimates using another sample that excludes all individuals living in urban areas from the 
SRDD sample. The results show that the treatment effects remain highly robust for nearly all 
outcomes. Among the statistically significant effects, the effect sizes range from 4-26% of the 
baseline effects. An exception is the effect on primary school completion, shown in panel B, 
which is statistically insignificant at the 10% level. 
Fourth, the 1698 boundary comprises both river and non-river segments. River segments 
possibly play a role as a natural physical barrier inhibiting social interactions across the 
boundary, leading to the stronger preservation of distinct cultures on both sides. Non-river 
segments, in contrast, possibly facilitate social interaction leading to a dilution of historical 
cultural differences, subsequently possibly leading to smaller treatment effects when focusing 
on non-river segments of the border. To check whether this is the case, I estimate a sub-sample 
that excludes all individuals living on both sides of the boundary’s river segments. The results 
shown in column 6, Table 2.4 do not provide clear evidence of any dilution of the treatment 
effects. While the estimates for the effect on primary school completion (panel B) and lower 
secondary school completion (panel C) are smaller than the baseline effects, the estimates for 
the effect on schooling years (panel A), upper secondary school (panel D), and a college degree 
(panel E) are larger than the baseline estimates.  
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Furthermore, I explore heterogeneity in the baseline SRDD estimates by various age 
groups (25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64). If effects were absent for the oldest age groups, for 
example, this would cast doubt on the interpretation of the effects as stemming from the 
intergenerational transmission of historical culture. The results are in Appendix B, Table B.2. I 
find statistically significant effects for all age groups in nearly all schooling outcomes. There is 
a pattern by which increases in lower degrees (primary and lower secondary schooling) are 
driven by older age cohorts, and increases in higher degrees (in particular, for college) are 
driven by younger age cohorts. This is consistent with a general increase in educational 
attainment over time. When examining the overall measure of years of schooling, the youngest 
(25-34) and oldest (55-64) groups have the largest effects. Thus, there is no sign that either the 
youngest or the oldest group is entirely driving the results.  
2.5.3 Effects on children’s school enrolment and academic performance 
Table 2.5 presents the results for the effects of Confucian cultural heritage on the post-
compulsory school enrolment of children aged 15-17 years old. While school enrolment is 
likely a commonly used proxy for quantity of education, I specifically focus on children aged 
15-17 because schooling is compulsory for children aged 14 and younger in Vietnam 
(Cornelissen and Dang, 2020). I estimate a set of specifications similar to those presented in 
Table 2.4, including OLS (column 1), baseline SRDD (column 2) and other robustness 
specifications (columns 3-6). The OLS estimate shown in column 1, Table 2.5 indicates that 
Confucian cultural heritage increases school enrolment among school-aged children by 8.9 
percentage points (statistically significant at the 1% level).  
The baseline SRDD estimate shows an increasing effect of Confucian cultural heritage 
on school enrolment by 5.8 percentage points (statistically significant at the 5% level). The 
baseline SRDD estimate is smaller than the OLS estimate by approximately 35%, implying a 
potential upward bias in the OLS estimate. This baseline estimate is additionally strongly robust 
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compared to the estimates using other robustness specifications, as shown in columns 3-6, Table 
2.5. For example, the specification using a quadratic polynomial function of geographic 
locations in column 3 produces an effect of 7.9 percentage points (statistically significant at the 
1% level). When excluding the observations from urban Ho Chi Minh City and all urban areas 
from the baseline sample, the treatment effects are 5.1 percentage points (statistically 
significant at the 5% level) and 5.4 percentage points (statistically significant at the 5% level), 
respectively, as shown in columns 4 and 5. Finally, in column 6 of Table 2.5, when excluding 
the observations of persons living around river segments from the baseline sample, I obtain an 
effect of 8.3 percentage points (statistically significant at the 1% level).  
 
TABLE 2.5: EFFECTS ON CHILDREN’S POST-COMPULSORY SCHOOL ENROLMENT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 

















Confucian 0.089*** 0.058** 0.079*** 0.051** 0.054** 0.083*** 
  (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) 
Observations 42,028 42,028 42,028 24,426 19,519 24,131 
Clusters 574 574 574 311 255 319 
Notes: Baseline samples restrict to individuals in communes within 20 kilometers of the 
boundary distance (children aged 15-17). Robust standard errors clustered at the commune 
level are in parentheses. Baseline specification includes controls (a dummy for male), a linear 
function of spatial location, distance to Saigon, boundary segment-fixed effects and cohort-
fixed effects. Linear function of spatial location is a linear function of latitude and longitude 
of the commune. Boundary segment varies with a 20-kilometer unit. Distance to Saigon 
(kilometers) is measured by the shortest travelling distance from the center of commune to the 
center of Ho Chi Minh City (Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee Hall).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Data source: Vietnam Population and Housing Census (2009, 15% sample)  
 
Next, I investigate the cultural effects on academic performance by focusing on 
standardised test scores from the 2016 Exam Scores data. The sample sizes vary by specific 
subject, and Mathematics, Literature, and English have higher numbers of students, while 
smaller numbers of students study selective subjects. I regress each of the test score outcomes 
on Confucian cultural heritage and a set of controls (dummies for gender and birth months). In 
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the model, all spatial terms in Equation (2.2) are not included because information about the 
location of students at the commune level is not available in the dataset. The model is thus 
similar to the OLS model presented in the previous tables, and I expect the effects to be biased 
upwards. I could therefore interpret my results as upper-bound estimates. The estimates are 
present in Table 2.6. 
 
TABLE 2.6: CONFUCIAN CULTURAL HERITAGE AND TEST SCORES 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Panel A. Compulsory subjects   
 Mathematics Literature English 
Confucian 0.366*** 0.244*** 0.447*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Observations 93,767 93,730 84,996 
 Panel B. Selective subjects   
 Physics Chemistry Biology 
Confucian 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.441*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) 
Observations 59,818 45,787 13,451 
Notes: Sample includes individuals of the 1998 cohort. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. Scores are standardised into 
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Control variables include dummies for 
gender (male) and birth month.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data source: Vietnam National High School Examination Data (2016) 
 
The results demonstrate that students from Confucian cultural heritage regions perform 
much better than those in control regions for all subjects. Panel A presents the estimates for 
compulsory subjects, which show that Confucian cultural heritage increases the scores for 
Mathematics by 37% of a standard deviation (column 1), Literature by 24% of a standard 
deviation (column 2), and English by 44% of a standard deviation (column 3). Similarly, panel 
B documents substantial and positive effects of Confucian cultural heritage on performance in 
selective subjects, with 21%, 22%, and 46% of a standard deviation for Physics (column 1), 
Chemistry (column 2), and Biology (column 3), respectively. All these estimates are highly 





2.6 Potential mechanisms 
2.6.1 Cultural values and beliefs towards education 
To study the main mechanism for the effect of Confucian cultural heritage on educational 
success, I investigate two proxy measures for cultural values and beliefs towards schooling 
constructed from the ABS data. These include an indicator for a preference for having better 
educational attainment as already achieved, and an indicator for beliefs about the importance 
of access to higher education beyond compulsory schooling. For each measure, I present 
estimates on two samples: one entire sample of all the observations of persons living in all 
available provinces and another sample restricted to the observations of persons who only reside 
in the two largest cities: Ho Chi Minh City (treatment regions) and Can Tho (control regions). 
 
TABLE 2.7: CONFUCIAN CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CULTURAL VALUES AND BELIEFS 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  
Preference for having better 
education as already 
achieved 
Belief about the importance of 
access to higher education 
beyond compulsory schooling 
Confucian 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.030** 0.032* 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) 
Observations 1,296 1,047 1,296 1,047 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. Columns 1 
and 3 use the whole sample. Columns 2 and 4 use the sub-sample including Ho Chi Minh City 
(treatment) and Can Tho (control). Survey year fixed effects are included. Control variables 
include a dummy for gender (male), and age, age squared.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Data source: Asian Barometer Survey (2003, 2004 and 2006).  
 
The estimates in Table 2.7 show that individuals living in Confucian culture regions have 
highe postive values and beliefs towards schooling than those living control regions. Confucian 
cultural heritage particularly raises the probability of a preference for having better educational 
attainment as already achieved by 5.6 percentage points (statistically significant at the 1% level) 
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for both samples (columns 1 and 2). Confucian cultural heritage raises beliefs about the 
importance of access to higher education beyond compulsory schooling by 2.7 percentage 
points (statistically significant at the 10% level) when estimating the entire sample (column 3) 
and by 3 percentage points (statistically significant at the 10% level) when estimating the 
restricted sample (column 4). 
2.6.2 Household investments in children’s human capital 
Another mechanism contributing to the causal link between Confucian cultural heritage and 
educational success is household investments in children’s human capital. In Table 2.8, I 
present my exploration of Confucian cultural heritage effects on a range of monetary 
expenditures on children’s school and learning activities using data from the VHLSS. While 
school enrolment is a measure of school quantity, these investments are likely good proxy 
measures for school quality and are therefore helpful for predicting my main results for 
educational success and, particularly, academic performance. I estimate a pooled sample of 
3,444 children aged 6-17 using the baseline SRDD specification in Equation (2.2).  
Column 1 of Table 2.8 shows that Confucian cultural heritage increases spending on 
children’s school tuition by 7.4% of a standard deviation, statistically significant at the 10% 
level. Semi-public and private schools which would typically provide better school quality 
result in higher tuition fees than traditional public schools in Vietnam (Glewwe and Patrinos, 
1999). The increase in tuition fees could therefore reflect higher school quality. Confucian 
cultural heritage also increases other expenditures. In particular, the estimates in columns 2, 3 
and 4, respectively, show positive and statistically significant effects on books and learning 
materials (11.1% of a standard deviation, statistically significant at the 1% level), learning tools 
and instruments (9.5% of a standard deviation, statistically significant at the 5% level), and 
private tutoring (10% of a standard deviation, statistically significant at the 5% level). Finally, 
column 5 shows the effect on total educational expenditures covering all expenditures related 
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to children’s school and learning activities. The treatment increases this total spending by 
11.7% of a standard deviation (statistically significant at the 1% level).  
 
TABLE 2.8: EFFECTS ON INVESTMENTS IN CHILDREN'S SCHOOL AND LEARNING ACTIVITIES 















Confucian 0.074*  0.111***   0.095**  0.100**  0.117***  
  (0.043) (0.040) (0.039) (0.047) (0.039) 
Mean of the dependent 
variable 
430.971 74.413 72.333 417.757 1431.605 
Observations 3,444 3,444 3,444 3,444 3,444 
Notes: Samples restrict to children aged 6-17 living in communes within 20 kilometers of the boundary 
distance. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. Controls include a 
dummy for gender (male), age, age squared, distance to Saigon, a linear function of longitude and latitude, 
boundary segment-fixed effects, birth cohort-fixed effects, and survey year-fixed effects. Expenditure 
variables are standardised into a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data source: Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys (2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016)  
 
2.7 Intergenerational educational mobility 
In this section, I present my investigation of whether Confucian cultural heritage affects 
intergenerational schooling mobility. I rely on the Census data and restrict the sample to those 
aged 25-64 who have available information on their schooling and that of their parents. To 
examine the Confucian cultural heritage effects on the intergenerational persistence of 
education, I estimate the following equation:  
𝑆𝑖𝑐
𝑜 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑆𝑖𝑐
𝑝 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐 + 𝛾3𝑆𝑖𝑐




+ 𝛾5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑐 + 𝛾6𝑿
′
𝑖 + 𝜁𝑖𝑐                                                           (2.3).                                                            
𝑆𝑖𝑐
𝑜  is the educational outcome for offspring 𝑖 living in commune 𝑐. 𝑆𝑖𝑐
𝑝
 is the educational 
outcome for the parent of the corresponding offspring. 𝑿′𝑖  is a set of controls for child birth 
cohort fixed effects. 𝜁𝑖𝑐 is the error term. Other terms are similarly defined as in Equation (2.2). 
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The coefficient 𝛾1 indicates the baseline intergenerational elasticity (IGE) of schooling. The 
coefficient 𝛾3, which is my parameter of interest, measures how Confucian cultural heritage 
affects IGE. I also cluster standard errors at the commune level, which is again the level of 
geographic chracteristics. 
Table 2.9 presents the coefficients for intergenerational schooling persistence for 
different child-parent pairs. The coefficients on parental schooling document a baseline IGE of 
around 0.5 years of schooling. The interaction effects indicate that the schooling of individuals 
residing in Confucian cultural heritage regions are less dependent on their parents’ schooling 
than the schooling of those living in control regions. Interestingly, the moderating effects of 
Confucian cultural heritage are stronger for child-mother than for child-father pairs. Confucian 
cultural heritage reduces the dependence of offspring’s schooling on fathers’ schooling by 0.04 
(weakly statistically significant at the 10% level) for sons, as seen in column 1, and by nearly 
0.05 (statistically significant at the 5% level) for daughters, as shown in column 3. The 
reduction is about 0.06 (statistically significant at the 5% level) for son-mother pairs, as shown 
in column 2, and 0.09 (statistically significant at the 1% level) for daughter-mother pairs, as 
presented in column 4. My results suggest that culture towards schooling is helpful in promoting 
intergenerational mobility through lessening the dependence of offspring’s schooling on 
parents’ schooling.  
My findings in this section complements an increasing literature in economics devoted to 
explain considerable heterogeneity in intergenerational social and economic mobility across 
locations (Chetty et al., 2014), time (Chetty et al., 2017a), and socio-economic status (Chetty 
et al., 2020; Fletcher and Han, 2019). Previous studies have shown the roles of the 
neighbourhood environment during childhood (Chetty and Hendren, 2018a, 2018b), type of 
college education (Chetty et al., 2017b), income shocks (Bütikofer et al., 2018), compulsory 
schooling laws (Cornelissen and Dang, 2020; Demirel and Okten, 2020), disease control 
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campaign (Bütikofer and Salvanes, 2020), and the timing of parental income during childhood 
(Carneiro et al., 2021). My findings indicate that a culture towards schooling helps promote the 
educational mobility across generations. 
 
TABLE 2.9: EFFECTS ON INTERGENERATIONAL PERSISTENCE OF SCHOOLING 
Dep. variable: Offspring's 
years of schooling 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Son-father Son-mother Daughter-father Daughter-mother 
Parental schooling 0.516*** 0.536*** 0.496*** 0.544*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Parental schooling x Confucian -0.040** -0.059*** -0.049** -0.091*** 
  (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) 
Observations 19,619 29,793 13,827 21,649 
Clusters 637 636 630 635 
Notes: SRDD estimation is used. Sample is restricted to children age 25-64 of the Kinh ethnicity living in 
communes within 20 kilometers of the boundary distance. Robust standard errors clustered by the commune 
are in parentheses. Control variables include child birth cohort fixed effects.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data source: Population and Housing Census of Vietnam (2009, 15% sample)  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
Education sciences, education psychology, and sociology have long recognized culture as a 
potentially important determinant of educational outcomes. Yet, whether culture causally 
affects educational decisions and academic performance is less clear because such educational 
effects of culture are difficult to isolate from confounding factors. In identifying the causal 
effect of culture on education, economists primarily focus on visible daily cultural practices in 
modern societies (Ashraf et al., 2020; La Ferrara and Milazzo, 2017). However, what people 
think or believe in their minds about the importance of schooling is a crucial cultural component 
that may affect educational decisions (Figlio et al., 2019). This has been rarely investigated, as 
it is typically difficult to disentangle empirically (Becker et al., 2020). Furthermore, 
understanding which determinants fundamentally drive such beliefs and preferences is 
important but remains unclear.  
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To shed light on these questions, I exploit a unique historical territorial expansion of 
historical Vietnam to study the effects of Confucian cultural heritage on educational attainment 
and academic performance in present-day societies. Based on a spatial regression discontinuity 
approach, I find that adults living in regions of Confucian cultural heritage has significantly 
higher average schooling years and qualification achievement than those residing in regions 
without Confucian cultural heritage. School-aged children who have inherited Confucian 
culture have higher school enrolment and also perform much better at school than their 
counterparts living in the former Khmer culture. These findings held in different samples and 
are strongly robust to various empirical specifications. In exploring potential interpretations of 
these results, I find evidence to suggest that my main effects are mediated via positive cultural 
values and beliefs towards education as well as increased investments in children’s school and 
learning activities.  
Inequality in schooling is the most vital cause of inequality in socioeconomic outcomes. 
Therefore, the implementation of educational policies and programmes to promote educational 
attainment and thus reduce inequality in schooling continues to be the central focus of initiatives 
fighting against poverty worldwide, particularly for poor countries in the years to come. 
Understanding the importance of traditional culture in general and cultural values and beliefs 
towards schooling in particular for educational success can therefore offer policymakers 
significant implications in designing their educational policies, and tailoring policies to specific 
cultural contexts is essential for obtaining the highest effectiveness rather than using one-size-
fits-all programmes (Ashraf et al., 2020; Rao and Walton, 2004; World Bank, 2015).  
Lastly but as importantly, although my paper specifically focuses on Vietnam, there are 
reasons to believe that its results could be generalized to the broader region of Northeast Asian 
countries, which are parts of the Confucian cultural sphere. Confucianism and the exam-based 
meritocratic institutions that it engendered were the core elements of historical Chinese 
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societies, which were then imported to pre-modern Korea and Japan in addition to Vietnam via 
Chinese colonial legacies. In the early modern era, Confucian culture has continued to expand 
its influence on other territories such as Taiwan, Macao, Hong Kong, and Singapore via the 
flows of Chinese immigrants (see Appendix B3 for a detail of the spread of Confucian culture). 
Although no longer formally used in today’s Northeast Asia countries and having been replaced 
by other ideologies – for example, communist ideology – in China and Vietnam, the results of 
my study suggest that Confucianism remains influential on social lives via the values it has 
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Abstract 
A primary role of the welfare state is to provide a safety net against adverse shocks such as 
becoming unemployed. We estimate the effect of a major welfare reform in the UK on mental 
health for unemployed claimants. In 2013 Universal Credit replaced six existing benefits, 
creating a simplified system of applications and payments, whilst simultaneously applying 
somewhat draconian policy rules including a commitment to intensive job search, a change in 
benefit income and a five-week wait to receive the first benefit payment. Exploiting a staggered 
roll-out across areas and time, we find the welfare reform was less able to mitigate negative 
mental health effects from entering unemployment by 26% of a standard deviation. We 
decompose this effect into the proportion coming from the individual policy rules, finding that 
a cut in income and a reduction in the number of benefits claimed worsened mental health 
problems from entering unemployment. 
 
JEL codes: I22, I24 









Governments spend a lot of money on welfare payments to individuals and families in need of 
social assistance. Accounting for around 20% of all public expenditure in the OECD, UK and 
US,44 it is not surprising that efficient delivery of the welfare state is a common goal of 
governments across the world. 
The objectives of a well functioning welfare state is to raise welfare of recipients, 
providing a safety net which mitigates for any negative consequences of losing a job or the loss 
of income. Whilst the efficient delivery requires trading off objectives of poverty reduction 
against delivering a welfare programme which raises the incentives to work, failure to strike 
the correct balance can result in unintended consequences such as induced mental health issues, 
illness or criminal activities of claimants (Blank, 1997, 2002). 
In this paper we evaluate a major overhaul of the welfare state in the UK - Universal 
Credit (UC) - on the mental health of participants.45 46 The UK Welfare Reform Act 2012 which 
introduced UC has been recognised as the most radical social security reform for over 60 years, 
replacing the existing “legacy” system (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). The reform is estimated to 
cost £15 billion to implement and the early roll-out had a positive albeit very modest effects on 
employment of claimants.47 A full evaluation of the reform requires to identify the mental health 
costs or benefits. 
 
44 In the UK, this represents around 11% of national income (Office for Budget Responsibility, 2017). 
45 Wickham et al. (2020) estimates a negative mental health association between being unemployed, which is 
larger after the UC roll-out than before. Our estimate is different, as individuals in the roll-out area became eligible 
if they changed their circumstances. For this reason, we estimate a panel data model observing individuals across 
time, identifying the effect of becoming unemployed whilst claiming UC versus legacy benefits on a claimant’s 
mental health.  
46 Papers documenting the relationship between unemployment and mental health include Björklund (1985); 
Hamilton et al. (1997); and Tefft (2011).  
47 Department for Work and Pensions (2014) found that 69% of UC claimants found a job between making their 
claim six months later compared to 65% of legacy claimants.  
 
103 
The design of UC may result in both positive and negative consequences of the reform. 
A first objective of UC was to reduce the administrative burden of the current welfare state by 
combining application processes and payments of up to six existing benefits combining income 
support, housing and child benefits into one.48 The second aim was to strongly incentivise 
claimants into self-sufficiency, through policy rules including changes in benefit income 
(Brewer et al., 2012) and compulsory intensive job search of up to 30 hours per week for 
unemployed or low income claimants. Whilst the simplified application process may raise 
mental health of claimants, the movement to draconian restrictions is likely to have the opposite 
effect.49 
Using the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) we answer two research 
questions. First, does the UC welfare reform exacerbate or mitigate any negative mental health 
effects of entering unemployment? A factor for mental health is constructed using 12 self-
reported answers to the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12), including questions relating 
to feeling constantly under strain, unhappy or depressed.50 51 
Second, to inform future policy in the UK and internationally we causally decompose the 
total mental health effect to identify the sub-policies which protect and those which worsen the 
mental health of claimants. Specifically we employ causal decomposition analysis to identify 
the separate role of three mediators - household income, the number of benefit claimed, and 
intensity of job search - in mediating the mental health effects of UC. Figure 3.1 highlights the 
pathways through which treatment - defined as entering unemployment under UC versus legacy 
 
48 The legacy system is similar to the welfare systems in many countries, offering a set of benefits depending on 
different needs. The six legacy benefits combined into UC include Income Support, Income Based Jobseeker’s 
Allowance, Income-Related Employment Support Allowance, Housing Benefit, Child Tax Credit and Working 
Tax Credit.  
49 See Section 3.2 for full details on the policy rules.  
50 Validation studies by Jackson (2007) have found the GHQ generates measures of psychological distress which 
has a large association with mental disorders.  
51 The GHQ has been used by economists as a measure of mental health, for example Baird et al. (2013), as well 
as public health research, see Weich et al. (2003), Weich et al. (2001).  
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- may affect the mental health of claimants. There may be a direct effect - indicated from the 
pathway from treatment to the outcome - estimating whether compared to the former system, 
UC mitigates or exacerbates mental health effects of entering unemployment (holding constant 
the mediators).  
 
FIGURE 3.1: MEDIATION PATHWAY FOR TREATMENT EFFECT OF BECOMING UNEMPLOYED AND 
CLAIMING UC ON MENTAL HEALTH 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the mediation pathway for the treatment effect of becoming 
unemployed whilst claiming UC on mental health. The three mediators - income, number of benefits 
and job search intensity - were sub-policy rules of UC. There may be treatment heterogeneity in the 
effect of the mediators on mental health due to additional policy rules in implementing UC. For 
example, a change in income may differentially affect mental health of UC claimants because the 
entire benefit payment under UC was received by the claimant; whereas under legacy housing 
benefits and council tax were paid straight to landlords and the council; UC was paid monthly 
whereas legacy payments were either weekly or bimonthly. UC claimants signed a work 
commitment to job search for up to 30 hours per week or face benefit sanctions, hence the effect of 
job search on mental health is likely to be heterogeneous across treatment to UC.   
 
The indirect effects measure the proportion of the treatment effect attributed to each of 
the three potential mediators, indicated in the figure by an arrow from treatment to the mediator 
and from the two arrows from mediators to mental health. The two arrows allow for possible 
treatment heterogeneity in the effect of a mediator on mental health under UC versus legacy, 
stemming from different implementation of the two welfare systems.52 Specifically, a change 
in income may differentially affect UC versus legacy claimant’s mental health because the 
payment moved from weekly or bimonthly to monthly leading to at least 5 weeks between 
 
52 See VanderWeele and Vansteelandt (2009).  
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approval and payment and paying benefits for housing and council tax to the claimant rather 
than the tenant or council. Heterogeneous pathways from the number of benefits claimed to 
mental health stem from to IT difficulties under UC which increased the risk of a rejected 
application. Under legacy having one rejected application is less problematic if the claimant 
also receives a different benefit payment. A change in job search intensity may differentially 
affect the mental health of UC claimants who were compelled to complete a set number of 
hours of job search per week in order to avoid benefit sanctions. Under legacy the job search 
criteria was not specified directly. 
To identify the treatment effect of UC on the mental health of participants, we exploit a 
staggered roll-out across areas of the UK between 2013-2018 which started in the North of the 
UK and slowly moved across the whole country. So as not to overwhelm the roll-out, not all 
benefit claimants within a roll-out area were eligible for UC, but rather those changing their 
employment or housing status whilst satisfying eligibility rules explained in Section 3.2.3. 
Given this, our identification strategy estimates a panel data model of the effect on mental 
health of entering unemployment under the the UC versus legacy system. Whilst the effects of 
an individual entering unemployment across time or claiming a benefit are potentially 
endogenous, the focus is on the difference in the effect of an individual entering unemployment 
under the two systems. This parameter is causally identified if the roll-out is exogenous and if 
the common trends assumption holds and, we show that our strategy is robust to tests of these 
two assumptions. 
To implement causal decomposition analysis, we require that variation in the meditators 
is uncorrelated with the outcome or treatment status (Celli et al., 2019). Again, this is satisfied 
if the identification assumptions of exogenous roll-out and common trends across treatment and 
control regions is satisfied (Deuchert et al., 2019). In addition, there can be no confounders 
post-treatment which affect the relationship between treatment and mediators, and is correlated 
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with the outcomes (VanderWeele and Vansteelandt, 2009). This assumption is satisfied because 
the potential mediators or policy rules of UC are contemporaneous to treatment. The intuition 
for the mediation analysis identification strategy is to compare two similar individuals who 
enter unemployment under different welfare systems. If they were both eligible to, say, 4 legacy 
benefits, then the individual living in the UC roll-out area claims fewer benefits, has a different 
level of benefit income and commits to a higher intensity of job search hours than an individual 
living in a legacy area. We identify what proportion of the total treatment effect comes from 
these three mediation channels. 
Our benchmark results suggest that the UC system exacerbates mental health problems 
among the unemployed individuals. In total, the mental health of newly unemployed claimants 
under UC versus legacy is 26% of a standard deviation worse with claiming UC. Whilst UC 
led to small positive employment effects, there were large negative consequences for mental 
health. 15% of the treatment effect can be explained by the reduction in income and number of 
benefits claimed. Job search intensity did not contribute to the treatment effect and we show an 
additional treatment effect was to lower the probability of being unemployed in the future 
suggesting that any negative mental health effects from intense job search may have cancelled 
out for UC claimants if they found a job. These findings are very informative for future 
government policy in the UK and elsewhere, aiming to improve the efficiency of a welfare 
system whilst protecting the mental health of claimants. 
Our paper contributes to several strands of the economics literature. First, it speaks to the 
central question of the consequences of welfare reforms (Blank, 2002). Previous studies on this 
research topic has initially focused on employment which is typically the direct target of welfare 
reforms through rectifying in-work credits (Brewer and Hoynes, 2019). Accordingly, welfare 
reforms are helpful in raising labour supply for the affected working age population including 
lone parents’ labour supply (Brewer et al., 2006; Francesconi and Van der Klaauw, 2007; Gregg 
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et al., 2009) and immigrant labour participation (Borjas, 2003). The literature has been extended 
to consider mental health outcomes, such as improving subjective well-being for single mothers 
(Herbst, 2013) as well as other unintended consequences including disparities in political 
outcomes (Fetzer, 2019) and increasing criminal activities (d’Este and Harvey, 2020; Giulietti 
and McConnell, 2020; Tuttle, 2019; Watson et al., 2019). 
We contribute to this research strand by focusing on mental health as a main outcome 
which is understudied from the literature. Wickham et al. (2020), also studies the mental health 
effect of UC, estimating a different parameter to ours. Whilst Wickham et al. (2020) compares 
a group of unemployed individuals who claimed UC to employed individuals who did not, 
before and after the UC roll-out, our paper focuses specifically on the individuals within a roll-
out area who were eligible for UC because of a change in unemployment status. We evaluate 
the relative merit of UC in mitigating for mental health effects of entering unemployment. 
Second our paper decomposes the main treatment effect into the indirect effects working via 
several key mediators which are driven by changes in UC rules compared to the legacy rules, 
providing a novel contribution to understanding mediating channels for the effects of a welfare 
reform. 
Next, our paper relates a growing literature in economics that use mediation analysis to 
decompose the main effect of a treatment into indirect effects working via different 
mechanisms. Celli et al. (2019) provides a summary of the different methods used for causal 
identification of mediators separately to the treatment effect including using difference-in-
difference methods (for example, Deuchert et al. (2019), instrumental variables (for example, 
Nicoletti et al. (2020) and Attanasio et al. (2020), using a randomised control trial (Heckman 
and Pinto, 2015 among others) and synthetic control methods (Celli et al., 2019). In our paper, 
we exploit exogenous variation in potential mediators which are strongly driven by policy 




3.2 Welfare systems in the UK 
The UK Welfare Reform Act of 2012 legislated for UC, a major reform aimed at simplifying 
the welfare system by replacing six means-tested benefits and in-work tax credits into one 
benefit. This reduced the administrative burden to applicants and welfare offices. UC replaced 
the former, or ‘legacy’ benefits: housing benefit, income-based jobseeker’s allowance (JSA), 
income-related employment and support allowance (ESA), income support (including support 
for mortgage interest), child tax credit and working tax credit.53 UC only required one 
application and made just one welfare payment. 
3.2.1 Legacy 
The welfare system prior to the UC reform is known as legacy. The system is common in most 
OECD countries, whereby a set of benefits exist for different purposes. Individuals claim 
separately for each benefit they are eligible for. Here we detail the six benefits under the legacy 
system which were combined under UC. 
Income-based JSA offers financial support whilst looking for work. Eligible individuals 
would have worked as an employee and paid national insurance in the last 2 to 3 years be aged 
18 to pension age, not in full-time education and available for work but currently out of work. 
Payments made every 2 weeks. 
Income-based Employment Support Allowance (ESA) is paid for individuals with a 
disability or health condition which affects how much they can work. For employed, self-
employed, unemployed to give money for living costs if out of work and support getting back 
to work if and when able. 
 
53 Other benefits were not influenced by the reform including disability living allowance, contribution-based JSA, 
contribution-based ESA, carer’s allowance and child benefit.  
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Income support is for those with low or no income with savings less than £16,000, aged 
16 up to the pension age, not in full-time work and satisfying one of these conditions: lone 
parent, lone foster parent, carer, on parental leave, unable to work and receiving benefits for 
sickness or disability, in full-time education (not university) age 16-20 and a parent or not living 
with a parent, a refugee learning English, in custody or due to attend court or a tribunal. It is 
usually paid to claimants every 2 weeks. 
Housing benefit offers help paying rent for unemployed, low income or claiming 
benefits. This benefit is not eligible under if paying a mortgage rather than rent. Importantly, 
payments are made straight to the landlords. 
Working tax credits requires working a certain number of hours per week which varies 
across demographic, from at least 16 hours for single with at least one child, over 60s or 
disabled and at least 30 hours for age 25-59. 
Child tax credits is an extension of working tax credits for those with children, where 
since 2017 payments are made only for the first two children. 
3.2.2 UC roll-out 
The implementation of UC roll-out is managed by the Department of Work and Pensions 
(DWP). The welfare reform required substantial changes in the technology of processing 
welfare payments and as such UC was rolled out across different local authorities slowly across 
time, starting from the pilot ’pathfinder’ areas in April 2013, followed by the staggered roll-out 
from 2015 and completing in December 2018 when all areas in the UK had introduced UC. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the national expansion of the UC roll-out coverage between 
January 2015 and December 2018. The figure shows that by January 2015 the Northern 
pathfinder areas had incorporated UC into their welfare systems. There followed a quick 




FIGURE 3.2: UC ROLL-OUT 
 
Note: This figure illustrates the geographic expansion of the UC roll-out coverage 
between January 2015 and December 2018. Each panel shows the geographic 
coverage of UC roll-out at a specific time. The roll-out dates are at the local authority 
district level.  
Data source: UK’s Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
 
3.2.3 UC eligibility 
Individuals living in a rolled-out local authority would become eligible for UC only if their 
housing or employment circumstances changed and they satisfied eligibility criteria.54 From the 
initial roll-out, individuals have to satisfy the following ‘gateway’ conditions. Individuals were 
eligible to claim UC if they resided in a roll-out area, had a change to their employment 
circumstances, were single with no partner or children and were aged 18-60, with no or low 
income (under £270 (or £330) per month if under (or older than) 25 years old), not being self-
 
54 This strict condition allowed DWP to prevent a rush of applicants transferring from the legacy system to UC 
within a local authority.  
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employed, not being in education or homeless, had savings no higher than £16,000 and if they 
accepted a ’claimant commitment’ to work-related requirements.55 
These conditions were changed in the following years to expand the coverage of UC 
whereby couples without children became eligible from 2014 and households with children 
from May 2016. In our analysis, we exploit the regional roll-out variation for our identification, 
comparing two individuals with the same characteristics (in particular conditioning on marital 
status, number of children) entering unemployment under two different policy regimes. 
Consequently for identification, we exploit the geographical variation in roll-out rather than the 
policy variation related to individuals’ traits. 
As of July 2019, the UK government planned a “managed migration” where all benefit 
claimants would be moved to UC. A pilot was initiated in Harrogate, Yorkshire but indefinitely 
postponed from March 2020 once the Covid-19 pandemic led to national lockdown and a large 
increase in UC claims. 
3.2.4 UC rules as potential mediators 
Whilst the overall objective of UC was to align six benefits into one, in practice UC was 
implemented along with several other individual policy changes, which will feature in our 
analysis of the decomposition of the effect of UC on claimant outcomes. 
First, UC aimed at strengthening incentives to work and a movement out of the benefit 
system. The overall expectations was that the benefits paid out would increase through UC as 
more individuals claim for their full benefit entitlement with one benefit application compared 
to several applications under the legacy system. Yet, there were distributional changes in benefit 
income received by different groups of individuals, designed to strengthen incentives to work 
where these were previously weakest, including low income households (Brewer and Hoynes, 
 
55 See Section 3.2.4 for the detailed information. 
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2019). For example, employed couples received the greatest increase in benefits and single 
parents received the greatest loss. In practice therefore, for some UC claimants, household 
income would fall under UC compared to legacy system whilst for others income would rise 
but given a set of covariates, the change in income is exogenously driven by the policy and not 
by individual unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore, there was an increase in deductions from 
the total UC amount for earned income, unearned income and capital attached to the claimants. 
These deductions potentially lead to a significant reduction in the final income the claimants 
received from UC compared to that from legacy benefits. 
Second, UC stipulated an intense job search criteria for either claimants out of work, 
receiving a low income or working just a few hours. To claim UC, individuals including non 
parents or single parents of a child aged three or over (or five or over for before April 2017) 
were expected to meet the full work-related requirements which consist of actively spending 
30 hours per week on job search. Upon being offered a job, claimants were obliged to accept if 
they were unemployed claimants, or the job increased their work hours and earnings for those 
already working. These activities were supported and monitored by an assigned work 
counsellor.56 Failure to adequately meet this work-related commitment without acceptable 
reasons resulted in benefit sanctions (non-payment) - although note that the specific policy of 
sanctions applied across both the legacy and UC systems (Williams, 2021). The severity of the 
sanctions varied across the work requirement missed. The lowest level of sanction would 
prohibit benefits until a missed work-related meeting with the work counsellor had taken place; 
 
56 Several UC claimants with specific conditions can be exempted from the full work-related requirements if they 
have one of the following conditions: having no sufficient ability for work or work-related activities, being 
satisfied for taking pension credit, being pregnant and within 11 weeks for the due of giving birth, being 
responsible for mainly caring a severely disabled individual, being responsible for caring a under-one child, being 
students who are aged under 21 without parental support and have a student loan or grant which will be deducted 
from the benefit when claiming UC, being students who are in a couple and have a student loan or grant which 
will be deducted from the benefit when claiming UC, or a victim of domestic violence (would be given a 13-week 
duration of work-related requirement exemption).  
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whilst a highest level stopped benefits for 3 months, for example if a job offer was not taken 
up. 
The policy rules of income, the number of benefits claimed and job search intensity will 
be three mediators through which the treatment effect (entering unemployment whilst claiming 
UC versus legacy) may affect mental health of claimants. We now detail the additional policy 
rules which lead us to expect heterogeneous effects of the mediators on claimants’ mental health 
under the UC and legacy systems. 
Income received by UC claimants may differentially affect mental health compared to 
legacy claimants for four reasons. First, UC shifted from a weekly or bimonthly to a monthly 
welfare payment for recipients, resulting in at least a five-week wait between the benefit 
application and receipt of the first payment. Second, from the initial pilot, DWP learnt that the 
delay in benefit payments led claimants to struggle to pay their bills and so from April 2014, 
claimants could apply for a loan (known as a UC advance) to cover their bills or living 
expenditures until their first payment was received. The advance is paid off across the 
subsequent 12 months, taken directly from the welfare payment. Third, he monetary sum of UC 
is calculated at the household level, rather than the former legacy system calculating at 
individual level and the one household level payment can be paid into a single or joint account. 
It was suggested in dual-household claims that this may increase the financial independence of 
women if the benefit was paid into her account. Finally, the housing benefits and council tax 
payments became included in the one benefit payment to UC claimants who had the 
responsibility to make payments themselves, whereas under the legacy system were paid 
directly to the landlord and the district’s council. A consequence of these rules of UC was an 
increase in financial debt leading to adverse consequences. According to Windle and Martin 
(2019), “76% of claimants on Universal Credit are behind on their rent payments, with just 24% 
 
114 
not in some form of rent arrears.” An unintended consequence of the UC reform therefore was 
an increased debt which may induce mental health problems of claimants. 
Finally, whilst combining six benefit applications into one could ease the administrative 
burden of the welfare state for recipients, there are potential downsides also which lead us to 
expect the effect of the number of benefit claims to vary across treatment status. There were 
often IT issues which delayed a new claimant’s application. Any error on the UC application 
meant that the individual received zero benefits, whereas under the legacy system an error in 
one benefit claim would affect only that specific payment. Therefore whether the reduction of 
benefits improved or worsened mental health of claimants remains an empirical question. 
It is possible that whilst the reduced administrative burden of claiming benefits under UC 
may have positive mental health effects for claimants, the implementation of these multiple 
stringent policy rules could have a reverse effect. In our analysis, we will exploit these policy 
rules, identifying the role of household income, the number of benefits claimed, and the 
intensity of job search as potential mediators for the effect of entering unemployment and 
claiming UC on claimants’ mental health. 
 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Data source 
We use data from the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS), which is commonly 
refereed as Understanding Society. The UKHLS is a large and nationally representative panel 
survey which replaced the former British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Our study uses a 
panel sample of UKHLS spanning from wave 1 (implemented in 2009-2011) up to wave 9 
(implemented in 2017-2019). Each UKHLS wave contains information including socio-
economic and demographic issues, health, employment and social benefits of about 40,000 
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households across the United Kingdom. Because the age condition for claiming UC is strictly 
between 18 and 60, our main sample is constructed based on an unbalanced panel sample of 
working-age individuals aged 18-60. 
In principle, unemployed individuals are among the most likely groups to claim social 
benefits during their unemployment spells. However, some unemployed individuals would be 
in reality not eligible to take any benefit if they had an amount of savings or household income 
large enough to claim any benefit. To make sure our results are not influenced by this group of 
unemployed observations, we exclude the observations who are unemployed but not claiming 
any benefits, UC or legacy among others (2.1% of the whole sample) from our benchmark 
sample. They are included in the analysis of Appendix C2. 
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics of key variables in our main sample. Our sample 
consists of 194,428 individual-year observations aged 18-60 in which there are 48,945 
individuals and on average one idividual appears in 6 UKHLS waves. 
3.3.2 Benefit claim 
The UKHLS participants report whether they are currently in receipt of a set of different benefit 
payments, allowing us to construct our measures of UC and legacy benefits. Our main policy 
variable is an indicator for the individual claiming the UC benefit in a particular wave of data. 
In particular, the two following questions, one from waves 1-3 (question 1) and another from 
waves 4-9 (question 2), are used to construct two dummy variables for claiming UC and legacy. 
Question 1: Which, if any, of these types of payments are you currently receiving: (1) 
Unemployment-related benefits, or National insurance credits; (2) Income Support; (3) 
Sickness, Disability or Incapacity benefits (including Employment Support Allowance); (4) Any 
sort of pension including a private pension or the state pension; (5) Child Benefit; (6) Tax 
Credits, such as the Working Tax Credit or Child Tax Credit; (7) Any other family related 
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benefit or payment; (8) Housing or Council Tax Benefit, other than the single person council 
tax discount. 
Question 2: Are you currently receiving any of these payments: (1) Income Support; (2) 
Job Seeker’s Allowance; (3) Child Benefit; (4) Universal Credit; (96) None of these. 
An indicator for claiming UC takes all values of 0 for waves 1-3 and a value of 1 if the 
answer for question 2 is (4) Universal Credit and 0, otherwise for waves 4-9. 
An indicator for claiming a legacy benefit takes a value of 1 if the answer to question 1 
takes at least one of the following choices (1), (2), (3), (5), (6) or (8) and 0 otherwise for waves 
1-3; and takes a value of 1 if the answer to question 2 takes at least one of the following choices: 
(1), (2) or (3) and 0 otherwise for waves 4-9. 
From Table 3.1, the number of the observations claiming UC is 888 - while that figure 
for claiming a legacy benefit is 42,669. The difference represents that UC roll-out occurred 
from wave 4 out of 9 in the data, and only individuals who changed their employment or 
housing status were eligible. 
3.3.3 Mental health 
Information from the UKHLS health section is used to construct the measure of mental health 
(Jackson, 2007). We particularly rely on the answers for a question set of the 12-item General 
Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12) to construct a score of poor mental health. The GHQ-12 
provides short self-reported measures of mental ability in a non-clinical setting with several 
scores given to specify the severity of symptoms of the most popular components of anxiety, 
mental illnesses and depression which has been used in economics research (for example Baird 
et al., 2013). Validation studies have shown that the GHQ generates measures of psychological 





TABLE 3.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
  All Claim UC Claim Legacy 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Poor mental health (score, standardised) 0.000 1.000 0.102 0.367 0.084 0.329 
Unemployed (dummy) 0.065 0.246 0.241 0.428 0.179 0.383 
Income (£, monthly, real value in 2010 prices) 3825.241 2601.509 2207.527 1518.661 2285.733 1434.894 
Number of benefits claimed (number) 0.664 0.970 1.510 0.548 2.113 0.939 
Job search intensity (number of job search) 0.113 0.634 0.586 1.360 0.380 1.146 
Age (years) 39.952 11.982 39.212 11.418 39.409 10.520 
Prior mental disorder (dummy) 0.024 0.153 0.019 0.137 0.059 0.235 
Higher degree (dummy) 0.120 0.325 0.041 0.197 0.049 0.217 
First degree (dummy) 0.167 0.373 0.094 0.291 0.093 0.290 
Higher diploma (dummy) 0.078 0.268 0.089 0.285 0.074 0.261 
A level (dummy) 0.101 0.302 0.100 0.301 0.072 0.258 
GCSE/O level (dummy) 0.225 0.418 0.303 0.460 0.288 0.453 
Having a child aged under 15 (dummy) 0.367 0.482 0.398 0.490 0.654 0.476 
Married (dummy) 0.513 0.500 0.336 0.473 0.447 0.497 
Observations 194,428   888   42,669   
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In the UKHLS data, the GHQ-12 asks 12 questions corresponding to including: 
concentration; loss of sleep; playing a useful role; being capable of making decisions; 
constantly under strain; problem overcoming difficulties; enjoy day-to-day activities; ability to 
face problems; unhappy or depressed; losing confidence; believe worthless; and general 
happiness. For each component, the respondents are asked with a four-point Likert-scale 
response (from 1 to 4) in which a higher number gives a poorer status of that mental 
component.57 
For example, the question which is used to measure the mental ability of the concentration 
component is: The next questions are about how you have been feeling over the last few weeks. 
Have you recently been able to concentrate on whatever you’re doing? (1) Better than usual, 
(2) Same as usual, (3) Less than usual, (4) Much less than usual. Meanwhile, the question used 
to elicit the information about loss of sleep is: Have you recently lost much sleep over worry? 
(1) Not at all; (2) No more than usual; (3) Rather more than usual; (4) Much more than usual. 
All mental health measures and their responses are specifically present in Appendix, Table C.1. 
Previous studies commonly use a dummy for poor mental health or a discrete score of 
mental ability from aggregating these GHQ-12 measures as a measure of mental health. 
However, such a mental health construction is probably prone to measurement error stemming 
from the use of Likert-scale questions (Brown et al., 2018). Such measurement error likely 
makes statistical analysis biased and inconsistent because of the potential problem of 
misclassification of the dependent variable (Hausman et al., 1998). 
To overcome this problem, we use factor analysis to construct a continuous score for poor 
mental health (see Cunha and Heckman, 2008). Using factor analysis allows us to control for 
measurement error by estimating a latent variable for mental health and thus sufficiently 
 
57 A Liker-scale question is a statement that elicits the respondent about their evaluation by giving a quantitative 
value for a level of agreement or disagreement on a dimension (Hu et al., 2007).  
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controlling for measurement error. A higher score value indicates a poor mental health ability. 
The equation used for estimating the latent factor is present in Appendix C, Equation (C.1). To 
make our interpretation of the results more straightforward, we standardise this poor mental 
health score into a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. In Appendix C, Table C.2, we 
present the results of our factor analysis with factor loadings of 12 mental health measures. The 
reference loading is based on concentration with a fixed score of 1. Based on this reference, we 
estimate the factor loadings for other mental health components. Among estimated coefficients, 
unhappy and depression has the highest loading with a score of 2.18 whilst capable of making 
decisions has the lowest factor loading of 0.83. 
Table 3.1 reports that the measure of standardised poor mental health score has a mean 
of 0 and standard deviation 1 in the full sample, whilst UC and legacy claimants have a worse 
mental health score of 0.1 and 0.08, respectively. 
3.3.4 Unemployment 
To construct a measure of unemployment, we rely on the following question asking the UKHLS 
respondents about their current economic activity from the module of Demographics of 
UKHLS: 
Question: Which of these best describes your current employment situation? (1) Self 
employed; (2) In paid employment (full or part-time); (3) Unemployed; (4) Retired; (5) On 
maternity leave; (6) Looking after family or home; (7) Full-time student; (8) Long-term sick or 
disabled; (9) On a government training scheme; (10) Unpaid worker in family business: (11) 
Working in an apprenticeship; (97) Doing something else. 
An indicator for unemployment takes a value of 1 if the answer for the above question is 
(3) Unemployed, and 0 otherwise. From Table 3.1, 6.5% of the total sample - whilst 24% and 




The potential mediators through which eligibility to UC exacerbated or mitigated the mental 
health effects of unemployment are given by the different policy rules explained in Section 2.4. 
The mediators consist of household income, the number of benefits claimed and the intensity 
of job search. 
Household income. Compared to the former system, UC changed the claimants’ 
household income through several changes in benefit rules such as increased deductions. We 
measure household income directly from the data, calculating monthly income of a household 
from all income sources, summed across all household members. Household income is 
measured in GPB in 2010 prices and is standardised into a mean of 0 and a standard deviation 
of 1. 
Number of benefits claimed. UC simplified the benefit application process by 
aggregating applications for up to six legacy benefits into one UC claim. Importantly, the 
number of benefits claimed as entering unemployment is a policy tool, exogenous to the 
claimant’s mental health. We exploit the information from the UKHLS data to construct a 
variable for the number of benefit claimed by summing up all benefits the respondents take at 
the survey time. The number of benefits claimed includes those not in the UC system, including 
disability allowance and carers allowance. 
Job search intensity. UC stipulates that unemployed or low income individuals must 
commit to finding a job through active actions, spending up to 30 hours per week in job search 
activities in order to claim the benefit. We proxy for job search intensity with a measure of the 
number of job search methods used by an individual for seeking a job. In particular, we exploit 
several questions from the UKLHS data asking the respondents about their use of each of the 
six following strategies for searching a job over the last four weeks including: (1) applying 
directly to an employer; (2) studying or replying to advertisements; (3) searching for 
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jobs/information about jobs on the internet; (4) contacting a private employment agency or job; 
(5) asking friends or contacts; and (6) asking steps to start their own business. The number of 
job search methods is simply the sum of these six strategies. 
Table 3.1 shows the differences in these mediators between the groups of claiming UC 
versus legacy benefits from our main sample. As expected, there are clear differences in these 
mediators between UC and legacy claim. Monthly household income is on average less for a 
UC claimant than a legacy claimant by GBP 78. An individual claiming UC also has the number 
of benefits fewer than a legacy beneficiary by approximately 0.6 benefits. A UC claimant has 
on average about 1.5 benefits while a legacy claimant has about 2.1 benefits.58 A UC claimant 
on average uses a higher number of job search methods with 0.59 methods than a legacy 
claimant with 0.38 methods. These differences suggest that changes in UC policies compared 
to the former legacy system likely cause changes in the mediating outcomes which are 
potentially linked to the mental health of the claimants. 
3.3.6 Control variables 
Control variables for individual characteristics include age, age squared, a dummy for having a 
previous mental disorder, a dummy for having a child aged 15 or younger, a dummy for being 
married and dummies for the highest educational levels. 
We use a question asking whether the individual had a depression problem in the past 
from the UKLHS data to construct a dummy for having a previous mental disorder. 
Educational levels are classified into several categories which are used for constructing 
dummies for the highest educational levels including higher degree (a higher degree is any 
degree beyond a bachelor’s degree), first degree (a first degree is an undergraduate degree), 
 
58 The average number of benefits claimed among the UC group is larger than 1 because in addition to claiming 
UC at the same time some people still claim other benefits such as Bereavement Allowance, Carer’s Allowance, 
Incapacity Benefit, Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit among others. Receiving other benefits may also 
reduce the amount of income one receives from UC due to a higher deduction.  
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higher diploma (the higher diploma is a level 2 qualification on the Regulated Qualifications 
Framework), A-level (Advanced-level set of qualifications which are typically taken at age 18) 
and GCSE/O-level (the GCSE level is the General Certification of Secondary Education which 
is a higher level set of qualifications which are typically taken at age 16 and the O-level is the 
Ordinary level is a subject-based qualification conferred as a component of the General 
Certificate of Education). 
The average age of the observations in our sample is nearly 40 years old. The share of the 
observations having a prior mental disorder is 2.4% (similar for UC claimants at 2% but higher 
for legacy claimants at 5.9%). In terms of the educational levels, approximately 12% hold a 
higher degree, 16.7% have a first degree, 7.8% have a higher diploma, 10.1% complete an A-
level, and 22.5% complete a GCSE/O level. Nearly 36.7% of the sample have a child and 
around 51.3% are married. 
 
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Exogeneity of UC roll-out 
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, UC was rolled out on a district-by-district basis from 2013 (wave 
4 of UKHLS) and by the end of 2018 (wave 9) covered all the local authority districts in the 
UK. 
Our methodology exploits changes in the mental health status of newly unemployed 
individuals compared across UC versus legacy areas. In essence, we conduct a triple difference 
(or D-in-D-in-D analysis) - comparing individuals across time, changing their unemployment 
status, under different welfare systems. As such it is important to test the common trends 
assumption, specifically asking if the areas rolled out as pathfinder regions in 2013 were chosen 




FIGURE 3.3: COMMON TRENDS IN MENTAL HEALTH 
 
Note: This figure tests the common trends assumption by comparing the trends of 
mental health between Pathfinder districts (rolled out in April 2013) and non-
Pathfinder districts, between 2009 to 2019. Mental health is measured by the rate of 
people aged 18-60 with psychological depression.  
Data source: UKHLS (2009-2019) 
 
The early Pathfinder districts include Ashton-under-Lyne, Wigan, Warrington, Oldham, 
Hammersmith, Rugby, Inverness, Harrogate, Bath and Shotton. In Figure 3.3 we the share of 
those aged 18-60 years old with psychological depression across the years 2009 to 2014, 
differentiating between the Pathfinder districts which received the early UC treatment and the 
non-Pathfinder districts which were rolled out from 2015 onwards. The trends leading up to the 
initial UC roll-out are parallel across the two types of districts, justifying the common trends 
assumption. 
Our identification strategy exploits not just the initial pathfinder roll-out, but the full 
expansion of UC. To show that the timing of roll-out is not related to local characteristics, Table 
C.3 regresses district level characteristics against the month and year of the local autority roll-
out. Local characteristics from the 2011 UK censuses include population size, the share of white 
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population, the percentage of working-age population, the percentage of population aged 16 
and over with being married, the share of economically active population aged 16-74, the share 
of population aged 16-74 with a full-time job, the share of households with unshared dwelling, 
and the share of population with very good reported health. These measures are aggregated at 
the local authority district level. Table C.3 shows that the date of UC roll-out is not correlated 
to these local characteristics. In column 9, when we regress the UC roll-out date on all of these 
characteristics in one specification, we find that all coefficients for these characteristics are 
statistically insignificant and p-value for joint significance of covariates is also statistically 
insignificant (p-value=0.645). These findings support our hypothesis that the timing of UC roll-
out is exogenous to local socio-demographic characteristics which may be linked to the mental 
health of local people. 
3.4.2 Estimation 
Does UC exacerbate or mitigate mental health issues from entering unemployment? We 
estimate this treatment effect, exploiting the exogenous roll-out across regions and time using 
a panel data estimation model. 
For the poor mental health outcome 𝑌𝑖𝑑𝑡 of individual 𝑖, living in local authority district 
𝑑 and observed in year 𝑡, we run the regression:  
𝑌𝑖𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑈𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑈𝑖𝑑𝑡 × 𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑿𝑖𝑑𝑡
′
+ 𝜙𝑖 + 𝜙𝑑 + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑑𝑡                                                                       (3.1).
 
𝑈𝑖𝑑𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is unemployed and 𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑡 is a dummy 
variable which takes the value 1 if the individual claims UC and 0 otherwise. 
Welfare programmes should in principle reduce mental health effects of becoming 
unemployed by providing income support and job search assistance. To understand whether 
UC mitigates or exacerbates the mental health effect of being unemployed, we include an 
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interaction term between being unemployed and receiving UC denoted 𝑈𝑖𝑑𝑡 × 𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑡. The 
coefficient 𝛼3 - our parameter of interest - is the differential effect of an individual entering 
unemployment under the UC compared to legacy benefit system on the claimant’s mental 
health. 
In the estimation model, we include fixed effects for the individual, local authority district 
and year, denoted by 𝜙𝑖, 𝜙𝑑 and 𝜙𝑡, respectively. Controlling for the individual and year fixed 
effects in the model allows the coefficient on 𝑈𝑖𝑑𝑡 to exploit the variation in unemployment 
status within an individual and across year - estimating the effect of moving into unemployment 
status in a particular year. The local authority district fixed effects are included to absorb any 
unobserved differences across regions which may be linked to the timing of the UC roll-out. 
𝑿𝑖𝑑𝑡
′  denotes the set of covariates in our model, including a dummy for claiming legacy 
benefit, age, age squared, a dummy for prior mental disorder, dummies for educational levels 
(higher degree, first degree, higher diploma, A-level and GCSE/0-level), a dummy for having 
a child aged 15 or younger, and a dummy for being married. 𝜖𝑖𝑑𝑡 is an error term assumed to 
have conditional mean zero. 
Given the local authority is the level at which treatment variation is defined, we therefore 
cluster our standard errors at the local authority district level in our estimation model to account 
for potential correlations across time within the same district. 
The coefficient of unemployment (𝛼1) estimates the change in mental health from an 
individual entering a state of unemployment, but is not likely to be causal given the possibility 
of entering unemployment due to reasons related to their mental health. Therefore, in our 
analysis we will interpret 𝛼1 descriptively. Instead, the purpose of our analysis is to estimate 
whether the UC welfare reform can affect the mental health effect of unemployment. The 
intuition behind the identification strategy is to compare two individuals entering 
unemployment, but under different welfare systems. Even if the cause of unemployment is 
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endogenous, the exposure to UC versus legacy is not, due to the staggered roll-out of UC across 
time and local authority districts as discussed in Section 3.4.1. Hence we can interpret the 
change in mental health as a causal treatment effect. 
3.4.3 Mediation analysis 
Whilst estimation of the total treatment effect is important, future policy reform in the UK and 
in other countries will rely on identifying the “effect of the cause” (Gelman and Imbens, 2013). 
Which aspects of a welfare reform help attenuate mental health effects of becoming 
unemployed and which exacerbate? Our framework will decompose the main treatment effect 
estimated using Equation (3.1) into the direct effect and the indirect effects through the different 
mediators - household income, the number of benefits claimed, and the intensity of job search. 
Causal mediation analysis carries inherent difficulties in separate identification from the 
treatment effect. Assuming that treatment is randomised, causal mediation analysis requires (i) 
exogenous variation in the mediators uncorrelated with the outcome; (ii) variation in the 
mediators uncorrelated with treatment status; and (iii) no confounders affecting the relationship 
between the treatment and the mediators which drive the mental health outcome (Celli et al., 
2019). In our case, the mediators are specific policy instruments whose variation across the two 
welfare systems of UC and legacy is uncorrelated with claimant’s mental health and eligibility 
to the treatment. Intuitively, our analysis compares two individuals who enter unemployment 
under different welfare systems due to the staggered UC roll-out, who consequently have 
different values of the mediators. Therefore, variation in the mediators used for identification 
is uncorrelated with either mental health or with the treatment (assumptions (i) and (ii)). 
Assumption (iii) is thought particularly difficult to satisfy and requires that no post-
treatment confounders exist. VanderWeele and Vansteelandt (2009) state that the assumption 
is less likely to be upheld as the time period between treatment and measurement of the 
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mediators increases. In our case, the variation in mediators is contemporaneous to treatment 
exposure. 
An exemplar of the identification strategy is to compare two individuals who enter 
unemployment and would be eligible for the same set of benefits, say job seekers allowance 
and housing benefit. The individual living in a UC roll-out area will make one benefit claim 
less, receive a different level of benefit payments and commit to an increased number of hours 
of job search compared to the individual eligible for legacy benefits. Only two policy rules, 
namely household income and the number of benefits, are observed directly and can be 
interpreted as causal mediators. The remaining mediator of the intensity of job search is a proxy 
for the policy rule of a commitment to spend up to 30 hours per week searching for a job. As 
this variable measures the policy rule with error, its value may be correlated with mental health; 
and we therefore cautiously give a descriptive interpretation to this potential mediator. 
Our decomposition analysis include several steps. First, we obtain the mediated effect of 
an UC versus legacy take-up on poor mental health of unemployed by adding each mediator 
and its interactive terms with 𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑡 into Equation (3.1). Adding the interactive terms with 𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑡 
allows heterogeneous indirect effect across treatment status to UC and legacy take-ups, as 
suggested by VanderWeele and Vansteelandt (2009) and Deuchert et al. (2019). As explained 
in Figure 3.1 and Section 3.2, while household income which is a potential mediator can drive 
mental health itself, the indirect effect of UC treatment on mental health through this channel 
may vary across the treatment status, due to the benefit payments for council tax and housing 
benefit being paid to the claimant rather than the council or landlord. The effect of the number 
of benefits claimed on mental health may vary across treatment status because under UC the 
right to claim additional benefits (such as disability benefit) reduces the risk of a rejected 
application; whilst the effect of job search intensity on mental health may vary under UC where 
the claimants’ signed a work commitment which if broken, led to benefit sanctions. 
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In particular, we estimate the following equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑖𝑑𝑡 × 𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝜆
𝑘𝑴𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝜃
𝑘𝑴𝑖𝑑𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑡 +  𝛽2𝒁𝑖𝑑𝑡
′ + 𝜁𝑖𝑑𝑡             (3.2). 
𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑡
𝑘  presents mediator 𝑘 for individual i living in local authority district 𝑑 in year 𝑡. There are 
𝐾 mediators. 𝒁𝑖𝑑𝑡
′ = (𝑈𝑖𝑑𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑡 , 𝑋𝑖𝑑𝑡) and 𝜁𝑖𝑑𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖 + 𝜙𝑑 + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑑𝑡 where 𝜀𝑖𝑑𝑡 is the error 
term and other terms are similarly defined as in Equation (3.1). In our mediation analysis, we 
particularly use two sets of mediators: one set includes only two mediators which are 
exogenously driven by changes in UC rules; and another set includes all three potential 
mediators. The set of control variables 𝑿𝑖𝑑𝑡
′  is the same as Equation (3.1). 
Second, we estimate the treatment effect on each mediator 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑡





𝑘𝑈𝑖𝑑𝑡 × 𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝛾2
𝑘𝒁′𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑑𝑡






𝑘  summarises the fixed effects at the individual, local 
authority, and year level and the error term respectively. 
To decompose of the treatment effect (the average treatment effect), consider a change in 
treatment status from 0 to 1 (which coincides with a change in eligibility for UC if unemployed 
from 0 to 1). The aim is to decompose the total effect of universal credit on mental health of 
newly unemployed given by the coefficient 𝛼3 in Equation (3.1) into the direct and indirect 
effects, calculated by combining equations (3.2)-(3.3). 
The direct effect is the effect of treatment holding constant the mediators at the untreated 
level (𝑚0
𝑘) and is given by the following equation: 
𝐷𝐸 = 𝐸[𝑌(𝑑1, 𝑚0
𝑘) − 𝑌(𝑑0, 𝑚0




𝑘)                  (3.4). 
The indirect effect through mediator 𝑘 is allowed to be heterogeneous across the treatment 





𝑘), holding constant treatment at the untreated level. It is calculated by 
combining equations (3.2)-(3.3) and using the following formula:  
𝐼𝐸 = 𝐸[𝑌(𝑑0, 𝑚1
𝑘) − 𝑌(𝑑0, 𝑚0
𝑘)|𝐶] = 𝜆𝑘𝛾1
𝑘 + 𝜃𝑘𝛾1
𝑘                             (3.5). 
The first term, 𝜆𝑘𝛾1
𝑘, represents the indirect effect through mediator 𝑘 itself. The second term, 
𝜃𝑘𝛾1
𝑘, represents the differential indirect effect for UC claimants. The sum of the indirect effects 
from all 𝐾 mediators is the total indirect effect through 𝐾 mediators. 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Main treatment effect 
Did the UC welfare reform protect unemployed individuals from experiencing mental health 
problems? As discussed in Section 3.2, there are two details which inform our research design. 
The roll-out of UC was staggered across regions and time periods and within a roll-out region, 
individuals became eligible only if their employment or housing changed. Using a panel data 
model including fixed effects at the individual, year and local authority district level, we focus 
on individuals entering unemployment and identify the differential effect on mental health for 
those claiming UC relative to legacy benefits. 
The coefficients estimated using Equation (3.1) for the main treatment effect are reported 
in Table 3.2. As an individual enters unemployment, their propensity to experience mental 
health problems rises by nearly 18% of a standard deviation. The positive coefficient on the 
interaction between unemployed and UC suggests that the UC system exacerbates poor mental 
health for those becoming unemployed compared to the legacy system. In particular, entering 
unemployment and claiming UC compared to legacy raises the poor mental health score by 
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nearly 26% of a standard deviation (statistically significant at the 5% level). This finding 
provides evidence on the negative unintended consequence of the welfare reform.59 
 
TABLE 3.2: EFFECTS OF BECOMING UNEMPLOYMENT AND CLAIMING UC ON POOR MENTAL 
HEALTH, INCOME, NUMBER OF BENEFITS CLAIMED AND JOB SEARCH INTENSITY 










Unemployed 0.178*** -0.211*** 0.114*** 1.555*** 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.046) 
UC 0.057 -0.033 0.951*** 0.060** 
 (0.050) (0.034) (0.035) (0.029) 
Unemployed*UC 0.262** -0.172** -0.183*** 0.314** 
 (0.125) (0.068) (0.061) (0.134) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Local authority district fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 194,428 194,428 194,428 194,428 
Notes. Sample is restricted to observations aged 18-60. Standard errors are clustered at the local authority 
district level. Controls include age, age squared, a dummy for prior mental disorder, and dummies for 
educational levels (higher degree, first degree, higher diploma, A-level, and GCSE/0-level), and dummies 
for having a child and being married.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data source: UKLHS (2009-2019) 
 
The augmented version of column 1 of Table 3.2 is present in Appendix C, Table C.5 in 
which all coefficients for key control variables are in reported. We can see that the poor mental 
health outcome has a non-linear relationship with age. Poor mental health has a strong positive 
link with prior mental disorder. Previous mental health problems increase the poor mental 
health score by about 44% of a standard deviation. However, it is surprising that educational 
 
59 It is possible to separately estimate the moderating effect of the legacy welfare system on mental health of 
unemployed claimants if we include in our sample unemployed individuals making no benefits claim. In Appendix 
C, Table C.4 details that an unemployed individual but not claiming any benefit has increased mental health 
problem by 22% of a standard deviation, which is raised by 21% of a standard deviation for being unemployed 
interacted with UC but reduced by nearly 5% of a standard deviation for being unemployed interacted with 
claiming a legacy benefit. In total, the differential treatment effect of entering unemployment and claiming UC 
versus legacy is nearly 26% of a standard deviation. This effect is highly similar to that using the benchmark 
sample and estimation model.  
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levels have no statistically significant relationship with the poor mental health outcome. This 
result is in line with previous evidence on no effect of education on mental health (Avendanoa 
et al., 2020). Both having a child and being married help mitigate mental health problems by 
approximately 2% and 5% of a standard deviation. 
We also find a robust effect of entering unemployment and claiming UC on individuals’ 
poor mental health when we restrict our sample to UKHLS waves 4-9. The estimates in 
Appendix C, Table C.6 show that the treatment effect of 28% of a standard deviation 
(statistically significant at the 5% level), which is highly similar to the benchmark treatment 
effect as shown in Table 3.2. 
3.5.2 Mediation analysis 
In this section, we decompose the treatment effect of becoming unemployed and claiming UC 
on mental health into the direct effect and the indirect effects via key mechanisms induced by 
reforms under the UK welfare reform. We present the results for two sets of mediators. The 
first one only includes the exogenous mediators which measure directly UC welfare rules 
(household income and the number of benefits claimed). The second set consists additionally 
of job search intensity which is a proxy for UC policy rules on work-related requirements. 
Because the job search intensity is likely an endogenous mediator, we treat the results for the 
second set of mediators as a descriptive decomposition. 
3.5.2.1 Effects on mediators 
Under the assumptions that treatment is randomized across regions and time and the common 
trends assumption, we can identify the causal effect of exposure to becoming unemployed and 
claiming UC on these three mediators and their interactions with claiming UC. The estimates 
in columns 2-4 of Table 3.2 estimates the model of Equation (3.3), replacing the dependent 
variable with the three mediators, income (column 2), the number of benefits claimed (column 
3), and job search intensity (column 4). 
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Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.2 show strongly statistically significant impacts on exogenous 
mediators: income and the number of benefits claimed respectively. As expected, claiming UC 
reduces household income for those entering unemployment by 17.2% of a standard deviation 
(statistically significant at the 5% level). Claiming UC also reduces the number of benefits 
claimed for a newly unemployed individual by 0.18 benefits (strongly statistically significant 
at the 1% level). 
Column 4 in Table 3.2 shows that UC take-up is more likely to increase job search 
intensity. The number of job search methods used by an unemployed claimant under the UC 
system is higher than that for the counterpart person under the legacy system by 0.31 methods 
(statistically significant at the 5% level). 
3.5.2.2 Treatment effects conditional on mediators 
Do the mediators reduce the total effect of becoming unemployed and claiming UC on 
claimant’s mental health? The estimates produced using estimates from equations (3.2)-(3.3) 
are combined to estimate the direct effect of treatment on mental health, holding constant the 
mediators at the untreated level in Equation (3.4) and the indirect effect through the mediators 
from Equation (3.5). 
Table 3.3 reports the results from Equation (3.2), estimating the treatment effect 
conditional on the mediators. Column 1 shows the results for the first set of exogenous 
mediators including income and the number of benefits claimed. The coefficient on the 
interaction between unemployment and UC is no longer statistically significant and importantly 
its effect size also reduces by about one third of the benchmark treatment effect revealed in 
Table 3.2. The treatment effect now is only 17% of standard deviation. 
Column 2 of Table 3.3 show the results when using the full set of the mediators. The 
coefficient of interest is now 24% of a standard deviation, making a reduction of about 7% 
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compared to the benchmark treatment effect. The coefficient is also not statistically different to 
zero. 
 
TABLE 3.3: EFFECTS OF BECOMING UNEMPLOYMENT AND CLAIMING UC ON POOR 
MENTAL HEALTH CONDITIONAL ON MEDIATORS 
  (1) (2) 
Unemployed 0.173*** 0.102*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) 
UC 0.275* 0.276* 
 (0.158) (0.161) 
Unemployed*UC 0.171 0.243 
 (0.139) (0.168) 
Household income -0.025*** -0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Household income*UC -0.044 -0.043 
 (0.059) (0.059) 
Number of benefits claimed -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Number of benefits claimed*UC -0.144* -0.144* 
 (0.086) (0.087) 
Job search intensity  0.048*** 
  (0.006) 
Job search intensity*UC  -0.042 
    (0.051) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Local authority district fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 194,428 194,428 
Notes. Sample is restricted to observations aged 18-60. Standard errors are clustered at the local 
authority district level. Controls include age, age squared, a dummy for prior mental disorder, 
and dummies for educational levels (higher degree, first degree, higher diploma, A-level, and 
GCSE/0-level), and dummies for having a child and being married.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data source: UKLHS (2009-2019)  
 
In terms of the sign of the coefficients of mediators on mental health problems, an 
increase in income helps reduce mental health problems as shown in both columns 1 and 2 and 
the differential for UC claimants is more negative, indicating a larger benefit to mental health 
from a change in income. An increase in the number of benefits claimed also lowers mental 
health problems, by a larger absolute value for UC claimants. This suggests that despite the 
reduction in the administrative burden from UC, the risk of a application with error dominated 
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the effect on claimant mental health. In contrast, whilst for non UC claimants an increase in job 
search intensity increases mental health problems, the differential effect for UC claimants is a 
reduction in mental health problems to a coefficient close to zero. 
The different magnitude and even sign of the effect for the treated and untreated group is 
intuitive given the implementation of UC. 
3.5.2.3 Mediation decomposition 
Table 3.4 decomposes the total treatment effect into the direct effect and the indirect effects 
working through the mediators. Recall that the total treatment effect is measured by the 
coefficient 𝛼3 in Equation (3.1), and its coefficient are present in column 1 of Table 3.2. The 
direct effect is measured by Equation (3.4) and the indirect effects through Equation (3.5) using 
estimates from Tables 3.2 and 3.3. We then sum up all of the indirect effects via various 
mediators to show the total indirect effect via all mediators. 
In column 1, the indirect effects of treatment through the policy rules of income and the 
number of benefits account for nearly 15% of the total treatment effect (3.9% of a standard 
deviation). Among the indirect effects, the effect working through income contributes 4.5% 
(1.1% of a standard deviation) whilst the effect working via the number of benefit claimed 
contributes 10.4% (2.7% of a standard deviation) to the total treatment effect. These indirect 
effects working via the mediators is added by the direct effect which amounts to 85% of the 
total treatment effect (nearly 22.3% of a standard deviation) to constitute the total treatment 
effect of 26.2% of a standard deviation. 
Column 2 of Table 3.4 shows the decomposition results when using the full set of 
mediators. The results show that the contributions of the indirect effects via income and the 
number of benefits claimed to the total treatment effect remain highly similar to those in column 
1. They occupy 4.33% and 10.55% of the total treatment effect, corresponding to 1.1% and 
2.8% of a standard deviation of the poor mental health score, respectively. 
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On the other hand, job search intensity has no moderating effect on poor mental health 
for unemployed individuals who claim UC. One possible reason why is that despite the 
commitment to intense job search under UC with potential consequences of sanctions for non-
compliance, the job search activities may have helped individuals to find a job. Indeed, in Table 
C.7 we estimate the effect of becoming unemployed and claiming UC using the specification 
from Equation (3.1) but replacing the dependent variable with an indicator for being employed 
(column 1) or unemployed (column 2) in wave 𝑡 + 1. The analysis shows a positive (albeit not 
statistically significant) effect on employment and a fall of unemployment by 11.9 percentage 
points from an unemployed individual claiming UC versus legacy. 
 
TABLE 3.4: DECOMPOSING EFFECT OF BECOMING UNEMPLOYMENT  
AND CLAIMING UC ON POOR MENTAL HEALTH 
  (1) (2) 
Effect through household income 0.011  0.011  
 [4.53%] [4.33%] 
Effect through number of benefits claimed 0.028  0.028 
 [10.41%] [10.55%] 
Effect through job search intensity  0.002 
    [0.72%] 
Effect through all mediators 0.039  0.041 
 [14.9%] [15.6%] 
Direct effect 0.223 0.221 
  [85.1%] [84.4%] 
Total effect 0.262 0.262 
  [100%] [100%] 
 
In summary, we find that the indirect effects via the proposed mediator of household 
income has a relatively modest impact on the treatment effect. This is not surprising given that 
the first eligible group of individuals - singles with no children - experienced the smallest 
change in income from the roll-out of UC versus legacy. However, the implementation of UC 
which combined many benefit claims into one actually worsened mental health of claimants 
relative to legacy claimants. The intense job search criteria did not affect the treatment effect 





Reforming the social welfare system may generate many benefits such as increasing labour 
market participation, poverty reduction and reducing administrative costs as well as fraud and 
errors in running the existing system. Yet, there are considerable costs associated with such 
reforms. Conventional knowledge typically focuses on the fiscal basis for calculating the cost. 
To understand the full costs of a welfare reform, it is essential to take into account its unintended 
consequences. 
In this study, we show that the welfare reform of UC in the UK exacerbates mental health 
problems of the benefit claimants, contributing 26% of a standard deviation to the poor mental 
health score. This suggests that the cost of a welfare reform is larger than previously assumed 
when the mental health effects are included. 
We decompose our main treatment effect of becoming unemployed and claiming a UC 
benefit on mental health into the direct effect as well as into the indirect effects working via 
several mediators which are driven by changes in new rules of the welfare system. The indirect 
effects contribute to 15% of the total treatment effect. Among these indirect effects, whilst the 
effects working via a reduction in household income and a reduction in the quantity of benefits 
claimed have positive contributions to poor mental health, the effect working via an increase in 









This thesis consists of three chapters in applied microeconomics. While Chapter 1 and Chapter 
2  studied the causes and consequences of schooling in the developing country context, Chapter 
3 explored the mental health consequences of a welfare reform in a developed country. To make 
my thesis fulfilled with these chapters, I used a diverse combination of research methods and 
data. In particular, I applied several key research methods for causal evaluation in applied 
microeconomics including differences-in-differences and spatial regression discontinuity 
design. In addition to estimating the treatment effect of a welfare reform on mental health, 
Chapter 3 applied a causal mediation analysis to decompose the treatment effect into the direct 
effect and the indirect effects working via different mechanisms. Several types of data structure 
including cross-sectional and panel data which is from both censuses and household surveys 
are used in this thesis.  
Chapter 1 studied the role of a compulsory schooling law in promoting school enrolment 
at the primary school level and the impacts it generates. Using compulsory schooling laws has 
been recognised as an effective tool in improving the educational enrolment level in both 
developed and developing countries. By focusing on the 1991 compulsory schooling law in 
Vietnam, which mandated all children aged 14 and younger to complete primary school, 
Chapter 1 shows that the law caused a considerable improvement in primary school enrolment 
as well as general education for those who were directly exposed to the law from the regions 
with a traditionally low level of primary school enrolment. This finding shows the importance 
of a primary compulsory schooling law in improving educational attainment in the developing 
world which can be applied in other poor countries with low rates of primary school enrolment 
such as sub-African countries. Furthermore, Chapter 1 contributes to the literature documenting 
the consequences of schooling. The economics literature has traditionally focused on personal 
benefits of schooling such as income, health and social behaviours for those who directly 
 
138 
involve in schooling. However, recent evidence reveals that the returns to schooling may be 
larger than what economists traditionally found if the spillover effects of education across 
generations are taken into account. Despite the importance of the intergenerational spillover 
returns to schooling, this topic has been understudied. Chapter 1 contributes to this research 
gap by providing evidence on the multigenerational impacts of exposure to the educational 
expansion induced by the 1991 schooling law in Vietnam. 
The results in Chapter 1 indicate that the educational expansion not only generates 
benefits for those who were directly exposed to the expansion but also has positive effects on 
the human capital investments (school enrolment and educational and health investments) of 
the next generation (the children of the directly affected generation) as well as the health in old 
age of the previous generation (the parents of the directly affected generation). By showing 
these impacts of an educational policy on three generations, Chapter 1 demonstrates 
considerably large benefits of a policy promoting educational attainment in a developing 
country, even for the basic level of primary school. These findings in this chapter could 
therefore provide a crucial rationale for poor countries which still have low rates of primary 
school completion to implement similar educational policies and laws. 
The study of the determinants of schooling has been long interested among economists 
as well as researchers from other social science disciplines. Disparities in schooling among 
different geographic regions or groups of people may come from many factors. As shown in 
Chapter 1, a compulsory school law is likely a contributor to schooling. Despite the importance 
of culture for educational achievement which has been well-discussed in educational studies, 
psychology, and sociology, causal evidence on the culture-education nexus has been extremely 
scant. Understanding whether culture causes educational outcomes is of importance for 
explaining why some groups of people whose a pro-schooling culture have better educational 
achievement than those without such a culture. Chapter 2 of my thesis revealed the positive role 
 
139 
of Confucian cultural heritage in explaining educational success in Vietnam. To implement a 
causal evaluation, this chapter exploited the territorial expansion of historical Vietnam which 
created geographic variation in Confucian cultural heritage in modern-day Vietnam. The results 
show that individuals living in the regions with a stronger Confucian cultural heritage have 
better educational outcomes measured by schooling years and degree achievement than those 
living in the regions with a weaker heritage. Children living in the treatment regions also 
perform better than those living in the control regions at the national examinations. The positive 
effects of a stronger Confucian cultural heritage on schooling outcomes are explained via 
positive cultural values towards schooling. 
Finally, Chapter 3 shows the negative effect of a welfare reform on mental health for 
entering unemployment. The welfare system is typically designed to protect vulnerable people 
from adverse shocks such as being unemployed. However, Chapter 3 disclosed that the recent 
welfare reform known as Universal Credit in the UK considerably exaggerated mental health 
problems among unemployed individuals. This finding indicates that the costs of a reform in 
the social benefits system may be larger than the costs commonly assumed when taking into 
account unintended consequences of the reform such as the mental costs. Exploiting changes 
in potential mediators which are driven by exogenous changes in sub-policy rules within the 
reform compared to the previous system, Chapter 3 decomposes the main effect into the direct 
effect and the indirect effects working via these potential mechanisms. The results show that a 
cut in income and a reduction in the number of benefits claimed worsened mental health 
problems from entering unemployment. This should serve as a note of caution to policy makers 
who implement welfare reform, to pay attention how not just the income changes, but also 









TABLE A.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 





Panel A. The directly affected generation 
Primary school completion (dummy) Census  1,656,579 0.80 
Cohorts 1974-1976 (pre-reform)  Census 407,593 0.78 
Cohorts 1977-1980 (phase-in)  Census 582,486 0.77 
Cohorts 1981-1984 (post-reform)  Census 666,500  0.84 
Secondary school completion (dummy) Census 1,656,579 0.66 
Years of schooling (number) Census 1,656,579 7.12 
Literacy (dummy) Census 1,656,579 0.98 
Economically active (dummy) Census 1,656,579 0.90 
Non-agricultural sector (dummy) VHLSS 17,471 0.74 
Earnings (monthly, VND 1,000, 2010 prices) VHLSS 17,471 2201.7 
Lived in same municipality past 5 years (dummy) Census 1,656,579 0.88 
Married (dummy) Census 1,656,579 0.79 
Spouse's years of schooling (years) Census 1,656,579 6.60 
Women's having at least one child (dummy) Census 832,706 0.81 
Women's being experienced child mortality (dummy) Census 832,706 0.21 
Women's number of children conditional on having at 
least one child (number) 
Census 672,555 1.78 
Male (dummy) Census 1,656,579 0.50 
Age (years) Census 1,656,579 29.7 
Kinh ethnicity (dummy) Census 1,656,579 0.80 
Tay ethnicity (dummy) Census 1,656,579 0.04 
Thai ethnicity (dummy) Census 1,656,579 0.03 
Other ethnicities (dummy) Census 1,656,579 0.13 
Buddhist religion (dummy) Census 1,656,579 0.06 
Other religions (dummy) Census 1,656,579 0.09 
No religion (dummy) Census 1,656,579 0.85 
Panel B. The children of the directly affected generation 
School enrolment (dummy) VHLSS 9,237 0.94 
School related expenditures: Tuition (annual, VND 
1,000, 2010 prices) 
VHLSS 9,237 135.4 
School related expenditures: Books and learning 
materials (annual, VND 1,000, 2010 prices) 
VHLSS 9,237 121.7 
School related expenditures: Learning tools and 
instruments (annual, VND 1,000, 2010 prices) 
VHLSS 9,237 128.6 
School related expenditures: Private tutoring (VND 
1,000, 2010 prices) 
VHLSS 9,237 341.8 
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School related expenditures: Total school related 
spending (VND 1,000, 2010 prices) 
VHLSS 9,237 1203.9 
Home expenditures: Children's books and magazines 
(monthly, VND 1,000, 2010 prices) 
VHLSS 9,237 3.40 
Home expenditures: Children's toys (annual, VND 1,000, 
2010 prices) 
VHLSS 9,237 33.9 
Working for the household (dummy) VHLSS 9,237 0.11 
Working for earnings (dummy) VHLSS 9,237 0.02 
Hours of work for earnings (hours) VHLSS 9,237 0.20 
Per capita household spending on food consumption 
(annual, VND 1,000, 2010 prices) 
VHLSS 9,237 6403.4 
Household spending on tobacco and cigarettes (monthly, 
VND 1,000, 2010 prices) 
VHLSS 9,237 49.9 
Health insurance coverage (annual, dummy) VHLSS 9,237 0.87 
Number of preventive health visits (annual, times)  VHLSS 9,237 0.76 
Preventive health care expenditure - Public (annual, 
VND 1,000, 2010 prices) 
VHLSS 9,237 34.4 
Preventive health care expenditure - Private (annual, 
VND 1,000, 2010 prices) 
VHLSS 9,237 47.7 
Hospitalization (annual, dummy) VHLSS 9,237 0.04 
Male (dummy) VHLSS 9,237 0.52 
Age (years) VHLSS 9,237 10.6 
Kinh ethnicity (dummy) VHLSS 9,237 0.71 
Tay ethnicity (dummy) VHLSS 9,237 0.04 
Thai ethnicity (dummy) VHLSS 9,237 0.04 
Other ethnicities (dummy) VHLSS 9,237 0.20 
Panel C. The parents of the directly affected generation  
Days of sickness (Annual, days) VNAS 1,818 16.78 
Good self-reported health status (dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.33 
Relative good health status (compared to others) 
(dummy) 
VNAS 1,818 0.43 
Depression (dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.00 
Sleep problems (dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.75 
Satisfied with life (dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.31 
Poverty (dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.18 
Income meeting personal needs (dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.34 
Income support from children for daily living (dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.66 
Savings (dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.10 
Number of home improvements (number) VNAS 1,818 1.86 
Satisfied with financial status (dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.13 
Private health insurance (dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.01 
Smoking (dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.25 
Drinking at least 2-3 times a week (over last 6 months, 
dummy) 
VNAS 1,818 0.15 
Drinking at least 4-6 times a week (over last 6 months, 
dummy) 
VNAS 1,818 0.13 
Drinking at least once a day (over last 6 months, dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.12 
Social activities (dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.55 
Having grandchild (dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.99 
Number of children-in-law (number) VNAS 1,818 4.19 
60-64 years old (Dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.38 
65-69 years old (Dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.19 
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70-74 years old (Dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.22 
75-79 years old (Dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.10 
80 and over years old (Dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.12 
Major ethnicity (Dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.88 
Male (Dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.47 
Primary education (Dummy) VNAS 1,818 0.55 
Notes: Census: Population and Housing Census of Vietnam (2009, 15% sample). VHLSS: 

























TABLE A.2: PLACEBO TESTS 
  (1) (2) 
  Males Females 
 
Panel A. Effects of reform exposure on parents' skilled 
occupation 
Treat*Post   -0.003  -0.003  
 (0.004) (0.006) 
Observations 637,140 260,738 
 
Panel B. Effects of ‘hypothetical’ reform exposure on 
primary school completion 
Treat*Post  0.008  0.005  
 (0.008) (0.006) 
Observations 726,409 748,326 
Notes: All specifications include fixed effects for cohort-by-province and region, and 
control variables. Panel A: Control variables include dummies for ethnicities (Kinh, 
Tay, Thai and others), dummies for religious affiliations (Buddhism, others and no 
religious affiliations) and a dummy for parental gender (male). Grandparents' highly 
skilled occupation is a dummy, missing values are set to the mean. Panel B: Control 
variables include dummies for ethnicities (Kinh, Tay, Thai and others) and dummies 
for religious affiliations (Buddhism, others and no religious affiliations). Samples 
include the individuals born 1965-1975. The timing of the 'hypothetical' reform is 1982 
and the oldest affected by this reform is the 1968 birth cohort. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the district level are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 








TABLE A.3: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE DIRECTLY AFFECTED GENERATION (ROBUSTNESS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Panel A. Education and economic outcomes         














Treat*Post*Female 0.083*** 0.090*** 0.665*** 0.011*** -0.006** 0.048* 0.117 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.037) (0.001) (0.003) (0.034) (0.150) 
Treat*Post*Male 0.091*** 0.100*** 0.735*** 0.011*** 0.032*** 0.049* 0.175 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.041) (0.001) (0.003) (0.032) (0.160) 
Data source: Census Census Census Census Census VHLSS VHLSS 
Observations  1,656,579  1,656,579  1,656,579  1,656,579  1,656,579 17,471 17,471 
 Panel B. Family outcomes 
 
Lived in same 
municipality  












Treat*Post*Female 0.057*** 0.002 0.610*** 0.022*** -0.026*** -0.011  
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.026) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012)  
Treat*Post*Male 0.015*** 0.086*** 0.895*** n.a. n.a. n.a.  
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.028)     
Data source: Census Census Census Census Census Census  
Observations  1,656,579  1,656,579  1,656,579 832,706 832,706 832,706  
 Panel C. Intergenerational persistence 
Dep. Variable: Years of schooling of directly affected generation    
Sample: Son-father Son-mother Daughter-father Daughter-mother    
Parental schooling 0.385*** 0.359*** 0.392*** 0.389***    
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015)    
Treat*Post*Parental -0.030** -0.070*** -0.009 -0.067***    
schooling (0.014) (0.015) (0.023) (0.024)    
Data source: Census Census Census Census    
Observations 187,957 236,127 71,804 91,600    
Notes: This table replicates the findings of Table 3 in the main text, when adding a linear cohort trend interacted with an urban/rual indicator. The remaining control 
variables are the same as those in Table 3. Significance levels are based on one-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in 
parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 








TABLE A.4: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE CHILDREN’S GENERATION: 
CHILD LABOUR OUTCOMES (AGED 6-14) 










At least one treated parent*Post  -0.010 -0.017** -0.136*  
(0.031) (0.009) (0.100) 
Observations 7,906 7,906 7,906 
Notes: All specifications include fixed effects for survey year, paternal cohort-by-province, 
maternal cohort-by-province, and region. Control variables: child's gender, ethnicitiy (Kinh, 
Tay, Thai and others), age and age squared. The sample includes children aged 6-14 of parents 
born in 1974-1984. Significance levels are based on one-sided hypothesis tests. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 



















TABLE A.5. REFORM EFFECTS ON AGE OF THE CHILDREN’S GENERATION 




Notes: All specifications include fixed effects for survey year, paternal cohort-by-
province, maternal cohort-by-province, and region. Control variables: child's 
gender, ethnicitiy (Kinh, Tay, Thai and others), age and age squared. The sample 
includes children aged 6-17 of parents born in 1974-1984. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the district level are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data source: Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (2010, 2012 and 2014) 
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TABLE A.6. REFORM EFFECTS ON THE CHILDREN’S GENERATION: HETEROGENEITY BY CHILD GENDER (ALL CHILD OUTCOMES) 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 





















Unconditional pre-reform gender difference  -0.022*** -0.027  -0.010 -0.087*** -0.066*** -0.046** -0.076*** 0.018** 
(son-daughter) (0.006) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.007) 
At least one treated parent*Post*Daughter 0.069** 0.168* 0.078 0.156* 0.158 -0.011 0.126 0.019  
(0.031) (0.104) (0.104) (0.102) (0.139) (0.103) (0.115) (0.044) 
At least one treated parent*Post*Son 0.096*** 0.298*** 0.208** 0.234** 0.272** -0.017 0.302*** -0.048*  
(0.028) (0.112) (0.109) (0.105) (0.132) (0.126) (0.114) (0.033) 
Effect difference (son-daughter) 0.027 0.130 0.130 0.078 0.114  -0.007 0.176* -0.067*  
(0.027) (0.108) (0.105) (0.093) (0.116) (0.108) (0.094) (0.037) 
Observations 9,237 9,237 8,694 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 
  Panel B               




















Hospitalization   
Unconditional pre-reform gender difference  0.010*** 0.121*** -0.029*** 0.046 0.024 0.033 0.007  
(son-daughter) (0.003) (0.036) 0.008 (0.042) (0.023) (0.023) (0.004) 
At least one treated parent*Post*Daughter -0.007 -0.114 0.023 0.237 -0.095 0.095 -0.013   
(0.014) (0.155) (0.041) (0.256) (0.140) (0.121) (0.034) 
At least one treated parent*Post*Son -0.024** -0.365*** 0.053 0.148 -0.223* 0.204* -0.045*   
(0.014) (0.147) (0.048) (0.237) (0.159) (0.127) (0.035) 
Effect difference (son-daughter) -0.017 -0.251 0.030 -0.089 -0.128 0.109 -0.032    
(0.014) (0.159) (0.036) (0.221) (0.146) (0.121) (0.033) 
Observations 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237   
Notes: All specifications include fixed effects for survey year, paternal cohort-by-province, maternal cohort-by-province, and region. Control variables: child's gender, ethnicitiy 
(Kinh, Tay, Thai and others), age and age squared. Expenditure variables are based on log expenditure (in 2010 prices), standardised into a mean of 0 and a standard deviation 
of 1. The sample includes children aged 6-17 of parents born in 1974-1984. Significance levels are based on one-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
district level are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






TABLE A.7: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE CHILDREN’S GENERATION: INVESTMENTS INTO SCHOOLING AND LEARNING (ROBUSTNESS) 




School related expenditures   Home expenditures 
























At least one treated parent*Post  0.088*** 0.160** 0.064 0.130* 0.210** -0.071 0.183** 
 
0.056 0.160* 
 (0.026) (0.093) (0.094) (0.097) (0.127) (0.103) (0.103)  (0.111) (0.125) 
Observations 9,237 9,237 8,694 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237   9,237 9,237 
Notes: This table replicates the findings of Table 4 in the main text, when adding a linear cohort trend interacted with an urban/rual indicator. The remaining control 
variables are the same as those in Table 4. Significance levels are based on one-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in 
parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 












TABLE A.8: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE CHILDREN’S GENERATION:  
CHILD LABOUR OUTCOMES (ROBUSTNESS) 










At least one treated parent*Post  -0.026 -0.015 -0.230**  
(0.035) (0.013) (0.134) 
Observations 9,237 9,237 9,237 
Notes: This table replicates the findings of Table 5 in the main text, when adding a 
linear cohort trend interacted with an urban/rual indicator. The remaining control 
variables are the same as those in Table 5. Significance levels are based on one-sided 
hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in 
parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 














TABLE A.9: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE CHILDREN’S GENERATION: INVESTMENTS INTO HEALTH (ROBUSTNESS) 




























At least one treated parent*Post  0.157** -0.086 0.035 0.133 -0.185* 0.127 -0.029  
(0.093) (0.135) (0.042) (0.231) (0.135) (0.112) (0.033) 
Observations 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 
Notes: This table replicates the findings of Table 6 in the main text, when adding a linear cohort trend interacted with an urban/rual indicator. The remaining 
control variables are the same as those in Table 6. Significance levels are based on one-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
district level are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 







TABLE A.10: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE CHILDREN’S GENERATION: HETEROGENEITY BY CHILD GENDER (ALL CHILD OUTCOMES, ROBUSTNESS) 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 





















Unconditional pre-reform gender difference  -0.022*** -0.027  -0.010 -0.087*** -0.066*** -0.046** -0.076*** 0.018** 
(son-daughter) (0.006) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.007) 
At least one treated parent*Post*Daughter 0.070*** 0.095 0.003 0.103 0.155 -0.063 0.095 0.012 
 (0.030) (0.104) (0.105) (0.107) (0.142) (0.108) (0.114) (0.044) 
At least one treated parent*Post*Son 0.097*** 0.207** 0.115 0.158* 0.270** -0.078 0.263*** -0.057* 
 (0.028) (0.112) (0.110) (0.107) (0.134) (0.127) (0.112) (0.035) 
Effect difference (son-daughter) 0.027 0.112 0.112 0.055 0.115 -0.015 0.168* -0.068* 
 (0.027) (0.108) (0.105) (0.093) (0.115) (0.107) (0.095) (0.037) 
Observations 9,237 9,237 8,694 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 





















Hospitalization   
Unconditional pre-reform gender difference  0.010*** 0.121*** -0.029*** 0.046 0.024 0.033 0.007  
(son-daughter) (0.003) (0.036) 0.008 (0.042) (0.023) (0.023) (0.004)  
At least one treated parent*Post*Daughter -0.004 -0.070 0.021 0.172 -0.146 0.082 -0.024  
 (0.014) (0.155) (0.042) (0.268) (0.148) (0.125) (0.036)  
At least one treated parent*Post*Son -0.020* -0.307** 0.050 0.066 -0.271* 0.184* -0.032  
 (0.015) (0.155) (0.049) (0.250) (0.166) (0.137) (0.038)  
Effect difference (son-daughter) -0.017 -0.238 0.029 -0.106 -0.125 0.102 -0.008  
 (0.014) (0.160) (0.035) (0.217) (0.146) (0.122) (0.033)  
Observations 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237   
Notes: This table replicates the findings of Appendix A, Table A.6 in the main text, when adding a linear cohort trend interacted with an urban/rual indicator. The remaining control 
variables are the same as those in Table A.6. Significance levels are based on one-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





TABLE A.11: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE PARENT’S GENERATION: HEALTH OUTCOMES (ROBUSTNESS) 


















 Panel A. Baseline  
At least one treated child*Post -9.367* 0.091*** 0.123*** -0.001 -0.022 0.041 
  (5.752) (0.036) (0.049) (0.003) (0.043) (0.048) 
 Panel B. Heterogeneity by parental gender  
At least one treated child*Post*Mother -7.190** 0.078** 0.078** -0.001 0.023 0.039 
 (3.490) (0.034) (0.034) (0.003) (0.040) (0.042) 




 (5.849) (0.051) (0.054) (0.005) (0.050) (0.053) 
Effect difference (father-mother) 4.250 0.008 0.065 0.003 -0.153** 0.024 
 (6.348) (0.067) (0.064) (0.007) (0.067) (0.067) 




(father-mother) (2.880) (0.025) (0.027) (0.004) (0.023) (0.025) 
Observations 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 
Notes: This table replicates the findings of Table 8 in the main text, when adding a linear cohort trend interacted with an urban/rual indicator. 
The remaining control variables are the same as those in Table 8. Significance levels are based on one-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





TABLE A.12: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE PARENTSS GENERATION: POTENTIAL FINANCIAL MECHANISMS (ROBUSTNESS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




















 Panel A. Baseline  
At least one treated child*Post 0.003 0.056 0.015 0.094*** 0.208** 0.061** 0.017* 
  (0.040) (0.051) (0.040) (0.027) (0.089) (0.030) (0.013) 
 Panel B. Heterogeneity by parental gender 
At least one treated child*Post*Mother 0.013 0.022 0.016 0.039* 0.133** 0.031 0.010 
 (0.031) (0.043) (0.037) (0.022) (0.071) (0.027) (0.012) 
At least one treated child*Post*Father 0.031 0.056 -0.032 0.077** 0.128* 0.065** 0.021** 
 (0.040) (0.051) (0.059) (0.032) (0.097) (0.035) (0.012) 
Effect difference (father-mother) 0.018 0.034 -0.048 0.038 -0.005 0.034 0.011 
 (0.050) (0.063) (0.073) (0.036) (0.115) (0.041) (0.015) 
Unconditional pre-reform gender difference  -0.042** 0.039 -0.073*** -0.014 0.081 0.049*** -0.002 
(father-mother) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.016) (0.069) (0.018) (0.006) 
Observations 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 
Notes: This table replicates the findings of Table 9 in the main text, when adding a linear cohort trend interacted with an urban/rual indicator. The 
remaining control variables are the same as those in Table 9. Significance levels are based on one-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the district level are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






TABLE A.13: REFORM EFFECTS ON THE PARENT’S GENERATION: POTENTIAL BEHAVIOURAL HEALTH MECHANISMS (ROBUSTNESS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Smoking 
Alcohol consumption, at least… 
Social 
activities 











per week  
once per 
day  
 Panel A. Baseline  
At least one treated child*Post -0.021 -0.057** -0.052** -0.035* -0.012 0.006 0.289*** 0.162 
  (0.035) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.049) (0.013) (0.100) (0.210) 
 Panel B. Heterogeneity by parental gender 
At least one treated child*Post*Mother -0.020 -0.001 0.007 0.017 -0.028 0.001 0.303*** -0.003  
(0.026) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.038) (0.014) (0.091) (0.148) 
At least one treated child*Post*Father -0.052 -0.100*** -0.125*** -0.112*** 0.082* 0.006 0.157** 0.190  
(0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.041) (0.055) (0.010) (0.095) (0.198) 
Effect difference (father-mother) -0.031 -0.099* -0.132** -0.129*** 0.110** 0.005 -0.146 0.193  
(0.049) (0.053) (0.052) (0.048) (0.061) (0.017) (0.127) (0.250) 
Unconditional pre-reform gender difference  0.327*** 0.279*** 0.234*** 0.216*** -0.065** -0.002 0.132 0.070 
(father-mother) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.006) (0.112) (0.116) 
Observations 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 1,818 
Notes: This table replicates the findings of Table 10 in the main text, when adding a linear cohort trend interacted with an urban/rual indicator. The remaining 
control variables are the same as those in Table 10. Significance levels are based on one-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors clustered at the district 
level are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data source: Vietnam Aging Survey (2011) 
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Math Science  Reading Math Science Reading Math Science Reading 
1 Singapore Singapore Singapore  China China China  China China China 
2 Hong Kong Japan Canada  Singapore Hong Kong Hong Kong  Singapore Finland Korea 




4 Taiwan Taiwan Finland  Taiwan Japan Japan  Korea Singapore Hong Kong 
5 Japan Finland Ireland  Korea Finland Korea  Taiwan Japan Singapore 
6 China Macao Estonia  Macao Estonia Finland  Finland Korea Canada 





8 Switzerland Viet Nam Japan  Liechtenstein Viet Nam Canada  Switzerland Canada Japan 
9 Estonia Hong Kong Norway  Switzerland Poland Ireland  Japan Estonia Australia 







Math Science Reading Math Science Reading Math Science Reading 
1 Taiwan Finland Korea  Hong Kong Finland Finland  Japan  Korea  Finland  
2 Finland Hong Kong Finland  Finland Japan Korea  Korea  Japan  Canada   
3 Hong Kong Canada Hong Kong  Korea Hong Kong Canada  New Zealand  Finland  
New 
Zealand   
4 Korea Taiwan Canada  Netherlands Korea Australia  Finland   UK Australia   
5 Netherlands Estonia New Zealand  Liechtenstein Liechtenstein Liechtenstein  Australia   Canada  Ireland   
6 Switzerland Japan Ireland  Japan Australia New Zealand  Canada   
New 
Zealand  
Korea   
7 Canada New Zealand Australia  Canada Macao Ireland  Switzerland  Australia  UK 
8 Macao Australia Liechtenstein  Belgium Netherlands Sweden  UK Austria  Japan   
9 Liechtenstein Netherlands Poland  Macao Czech Rep. Netherlands  Belgium   Ireland  Sweden   















TABLE B.2: HETEROGENEITY: EFFECTS ON ADULTS’ SCHOOLING OUTCOMES BY AGE GROUPS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 
 Panel A. Schooling years 
Confucian 0.807***  0.589***  0.619***  0.805***  
 (0.184) (0.194) (0.227) (0.230) 
 Panel B. Primary school completion 
Confucian 0.030**  0.036**  0.051**  0.079***  
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.022) 
 Panel C. Lower secondary school completion 
Confucian 0.072***  0.078***  0.101***  0.112***  
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
 Panel D. Upper secondary school completion 
Confucian 0.084***  0.052***  0.035*  0.055***  
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) 
 Panel E. College degree 
Confucian 0.049**  0.012  -0.007  0.008  
  (0.022) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Observations 127,714 97,691 77,799 38,726 
Clusters 574 574 574 574 
Notes: Samples restrict to individuals in communes within 20 kilometers of the boundary distance 
(adults aged 25-64). Robust standard errors clustered at the commune level are in parentheses. Baseline 
specification includes controls (a dummy for male), a linear function of spatial location, distance to 
Saigon, boundary segment-fixed effects and birth cohort-fixed effects. Linear function of spatial 
location is a linear function of latitude and longitude of the commune. Boundary segment varies with 
a 20-kilometer unit. Distance to Saigon (kilometers) is measured by the shortest travelling distance 
from the center of commune to the center of Ho Chi Minh City (Ho Chi Minh City People’s Committee 
Hall).            
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 









Appendix B1: Confucianism on education 
Confucianism provides key theoretical and practical principles for learning activities which 
were mainly documented in two Confucian texts including the Annects (Lunyu) and the Xueji 
(“Record of Learning”) (Tan, 2017; Li, 2003). In terms of theoretical principles, Confucianism 
highlights the importance of education as a key means for transforming people and maintaining 
society with a stable social order (Tan, 2015a, 2015b). Therefore, rulers must dedicate their 
best efforts to educate their citizens (Di, 2016). Confucius stated that “[I]f a ruler desires to 
transform the people [and] perfect [their] customs, [the ruler] can only do so through 
education.”60 In addition, Confucianism strongly points up that to obtain the best learning 
outcomes students must study hard and invest their best efforts on learning process with strict 
discipline and deep aspiration (Tan, 2015a, 2015b) because “[L]earning without thought is 
labour lost; thought without learning is perilous.”61  
Regarding practical principles for learning, Confucianism established a standard objective 
of dao (meaning “the Way of Heaven”) for the learning process (Chan, 2000), which was 
considered as a ‘guiding course’ inherited from ancient wisdom (Hansen, 1989) for reaching a 
“vision of human excellence” (Cua, 1989). Dao was first applied in learning in the ruling times 
of the Yao, Shun, and Yu dynasties in ancient China (Tan, 2017). Confucianism argues that 
“people who do not learn will not realize dao”62 and thus they would be failed to obtain “human 
transformation and cultural perfection.” To become an exemplary person, a male must achieve 
dao because “[A]lthough the ultimate dao is present, [one] does not know [its] goodness if 
 
60 The Confucian text Xueji I. 
61 The Confucian text Analects 2.52.   
62 The Confucian text Xueji II. 
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[one] does not learn it”63 and “the exemplary person64 learns for the sake of dao.”65 Confucius 
further called for long-life learning to achieve “the good dao till death.”66  
According to Confucianism, students could fully achieve dao by inculcating ren (meaning 
“humanity”) through li (meaning “normative behaviors”). The concept of ren implies a lifelong 
endeavour any learner needs to comply to become an exemplary person (Wei-ming, 1979). 
Confucianism evaluates a person’s morality based on his best efforts devoted in lifelong 
learning to pursue the highest success of ‘self-perfection’ (Li, 2003). Using the spirit of ren 
helps a learner acquire a “great learning” (Li, 2003). Furthermore, Confucianism constructs the 
concept of li67 comprising a guide of normative behaviors which should be used as a means for 
approaching ren (Tan, 2017). One of the most essential principles of li is learning aspiration 
encouraging learners to invest their best efforts to transform learning results through positive 
attitudes (Hall and Ames, 1987). Learners’ general objective is to recognize and to enlarge dao 
by clasping and expressing li during their learning course. Confucius underlined that thanks to 
such an educational approach, governors could positively change their citizens withing 
maintaining traditional values.68 Confucian perspectives help inspire students to consolidate 






63 The Confucian text Xueji III. 
64 The ‘exemplary person’ is a role model person in society who has high competence of knowledge and moral 
standards. The ‘exemplary person’ is junzi in Chinese and nguoi quan tu in Vietnamese. 
65 The Confucian text Analects 19.7.   
66 The Confucian text Analects 19.7.   
67 The Confucian text Analects 12.1. 
68 The Confucian text Xueji I. 
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Appendix B2: Dai Viet’s Confucian exam system 
Starting in the early 1000s, Dai Viet’s Confucian exam system was strongly developed during 
the ruling times of the Tran dynasty (1225-1400) with a two-level system, including the exams 
in local governments and the exams in the central government (Quoc-Su-Vien-Trieu-Le, 1993). 
Candidates who performed best in local exams were selected into exams at the central 
government level. Dai Viet also constructed a complete set of exam rules to help carry exams 
seriously and efficiently. The exam system was consecutively advanced during the consecutive 
dynasties. In particular, its curriculum was also improved over time by customizing the exam 
content for each of specific job positions although it was based on Confucianism.  
 
FIGURE B1: DAI VIET’S COMPLETE EXAM STRUCTURE 
 
Source: This figure is created by the author based on Taylor (2013), Quoc-Su-Quan-
Trieu-Nguyen (1972), Ngo et al. (2001) 
 
The exam system was gradually developed by expanding other exam levels. Its structure 
reached the complete version under the reign of the Nguyen dynasty, which was a three-exam 
system including the “Licensing Exam” at the prefectural level, the “Qualifying Exam” at the 
provincial level, and the “Academy Exam” at the central government level. Figure B.1 depicts 
the complete structure version of Dai Viet’s exam system. Licensing Exams (Thi Huong) were 
held by local authorities to select qualified candidates for Qualifying Exams (Thi Hoi). The 
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qualified candidates with top scores in Qualifying Exams were given the titles of provincial 
heroes. Finally, top candidates from Qualifying Exams across the state were granted admissions 
to participate in Academy Exams (Thi Dinh), that were usually held in the royal’s hall in Dai 
Viet’s capital. The central government was responsible for organizing, invigilating as well as 
grading of both the Qualifying and Academy Exams. 
Dai Viet’s rulers placed their special priorities on these exams. They therefore organized 
these exams seriously to guarantee that results exactly reflected the true quality of candidates 
who would then became bureaucrats.69 All cheating behaviors disclosed would be seriously 
punished by law. Exams were opened to all males regardless of their social and family 
background. Winners in the exams were typically appointed as imperial bureaucrats who gained 
huge benefits. A well-known example was Le Van Thinh, who was born to ordinary parents 
and was ever the first exam winner of Dai Viet in 1075. Le Van Thinh was recruited as the 
Imperial Preceptor (known as “Teacher of the Emperor”) in the royal court of the Ly dynasty 
and he then was promoted to State Chancellor (Thai su), that was the highest position in the 
central government (Taylor, 2013). Vietnamese history also witnessed many males from 












Appendix B3: The spread of Confucianism  
Confucianism initially emerged in ancient China and gradually established itself as one of the 
profound schools of thought70 under the ruling times of the Han dynasty around the 2nd century 
B.C. In 140 B.C., Emperor Han Wudi formally accepted a proposal of using Confucianism as 
the national doctrine (Wang, 2013). Since then until the early 20th century, Confucianism 
maintained its prominent status in society. Although Confucianism was formally removed its 
formal centrality as the national doctrine since the early 20th century when Chinese imperialism 
was gradually collapsed and replaced by new ruling forces such as communists (Goldman, 
1975; Gregor and Chang, 1979), its influence on Chinese social life has still been existent (Bell, 
2010; Li and Liang, 2015). To generalize the influence of Confucianism throughout Chinese 
history, American Sinologist William Theodore de Bary wrote:  
If we were to characterize in one word the Chinese way of life for the last two 
thousand years, the word would be ‘Confucian’. No other individual in Chinese 
history has so deeply influenced the life and thought of his people, as a transmitter, 
teacher and creative interpreter of the ancient culture and literature and as a 
moulder of the Chinese mind and character. (de Bary et al., 1960, vol. 1, pp. 15). 
Although originating from ancient China, Confucianism’s influence has been widespread 
to neighbouring countries and territories in Northeast Asia including Korea, Japan, Vietnam, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore to make up the region of East Asian cultural sphere (known 
as the Sinosphere) (Choi, 2010; Huat, 2004; Wei-ming, 1996). In addition to rooting into pre-
modern Vietnamese society as discussed in the main paper, Confucianism entered Korea in 108 
B.C. during the ruling times of the Joseon dynasty (Shin and Sin, 2012) during the ruling times 
of the Joseon dynasty. Confucianism began to gain its influence in historical Korean society 
since the ending of the Three Kingdoms Period (57 B.C.-668) when the Silla dynasty (57 B.C.-
 
70 In addition to Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism were among other ideologies in ancient Northeast Asia.  
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935) with support from historical China’s Tang dynasty won in the war against Baekje (known 
as Paekche) and Goguryeo (known as Koguryo) kingdoms to unify the whole state of pre-
modern Korea. Going through Korea, Confucianism arrived in Japan in about the 3rd century 
and then became an important political ideology during the 7th and 8th century. Confucianism 
strongly influenced cultural traditions during the Japanese imperialism (Paramore, 2016).  
Confucianism advocated meritocracy and promoted equality of opportunity in access to 
schooling (Nuyen, 2001). Historical states in Northeast Asian countries conducted Confucian-
inspired meritocracy (Liu, 2007; Kim, 2019; Kim et al., 2017). Public service positions at all 
levels were appointed based on candidates’ performance at imperial civic exams (Elman, 2000; 
Sundell, 2014; Xiao and Li, 2013). Chinese meritocracy was based on its imperial examination 
system known as Keju, which was among the first exam-based meritocratic institution ever in 
the world (Bai and Jia, 2016; Chen et al., 2020; Elman, 2000). Although Keju was officially 
initiated in 605 A.D. during the reign of the Sui dynasty, its immature versions were initially 
inaugurated during the Han dynasty (206-220 A.D.). Keju was then developed during the Tang 
dynasty, advanced during the Song dynasty and achieved its highest development throughout 
the Ming dynasty and the Qing dynasty (Elman, 2000; Wang, 2013). Its system reached a 
complete structure during the Qing dynasty (Bai and Jia, 2016). Exams were opened for all 
males regardless of their age and social class, providing opportunities for commoners to change 
their lives (Elman, 2013). Imperial governments managed the exams with their best attempts to 
secure the fairness of contest that would help select true talents (Elman, 2013; Fan, 2016; Wang, 
2012). Therefore, Keju to some extent likely improved social mobility (Weber, 1951; Chang, 
1962; Qian, 1982) because individuals who performed well at exams typically became 
bureaucrats or teachers and scholars (Chang, 1955). Implementing such exam-based 
meritocracy allowed historical Chinese states to stabilize their political control over a long 
period. Chinese feudal society was collapsed in 1911 followed by the ending of Keju in 1905 
several years (Bai and Jia, 2016). 
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Chinese imperial exams strongly influenced civic exams in other pre-modern Northeast 
Asian states (Liu, 2007). Japan, Korea, and Vietnam adopted the original version of Chinese 
exams using the same formats, procedures and contents to construct their exam-based 
meritocratic institutions for civil service recruitment. Japan was the first Northeast Asian 
country importing imperial exams from the Tang dynasty in ancient China and creating its 
system between the 7th and 8th century. Japanese exams’ contents mainly relied on Confucian-
based texts Hsui-tsai (‘Exceptional Talent’), Ming-ching (‘Learned in Classics’), Chin-shih 
(‘Presented scholar’), and Ming-fa (‘Learned in Law’) (Spaulding, Jr., 2015; Wang, 2012). 
Although the Japanese exam system only endured about two centuries, it established a 
foundation for initiating later meritocratic regimes during the ruling times of the Tokugawa 
administration (1603-1867) and the ‘Meiji Restoration’ (1868-1912) (Gordon, 2019). Its 
influence was even prolonged to 1945 by inspiring higher civil exams in Japanese capitalism 
which combined both Confucian knowledge and legal studies for exam contents (Esman, 1947; 
Spaulding, 1967). Modern-day Japan also implements its national civil service examinations 
for the recruitment of public servants due to the influence of pre-modern examinations 
(Sakamoto, 2001). 
In historical Korea, King Wonseong of the Silla dynasty founded the National Academy 
(gook-hak), which was typically mentioned as the state university for educating junior 
intellectuals with Confucian literature. He also started Confucian exams known as toksõ-
samp’um-kwa (the three-grade reading exam) in 788, which was similar to exams held by 
ancient China’s Tang dynasty (Lee, 2000). 252 Confucian exams were organised in ancient 
Korea during the Silla time (Cho, 1996). After a short termination period following the collapse 
of the Silla dynasty, the national civil exam system was reinstated by King Gwangjong during 
the reign of the Goryeo dynasty in 958 known as gwa-geo, which also adopted the Chinese 
version (Kang, 1974). Gwa-geo was very useful for recruiting civil officials and making a 
smooth transition from a military bureaucracy to a civil government, providing political 
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stability during the Goryeo and Joseon dynasty (Deuchler, 1992; Kim, 2019). The historical 
Korean exam system was formally dismissed from imperial bureaucracy in 1894 via the Gabo 
reform.  
In other territories and countries such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore,71 
Confucianism arrived in and rooted in society through historical waves of Chinese immigrants. 
Moreover, ruling elites in these countries also placed their high respect for Confucian values. 
For example, the founder of Taiwan Chiang Kai-shek encouraged the use of Confucian 
traditions to construct a new era of Taiwan, especially during the era of China’s Cultural 
Revolution, in which Chinese traditional values were destroyed by communists (Kim, 2014). 
Similarly, the Singaporean government officially emphasized Confucian values as the “Asian 
values” (Chang, 2003). 
Today, Confucianism is not formally used as the national doctrine in these countries, 
however, its long-standing influence still exists through cultural values and conformity it 
created and transmitted across generations (Boardman and Kato, 2003; Lin and Ho, 2009). 
These imperial civil exams induce long-lasting effects on educational outcomes in present-day 
society through the persistence of Confucian cultural values towards education. Qualitative 
evidence shows that parents invest more in their children’s education (Lam et al., 2002), and 
children insert higher efforts into their schooling and exams to achieve better academic results 
in Confucianism-originated countries (Marginson, 2011). The effect of historical civil exams is 
also on modern business activities (Kim et al., 2017) in which firms organise examinations for 
personnel recruitment (Cheung and King, 2004; Hempel and Chang, 2002).  
In addition, the influence of Confucianism has been also documented in second-
generation immigrants in Western countries. Previous studies from sociology have documented 
 
71 Singapore is a special case because although its geographic location is in Southeast Asia, its cultural background 
belongs to Northeast Asia as a large part of its population is Chinese (Huat, 2009). 
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academic success of children of immigrants from Northeast Asian countries compared to 
children born to parents from other countries (Byun and Park, 2012; Jerrim, 2015; Jerrim and 






Appendix C: Appendix to Chapter 3 
 
 
TABLE C.1: GENERAL HEALTH QUESTIONNAIRE-12 
Mental health measures 
Scale 
1 2 3 4 
GHQ 1 Concentration  Better than usual  Same as usual  Less than usual  Much less than usual 
GHQ 2 Loss of sleep Not at all No more than usual  Rather more than usual  Much more than usual 
GHQ 3 Playing a useful role More so than usual  Same as usual Less so than usual  Much less than usual  
GHQ 4 Capable of making decisions More so than usual  Same as usual Less so than usual  Much less capable 
GHQ 5 Constantly under strain Not at all No more than usual  Rather more than usual  Much more than usual 
GHQ 6 Problem overcoming difficulties Not at all No more than usual  Rather more than usual  Much more than usual 
GHQ 7 Enjoy day-to-day activities More so than usual  Same as usual Less so than usual  Much less than usual  
GHQ 8 Ability to face problems More so than usual  Same as usual Less able than usual  Much less able 
GHQ 9 Unhappy or depressed Not at all No more than usual  Rather more than usual  Much more than usual 
GHQ 10 Losing confidence Not at all No more than usual  Rather more than usual  Much more than usual 
GHQ 11 Believe worthless Not at all No more than usual  Rather more than usual  Much more than usual 









TABLE C.2: FACTOR LOADINGS OF MENTAL HEALTH MEASURES 
Mental health measures 
Factor loadings  Signal 
(1) (2) 
GHQ 1 Concentration  1.0000 0.1743 
GHQ 2 Loss of sleep 1.6961 0.3707 
GHQ 3 Playing a useful role 1.0143 0.2172 
GHQ 4 Capable of making decisions 0.8311 0.1553 
GHQ 5 Constantly under strain 1.7365 0.3308 
GHQ 6 Problem overcoming difficulties 1.7979 0.2648 
GHQ 7 Enjoy day-to-day activities 1.1563 0.1753 
GHQ 8 Ability to face problems 0.9597 0.1526 
GHQ 9 Unhappy or depressed 2.1819 0.2403 
GHQ 10 Losing confidence 2.0926 0.2491 
GHQ 11 Believe worthless 1.7325 0.2433 













TABLE C.3: BALANCE TESTS: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TIMING OF UC ROLL-OUT AND LOCAL AUTHORITY DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Dep. Var: UC roll-out date (month and year) 
Population (log, 1000 persons) -0.2673        -0.5912 
 (1.0918)        (1.2703) 
Share of white population (%)  0.0534       0.0475 
  (0.0555)       (0.0911) 
Share of working-age population aged 16-64 (%)   -0.0646      -0.4029 
   (0.2202)      (0.5264) 
Share of being married for those aged 16 and over (%)    -0.0841     -0.3110 
    (0.1113)     (0.3014) 
Share of economically active population aged 16-74 (%)     -0.3430    -0.3041 
     (0.3148)    (0.5443) 
Share of population aged 16-74 with a full-time job (%)      -0.1805   0.1008 
      (0.2525)   (0.3744) 
Share of households with unshared dwelling (%)       4.2876  9.1381 
       (6.8480)  (11.4806) 
Share of population with very good health (%)        -0.3676 -0.2624 
        (0.3379) (0.3855) 
p-value for joint significance of covariates          0.6446 
R-squared 0.0002 0.0024 0.0002 0.0015 0.0031 0.0013 0.0010 0.0031 0.0159 
Observations  382  382  382  382  382  382  382  382  382 
Notes: Observations are measured at the local authority district level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 







TABLE C.4: EFFECT OF BECOMING UNEMPLOYMENT AND CLAIMING UC VS 
LEGACY ON POOR MENTAL HEALTH 












Individual fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Local authority district fixed effects Yes 
Observations 199,563 
Unemployed*UC - Unemployed*Legacy 0.2596** 
  (0.1205) 
Notes. Sample is restricted to observations aged 18-60. This sample includes all 
unemployed individuals regardless of whether they are claiming any benefits. 
Standard errors are clustered at the local authority district level. Controls include 
age, age squared, a dummy for prior mental disorder, and dummies for 
educational levels (higher degree, first degree, higher diploma, A-level, and 
GCSE/0-level), and dummies for having a child and being married.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 










TABLE C.5: EFFECT OF BECOMING UNEMPLOYMENT AND CLAIMING UC ON 
POOR MENTAL HEALTH (FULL VERSION OF COLUMN 1, TABLE 3.2) 











Age squared -0.000*** 
 (0.000) 
Prior mental disorder 0.435*** 
 (0.028) 
Higher degree -0.036 
 (0.041) 
First degree -0.045 
 (0.032) 
Higher diploma  0.021 
 (0.041) 
A level  -0.003 
 (0.031) 
GCSE/O level -0.000 
 (0.041) 
Having a child  -0.019* 
 (0.009) 




Individual fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Local authority district fixed effects Yes 
Observations 194,428 
Number of individuals 48,945 
R-squared 0.016 
Notes: Sample is restricted to observations aged 18-60. Standard errors are 
clustered at the local authority district level. Controls include age, age squared, a 
dummy for prior mental disorder, and dummies for educational levels (higher 
degree, first degree, higher diploma, A-level, and GCSE/0-level), and dummies 
for having a child and being married.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 









TABLE C.6: EFFECT OF BECOMING UNEMPLOYMENT  
AND CLAIMING UC ON POOR MENTAL HEALTH: ROBUSTNESS  
(RESTRICTED SAMPLE OF WAVES 4-9) 














Individual fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Local authority district fixed effects Yes 
Observations 116,289 
Notes. Sample is restricted to observations aged 18-60 of waves 4-9. Standard 
errors are clustered at the local authority district level. Controls include age, 
age squared, a dummy for prior mental disorder, and dummies for educational 
levels (higher degree, first degree, higher diploma, A-level, and GCSE/0-
level), and dummies for having a child and being married.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 













TABLE C.7: EFFECTS OF BECOMING UNEMPLOYMENT AND CLAIMING UC 
ON FUTURE EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
 (1) (2) 
  Employed Unemployed 
Unemployed -0.008 -0.055*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) 
UC 0.011 -0.026* 
 (0.023) (0.014) 
Legacy -0.022*** 0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Unemployed*UC 0.110 -0.119* 
 (0.068) (0.063) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Local authority district fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 150,093 150,093 
Notes. Dependent variables are measured at the year t+1. Sample is restricted 
to observations aged 18-60. Standard errors are clustered at the local authority 
district level. Controls include age, age squared, a dummy for prior mental 
disorder, and dummies for educational levels (higher degree, first degree, higher 
diploma, A-level, and GCSE/0-level), and dummies for having a child and 
being married.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 










Appendix C1: Factor analysis 
In this section, we show how we perform our factor analysis for the mental health mea- 
surement, including 12 components of mental health (concentration; loss of sleep; playing a 
useful role; being capable of making decisions; constantly under strain; problem overcoming 
difficulties; enjoy day-to-day activities; ability to face problems; unhappy or depressed; losing 
confidence; believe worthless; and general happiness).  
We particular estimate the following equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑐 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛽𝑐𝛾𝑖𝑐 + 𝑒𝑖𝑐                                                     (C. 1). 
𝑌𝑖𝑐 is the 𝑐
th component of the mental health of individual 𝑖 (𝑐 =  1, . . . , 12). 𝛼𝑐 is the intercept 
of and 𝛽𝑐 is a factor loading specific for mental health component 𝑐. 𝑒𝑖𝑐 is the measure-specific 
measurement error which has mean zero and is assumed to be uncorrelated with 𝛾𝑖𝑐  and also 
independently distributed across individuals and mental health components. Finally, 𝛾𝑖𝑐  is the 
latent factor for mental health-specific component 𝑐 which can be identified and extracted by 









Appendix C2: Separate effects of entering unemployment and claiming UC versus legacy 
on mental health 
A small proportion of the UKHLS data reported being unemployed but were not claiming UC 
or legacy benefits. This can occur if unemployed individuals were ineligible for benefits, for 
example if the had savings above the threshold, or their household income was too high (in the 
case of UC). Our main analysis excluded these individuals, who represent a small number of 
unemployed individuals. We now include them in the sample in order to analyse the separate 
roles of legacy versus UC in mitigating any negative mental health effect of becoming 
unemployed. 
Equation (3.1) becomes: 
𝑌𝑖𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼0
′ + 𝛼1
′ 𝑈𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼2
′ 𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼3
′ 𝐿𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼4
′ 𝑈𝑖𝑑𝑡 × 𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼5
′ 𝑈𝑖𝑑𝑡 × 𝐿𝑖𝑑𝑡
+ 𝜶6
′ 𝑿𝑖𝑑𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜇𝑑 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑡                                                                        (C. 2).
 
Similarly to Equation (3.1), 𝑈𝑖𝑑𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is 
unemployed, 𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual claims UC and 𝐿𝑖𝑑𝑡 is 
a dummy variable indicating whether the individual claims one of the legacy benefits. 𝜇𝑖, 𝜇𝑑 
and 𝜇𝑡 are fixed effects for the individual, local authority district and year, respectively. 𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑡 is 
an error term. 
The coefficients 𝛼4
′  and 𝛼5
′  indicates how claiming for UC and legacy respectively 
mitigates or exacerbates the poor mental health effect of becoming unemployed. The parameter 
of interest is the difference between the legacy and UC interaction terms, the coefficient gap 
𝛼4
′ − 𝛼5




Table C.4 reports the regression results for Equation (C.2). An individual unemployed 
but not claiming UC or legacy has poorer mental health by 22% of a standard deviation. 
Entering unemployment and claiming for a legacy benefit will mitigate this effect by nearly 5% 
of a standard deviation (the interaction between unemployed and legacy) whilst entering 
unemployment and claiming UC exacerbates the effect by 21% of a standard deviation. In all 
the difference of claiming UC versus legacy in mitigating the mental health effects of 
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